Taken from “Warships and Sea Battles of World War I” (Bernard
Fitzsimons, Ed. London: BPC Publishing Ltd. 1973. ISBN 0-517-130912).

Edward Wittenberg
ewitten507@aol.com

Correcting the failures

Some, but not all, of the failures on the British side were
recognized and attempts were made to correct them. The Tiger and the
other battle-cruisers were urged to improve their gunnery, which to
Jellicoe had always been suspect, and the Admiralty accelerated its
programme of installing director firing systems in all ships.

The battle orders were reworded so that Pelly’s mistake regarding
fire concentration could be avoided in the future and the signalling
system was improved by the installation on each ship of an auxiliary
wireless set and by further additions to the signal book which would
clarify the sort of instructions which Beatty had so desperately wished
to send when his flagship fell out of line.

The other innovation which Churchill and Fisher pressed for, the
transfer of the battle-cruisers to the Humber and the Grand Fleet
battleships to Rosyth, was abandoned after vigorous protests from both
Jellicoe and Beatty. For although this move would put both forces in a
better intercepting position, these two bases did not compare with Scapa
as an anchorage or a practice area, were navigationally unsuitable and
could easily be mined. In the field of tactics the British did not seek
for, or perhaps did not think of, any answers to the threat posed by
German mines and submarines during the action. Yet without such
answers and in view of the Grand Fleet’s super-sensitiveness to such
attacks, their only reply remained that of swinging away, disengaging,
temporarily at least, from the battle. Temporary disengagements,
however, could swiftly develop into more permanent ones if great care
were not taken.

Finally, the Dogger Bank action tended to confirm the opinion of
Fisher, Beatty and perhaps others that the battle-cruisers themselves
‘will finish the job’. This was a rather natural thing to say in view of
their performance here and earlier at the Falklands, but in both battles
the British warships had possessed a large numerical superiority and
the enemy had retreated with- out engaging in a ‘toe-to-toe’ boxing
match. In other words, although the Lion indeed took some heavy
punishment, the British battle-cruisers were not yet proven in full
battle, especially in their defence capabilities. In particular the
weaknesses of Beatty’s ships to plunging shells and to the possibility of
the being ignited by flashes in the turrets had not shown itself, as it
had done in the case of the Seydlitz, where the Germans took the
necessary corrective action.

The battle of the Dogger Bank had seen the British and German
battle-cruisers engage each other and the weaker force once again
evade the stronger. In that it revealed where command of the sea lay,
the action justified the eulogising of the British press. But it also
produced evidence of serious weaknesses on both sides. Whether this
would be enough to tilt the balance of power in the North Sea in the
future was another question.

Taken from “Warships and Sea Battles of World War I” (Bernard
Fitzsimons, Ed. London: BPC Publishing Ltd. 1973. ISBN 0-517-130912).

Edward Wittenberg
ewitten507@aol.com

Misunderstanding or tragedy?

But if this victory appeared decisive to the British press, it was
not so obvious to the professional critics. Beatty was unanimously
praised for his part and Fisher’s only quibble with him was that the
battle-cruisers had carried enough fuel for 3,000 miles instead of the
probable 500 miles, and therefore reduced their speed by a knot or two.
The actions of the other officers, however, were not so well received,
and with some reason. Keyes was later to admit that ‘the spectacle of
Moore and Co. yapping around the poor tortured Blucher, with beaten
ships in sight to be sunk, is one of the most distressing episodes of the
war’. Like everyone else, he saw the lucky escape of the German
battle-cruisers, due to a simple misunderstanding, as a tragedy for the
Royal Navy.

Fisher criticised Moore’s decision to give up the chase, calling it
‘despicable’ and ‘absolutely incomprehensible’. While sympathising with
Moore’s confusion and bewilderment at Beatty’s signals from the crippled
Lion, one is forced to conclude that he did not show any of the
initiative necessary in such tense encounters. Before the Lion was
knocked out of the battle, Beatty had clearly shown that his primary
concern was to catch the main body of Hipper’s force and not just to
finish off the already doomed Blucher. With the advantage in numbers,
armament and speed the British had a unique chance to destroy all of
the German battle-cruisers, but Moore had let the opportunity slip.
Churchill and Fisher shortly sent him away to command a cruiser
squadron in the Canary Islands region.

Moore’s attitude was symptomatic of the rigid adherence to orders
which characterized the Royal Navy’s outlook at that time. Initiative and
independent judgement were not encouraged. Fisher might fume that ‘in
war the first principle is to disobey orders. Any fool can obey orders!’,
but he was hardly renowned for his tolerance when subordinates
ventured to cross his opinions and commands.

There was also a failure on board the Lion to communicate
Beatty’s wishes exactly. The order to engage the enemy’s rear was both
unnecessary and confusing, and wag in any case mixed up with the
flags of his previous direction. Without this ambiguous signal Moore
would have continued to fire away at the Seydlitz and Derfflinger, and
perhaps this was the reason why Beatty was not very eager to chastise
his Second-in-Command afterwards. But it is worth remembering that
Seymour, Beatty’s Flag Lieutenant, had had no specialist training in
signals, and had sent unclear messages during the Scarborough Raid
action.

Probably Captain Pelly of the Tiger was the person who came in
for most criticism, especially from Fisher, who thought that his failure
to engage the Moltke was ‘inexcusable’, and that he was a ‘poltroon’ for
not charging after the enemy when the Lion sheered out of line. The
first point is worth examining. The official naval historian is to some
extent correct in following Fisher and pointing out that ‘the master
principle was that no ship should be left unfired upon’, but there is
another side to the matter. Pelly’s information regarding the position of
the Indomitable was in fact incorrect but his tactics were right. After
all, the leading three German battle-cruisers continued to concentrate
upon the Lion (though the Tiger was also engaged and suffered six
hits) and achieved great effect. Crippling the enemy’s leading had been,
and still remained, a major stepping-stone on the path to winning the
battle, and the official historian was forced to admit that the German
firing policy ‘was all that the advocates of concentration on the van
could wish’.

Finally, and perhaps more important still, the fuss over Pelly’s
decision tended to obscure the much more vital fact that the British
standards of shooting were rather poor. Here indeed could the Tiger
feel somewhat ashamed, for despite being the only British battle-cruiser
equipped with a director fire-control system she had not registered a
single hit. The Southampton, as mentioned earlier, had seen her shots
regularly land some 3,000 yards over the German ships. The Tiger was
in fact a special case, with a gunnery lieutenant who was ‘villainously
bad’ (Fisher) and a large number of recovered deserters among the
crew. Moreover, being a relatively new ship, she had not fired at a
moving target!

Nevertheless she serves as a symbol for the gunnery standards of
the British battle-cruisers, which, even allowing for the vast clouds of
smoke often obscuring the view, was very poor when compared with that
of their opponents. Apart from the Blucher and the Kolberg, which
suffered at the hands of Aurora in the first encounter, the only hits
made upon the German ships during the entire battle were the two on
Seydlitz and the one on the Derfflinger. In contrast the Lion received
16 hits while the Tiger was hit six times. Had the German shells been
more effective, the battle of the Dogger Bank might have had a different
ending, the British also lacked a really good armour-piercing shell.

Taken from “Warships and Sea Battles of World War I” (Bernard
Fitzsimons, Ed. London: BPC Publishing Ltd. 1973. ISBN 0-517-130912).

Edward Wittenberg
ewitten507@aol.com

British gunnery hampered

Nevertheless, the British gunnery was greatly hampered by smoke
drifting from Tyrwhitt’s squadron which had moved to the north-east.
The Tiger, a newly commissioned ship with an inefficient gunnery
officer, spotted Lion’s shells as her own in consequence of the smoke
and did not realise that she was in fact firing 3,000 yards over
Seydlitz. On the other side, however, the more efficient German gunners
were making themselves felt on board the Lion. Shortly before l 000
hours she was hit on the roof of her foremost turret and one of the
guns was disabled. A few minutes later an 11-inch shell from the
Seydlitz pierced the Lion’s armour, flooding the engineer’s workshop
and putting two dynamos, the after fire control and the secondary
armament circuits out of action.

At 1018 hours the Derfflinger, which was on fire herself from one
of Princess Royal’s shells, managed to land two 12-inch shells on
Beatty’s flagship. One of these flooded the port bunkers, the other
flooded the torpedo fiat and adjacent compartment. The Lion, with speed
gradually falling, was by then zig-zagging desperately while Beatty still
stood on the open bridge with his staff, all drenched by the
‘near-misses’.

As the German battle-cruisers continued to pour shells at the
Lion, the battered Blucher was burning fiercely and dropping even
further behind. At 1048 hours she sheered off to port, apparently out of
control, and came under a concentrated fire from the Harwich flotillas
and the Indomitable, which had at last caught up with the action. The
Blucher, to all eyes, was obviously finished.

Beatty’s overriding concern, however, was to catch the rest; of
Hipper’s squadron. The prospects for this looked bright with the slower
German battle-cruisers still over 100 miles from Heligoland and many
hours of daylight left, but a whole series of incidents altered the course
of the battle. The Lion, still under an intense bombardment, was hit at
about 1052 hours by a shell which penetrated the boiler-rooms and
flooded the feed tank, stopped the port engine and reduced speed to 15
knots. Moreover, as the ship listed 10 degrees to port, the remaining
dynamo suddenly failed and cut off lighting and power. Most important
of all was the fact that Beatty could henceforward only signal with
flags, since the wireless and signal lights were also put out of order.
Falling out of line, Beatty was forced to watch as the Tiger, Princess
Royal and New Zealand rushed past and Rear-Admiral Moore was left
with the command.

It was at this point that Beatty and others on board the Lion
thought they saw submarines on the starboard bow. In fact the nearest
German submarines were many miles away, but Beatty was not to know
that and anticipated a submarine trap. He therefore signalled for a
sharp turn to port, which would take Moore’s vessels away from the
danger – a manoeuvre which enabled the Indomitable, by cutting the
corner, to catch up with the squadron again. Since this new course also
took the British battle-cruisers away from Hipper’s at almost right
angles it meant that they would later have to cross the enemy’s wake
and run the risk of mines. As it happened the German ships carried no
mines on this occasion, but nevertheless Beatty soon changed his mind
and modified his ships’ course to the north-east.

This was not a great modification, however, and it carried Moore’s
vessels more towards the battered Blucher than towards the rest of
Hipper’s battle-cruisers just when they were beginning to turn back in
a gesture to help the Blucher, and their destroyers were rushing ahead
to launch torpedo attacks against the British squadron as it made its
swing to the north-east. With the distance between the two forces
rapidly widening, Hipper seized this chance to extricate the rest of his
force and ordered a resumption of the south-easterly course. Since
Seydlitz’s after turrets were out of action and her ammunition supplies
were running short, it would have been an expensive gesture in any
case to have tried to recover the shattered wreck of the Blucher.

This temporary breathing-space afforded to the German squadron
was now prolonged by confused communications on the British side.
Beatty, breathing fire at his ship’s disablement, was determined to make
it quite clear to Moore that Hipper’s main force was to be destroyed and
ordered the flag signal ‘Attack the rear of the enemy’. In confused
circumstances such as these this message was not the clearest
expression of the Admiral’s intentions, but it was made even less clear
when the flags for this signal were hauled down together with those for
the previous signal ‘Course NE’ thus combining two separate messages
with one executive order. As a result, the British battle-cruisers read
the message as ‘Attack the rear of the enemy, bearing NE’, which was
where the crippled Blucher lay. Moore, who was unaware of the reported
submarine threat and thought that the earlier turns to port had been to
get nearer to the Blucher, became convinced that this was Beatty’s
intention when he saw the German vessel bearing to the north-east. With
no thoughts of questioning such orders, the four battle-cruisers gave
up the pursuit of Hipper’s force and turned towards the Blucher.

Beatty had indeed tried to make his intentions clearer by later
hoisting Nelson’s famous signal ‘Engage the enemy more closely’ and
incidentally but perhaps symbolically found that this had been replaced
in the signal book by the less inspiring phrase ‘Keep nearer to the
enemy’. In any case the fast-disappearing British battle-cruisers could
no longer read the Lion’s signals. Shortly afterwards, being eager to
discover what was really happening and having ascertained that
immediate repairs to his ship were impossible, Beatty transferred to the
nearest destroyer, the Attack, and set off in pursuit. The Lion
meanwhile limped slowly away towards the north-west.

Over the horizon to the south-east the Blucher was suffering
in isolation as more and more British ships closed in upon her and as
the rest of Hipper’s force steamed hurriedly towards Wilhelmshaven.
Blucher continued to fight stubbornly against the overwhelming odds.
By this time she was on fire in many places and only two of her main
guns were in action, trying to keep her enemies at bay. By 1120 hours
the Arethusa and her ‘M’ class destroyers were also in the fray and the
Meteor went in close to launch torpedoes. She was then suddenly hit by
an 8.2-inch shell, which burst in the front boiler-room and put her out
of action. Blucher was still a danger to those impetuous enough to get
too close to her.

The other three ‘M’ class destroyers and the Arethusa were
by now closing in and firing torpedoes. Tyrwhitt steered his cruiser to
within 2,500 yards of the Blucher, blasting away at her continuously
with Arethusa’s 6-inch guns and finally let fly with two torpedoes, both
of which hit. Even now the Blucher was not only firing her guns at the
Arethusa but also launching torpedoes at the British battle-cruisers,
which were contributing to the destruction. Overhead the whole scene
was being watched by the helpless crew of a Zeppelin, who could do
nothing other than chronicle Blucher’s end.

This came shortly after noon, at about 1210 hours. Hit by seven
torpedoes and over 70 shells, Blucher had been a blazing wreck long
before that and had her last gun put out of order about 1145 hours.
Tyrwhitt again ordered the Arethusa to close the German ship but this
time only to rescue the survivors, who cheered at her coming. Turning
over completely, Blucher lay bottom upwards for a few minutes while
Arethusa’s small boats picked up the German seamen and then suddenly
she disappeared. The Arethusa and her destroyers managed to rescue
260 of these gallant men, who had been under more or less continuous
fire for three hours, before a German seaplane arrived and
unfortunately forced an end to this rescue operation by bombing the
small boats. In fact the pilot, an inexperienced flyer, was trying to
attack the destroyers, but his action was later criticised by the German
admiralty.

Moore’s battle-cruisers had turned north a short while before. The
Rear-Admiral knew that his squadron would probably be in sight of
Heligoland before they could catch up with Hipper again and that the
risks were therefore too great. Already Keyes had reported that the
High Seas Fleet was on the move. Moreover Moore knew nothing about
the condition of the Lion after seeing her limp away to the north-west
and greatly feared for her safety.

At 1220 hours they met the destroyer Attack coming south-wards
with Beatty on board. Hastily transferring his flag to the Princess
Royal, the Admiral rushed aboard the battle-cruiser and learnt for
himself the sad news. Bitterly disappointed, he impetuously signalled for
an immediate about-turn and set off after Hipper. After further enquiry,
however, he also realised that their task was by then impossible. Hipper
had slipped out of his net for the second time within six weeks and
could not be caught. It was, as his Flag Lieutenant Seymour put it, ‘like
trying to win the Derby after falling at Tattenham Corner’. The British
battle-cruisers therefore turned to find the Lion and to escort her
home.

The Lion had in fact to be towed to Rosyth. By 1530 hours with
her speed below 8 knots, she was forced to take a towline from the
Indomitable. Surrounded by a large force of destroyers and cruisers,
with the battle-cruisers and the Grand Fleet battleships providing a
more distant cover in case of a surprise German attack, these two
exposed vessels slowly edged their way home all that day and the next.
Early on January 26 the Lion, whose engines had by then completely
failed, was anchored in the Forth. On the other side of the North Sea,
with ideas of surprise attacks on the Grand Fleet very far from their
minds, Hipper’s very relieved squadron had been met at about 1430
hours on the 24th and escorted back to the Jade estuary.

On the face of it, the battle of the Dogger Bank was a clear-cut
British victory. They had chased Hipper’s squadron from the seas and
destroyed one of his larger vessels without losing so much as a
destroyer themselves. The Seydlitz had also been seriously damaged,
while both the Derfflinger and the Kolberg, suffered to some extent.
Against this, the Lion was to stay out of action for four months while
the Tiger had trifling damages. The destroyer Meteor had been damaged
by the Blucher, and the Aurora only scratched by the Kolberg. The
Germans lost almost 1,000 men killed, but fatal casualties on the British
side totalled only 15.

Taken from “Warships and Sea Battles of World War I” (Bernard
Fitzsimons, Ed. London: BPC Publishing Ltd. 1973. ISBN 0-517-130912).

Edward Wittenberg
ewitten507@aol.com

Closing at 28 knots

Settling down to a steady pursuit and increasing speed, Beatty sent the
fast ‘M’ class destroyers ahead to report on the exact strength of his
opponent. By 0845 hours, despite the shelling which the destroyers
encountered as they closed to within 9.000 yards of the Blucher, the
composition of the German force was clear. It was also clear by then
that Beatty’s ships had the edge as regards speed and were gradually
closing up to the German battle-cruisers. The British ships reached 25
knots. increased to 26 and then met Beatty’s demand for 27 knots,
although the Indomitable slowly began to be outpaced. Beatty afterwards
stated that at one point his ships had reached the almost incredible
speed of 28.5 knots, and indeed even the ‘M’ class destroyers found it
hard work later to move ahead of the battle-cruisers.

As a result of these high speeds the Lion drew to within 20,000
yards of the Blucher shortly after 0900 hours and then commenced
firing at a range hitherto had been considered impossible; (the
experimental maximum in 1914 had been 16,000 yards). Shortly afterwards
the Tiger and Princess Royal were also able to open fire on the Blucher,
which began to suffer from this concentrated fire. Soon the German
battle-cruisers, echeloned to enable all four of them to return the fire
from their starboard side, were answering vigorously although greatly
inconvenienced by the smoke from the English destroyers to the
north-east.

Naturally enough the rearmost German and the foremost English
vessels attracted the most attention and suffered as a consequence. The
Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal, swinging slightly to starboard, brought
their after turrets into action and began to damage the Blucher
seriously with regular salvoes. At the third salvo the German vessel was
hit on the water-line and had her speed reduced; and at the fourth,
explosions shattered the after superstructure and two turrets, killing or
injuring over 200 sailors. The Lion, being the nearest English ship and
the one surrounded by least smoke, also took punishment. At 0928 hours
she received a hit on her water-line, which penetrated the bunkers.
Hammocks, mess-stools and anything else available were quickly used to
make good the damage and the Lion steamed ahead unhindered, but
Beatty was getting worried about the Germans’ concentration on his
ship. At 0935 hours therefore, seeing that the New Zealand had come
within range of the Blucher and was engaging her, Beatty gave the
order to fire at opposite numbers.

Consequently, while the New Zealand continued to pound away at
the Blucher, the Lion shifted her fire to Hipper’s flagship Seydlitz and
the third English vessel, Princess Royal, turned upon the third German
battle-cruiser, the Derfflinger. However, the commander of the Tiger,
Captain Pelly, who had begun to direct his ship’s fire upon the Seydlitz
a few minutes earlier, continued to shoot at this target in the belief
that Indomitable was by then engaging Blucher. Thinking that the rear
three ships of the opposing battle-lines were respectively firing at each
other, Pelly felt that his task was to assist the Lion in crippling the
German flagship. Though sound enough in theory this idea failed in
practice because the Indomitable was still not within reach of the
Blucher. This meant that with the existing dispositions the second
German battle-cruiser, Moltke, was able to lob salvo after salvo
undisturbed at Lion.

Beatty had therefore failed to divert any of the German fire from
himself and all three battle-cruisers continued to shoot at his flagship.
At first this did not appear to be so serious a matter since it was the
English ships who were handing out the punishment. The Lion’s salvoes
had found Seydlitz almost at once, from a range of some 17,500 yards,
and a 13.5-inch shell penetrated the working chamber of the rearmost
turret. The flames roared downwards threatening the turret magazine
and then along towards the magazine of the adjacent turret. The
ammunition in transit exploded and killed 159 men, put both after
turrets out of action and sent flames shooting up high above the ship.
Only the action of the executive officer, who promptly flooded both
magazines, avoided the explosion of the stored ammunition and the
probable destruction of the battle-cruiser. Moreover, far at the rear of
the German line, Blucher was also taking a battering and slowly
dropping further back.

Taken from “Warships and Sea Battles of World War I” (Bernard
Fitzsimons, Ed. London: BPC Publishing Ltd. 1973. ISBN 0-517-130912).

Edward Wittenberg
ewitten507@aol.com

Strict radio silence

Although the Admiralty was almost certain that only the German
battle-cruisers would come out and that their cartographical calculations
were correct, they were still not inclined to take chances. The seven
pre-dreadnought battleships of Vice-Admiral Bradford’s 3rd Battle
Squadron, also based on Rosyth, accompanied by Rear-Admiral
Pakenham’s 3rd Cruiser Squadron, were ordered to a position about 40
miles north-west of Beatty, to intercept Hipper if he came by a more
northerly route or to support the British battle-cruisers if they got into
trouble. Much further south, Commodore Keyes was moving from Harwich
to the Heligoland Bight in the hope of intercepting and torpedoing any
German vessels with his “Overseas” squadron of Firedrake, Lurcher and
four submarines.

Finally, Admiral Jellicoe, resting at Scapa Flow with the main
battleship force of the Grand Fleet, cleared harbour at 2100 hours on
the 23rd with three battleship squadrons, covered by three cruiser
squadrons and 28 destroyers. Further ahead of him ranged Rear-Admiral
Napier’s 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron. These forces, while covering the
Scottish coast in the early stages of their cruise, were to sweep down
to the rendezvous with Bradford’s vessels by mid-morning.

During the night the various squadrons picked their way between
the minefields (Beatty’s force actually dashing through an area which
was reportedly mined) and approached the Dogger Bank from different
directions. The British ships kept a strict radio silence while the
occasional German wireless traffic intercepted by the D/F stations
continued to confirm the Admiralty’s belief that something was afoot on
the German side. The weather was calm and the sea still. Apart from
Tyrwhitt’s forces, which were a little delayed by fog at Harwich, all the
British ships appeared to be moving according to schedule and Churchill
was thrilled with the idea of “a beast of prey moving stealthily forward
hour by hour into the trap”.

At 0700 hours on the 24th Beatty, with Goodenough’s cruisers
steaming parallel on his port beam, reached the rendezvous area. Ten
minutes later, with the dawn breaking to give almost perfect visibility,
the Arethusa with seven new ‘M’ class destroyers of the Harwich force
were sighted straight ahead. The Aurora, Undaunted and the rest of the
destroyers were then some 13 miles astern, delayed because of the early
fog.

It was this latter group, still south of the rendezvous point,
which first clashed with Hipper’s forces. The Aurora leading the 1st
Destroyer Flotilla, sighted a three-funnelled cruiser and four destroyers
on her starboard bow shortly after 0700 hours and moved closer to
challenge. expecting to meet up with Tyrwhitt’s flotilla again. The
cruiser was, in fact, the Kolberg, which was guarding the port flank of
Hipper’s battle-cruisers, then steaming around the north side of the
Dogger Bank. Opening fire on the Aurora at 0715 hours the Kolberg
managed to get in three quick hits although they did little damage.
Recovering from this surprise, the Aurora began to return the fire and
soon scored a hit on the Kolberg’s forebridge, which killed two men and
forced her to turn away. The Aurora, proceeding north-eastwards again
and joined by Undaunted’s flotilla, soon sighted more German warships
to starboard and then, at about 0730 hours, saw the Southampton’s
shape at the head of Goodenough’s squadron, looming out of the dusk to
the north. Some five miles behind the Southampton steamed Beatty’s five
battle-cruisers.

Confident. that he was about to surprise a weaker enemy, Beatty
had ordered his battle-cruisers to steer SSE towards the sounds and
flashes of the guns and to increase speed to 22 knots, while sending
the cruisers on ahead. Hipper, on the other hand, had not expected an
immediate encounter and therefore had to act warily in case he came up
against the Grand Fleet or a part of it. The engagement with the Aurora
to the westward was soon followed by sightings of more destroyers and
Goodenough’s squadron, and then by the sight of heavy smoke further
north. Although not greatly increasing his speed, Hipper therefore
ordered an almost complete turn so that his forces were steaming
south-eastwards by 0740 hours. By that time the heavy smoke to the
north-west had resolved itself into the five British battle-cruisers,
which were steadily working themselves up to full speed.

Hipper, suddenly aware of his critical position 170 miles from
Heligoland without any hope of support from the High Seas Fleet,
ordered his destroyers to push on ahead and his main force to increase
speed to 23 knots, which was Blucher’s maximum. The German
battle-cruiser squadron then steered south-easterly in line ahead
formation, led by Seydlitz with Moltke, Derfflinger and Blucher following
in that order. Beatty, who had originally hoped to get to the Germans’
leeward (the port side, in this instance) before engaging and thus avoid
his own smoke as well as eventually cutting off the Germans from their
base, was forced by Hipper’s manoeuvre to follow on the starboard and
fear of mines being dropped from the enemy’s stern, and of loss of time,
now prevented his battle-cruisers from switching over to port.

As the chase developed, the respective admiralties were being
acquainted with the situation. Churchill, Fisher, Wilson and Oliver,
gathered together in the War Room of the Admiralty, could do nothing
but wait and hope as confused messages came flooding in. In the middle
of the North Sea and about 140 miles NNW of the action, Jellicoe’s great
fleet of ships swung slightly more to starboard to intercept if the
German battle-cruisers turned north. Further south, Vice-Admiral
Bradford’s force, cruising north of the Dogger Bank and joined by the
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, was ordered to steer eastwards to cut off
Hipper if he fled to the north-east. The German admiralty, which first
received the news of Seydlitz’s sighting at about 0750 hours, ordered all
ships at Wilhelmshaven to get up steam and to assemble in the Schillig
Roads, but having left it so late it would be many hours before they
could join in the battle.

While browsing through the stacks at my local library this summer, I
came across a work entitled “Warships and Sea Battles of World War I”
(Bernard Fitzsimons, Ed. London: BPC Publishing Ltd. 1973. ISBN 0-517-
130912). Last week, I checked it out again to review certain sections
concerning the German U-boat effort. While reading those sections, I
happened to re-read the section by Patrick Kennedy which deals with
the Battle of Dogger Bank. Since I’ve posted messages dealing with
Tsushima, Coronel and the Falklands, and Jutland, this section seemed to
fit in admirably. As always, questions and comments are welcome.
Take care, Ed.

Edward Wittenberg
ewitten507@aol.com

Dogger Bank: Clash of the Battle Cruisers

January 24, 1915 saw the largest naval clash of the
war up to that date: four German battle-cruisers
pitted against five British ones. The conflict was
confused, and poor British signalling was mainly
responsible for the major elements of the German
squadron slipping away, leaving only the hybrid
battle-cruiser Blucher to be finally crushed by the
storm of British fire. In the battle, however, points of
enormous importance for future naval operations had
become apparent. Signalling had to be improved,
gunnery, in the British vessels particularly, needed
drastic attention, armour protection for the ships’
vitals needed strengthening and a way of stopping
flash travelling down to the magazines needed
devising. These lessons were apparent to both
admiralties, but whether or not the lessons had been
learnt fully would have to wait till the next clash.

Shortly before noon on January 23, 1915, Winston Churchill
returned to his room at the Admiralty after a long talk with Admiral
Fisher, who was laid up in bed with a cold. Hardly had he sat down,
Churchill recounts, when Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson strode hurriedly into
the room with a ‘glow in his eye’ and baldly announced: ~First Lord,
those fellows are coming out again.’ The fellows referred to were of
course the Germans, and the decisions and orders which followed from
this announcement were to lead to the greatest clash in the North Sea
since the war began.

The movements had begun only a short while earlier at 1025 hours
that same morning when Rear-Admiral Hipper, resting with his
battle-cruisers off Wilhelmshaven, received orders to take them, together
with some cruisers and destroyers, and to sweep into the Dogger Bank
area that night. The German intentions were not very clear but it was
hoped to disrupt the British fishing fleet there and to sink a few of
their escorts. Moreover, the report of British scouting operations in that
area, brought in by a German seaplane on the 19th, had aroused
curiosity at the German admiralty and also the anticipation that some
light forces of the British might be caught unawares by a swift.
one-day reconnaissance mission from Wilhelmshaven. Such a sweep was
in any case well in line with the Kaiser’s recent decision that the
battle-cruisers could sortie to harass the British, although a major fleet
action was still considered to be undesirable.

It was the efficiency of its Intelligence services which enabled the
Royal Navy to learn so very quickly about the planned German operation
and to take steps to meet. it. The chance recovery by the Russians in
August 1914 of the German navy’s cipher signal books and squared
reference charts from the wrecked cruiser Magdeburg had been a boon
to the British deciphering team, who, from then on, were able to decode
the Germans’ intercepted wireless messages. In addition, the
establishment of radio direction-finder stations along the east coast of
England enabled the Admiralty to pinpoint the position of German
vessels when they used their radios. Thus Churchill had news of the
German plans and the probable size of their forces only one hour and a
half after Hipper had received his instructions.

Shortly after Hipper’s ships slid out of the Jade estuary on the
evening of January 23, a variety of British squadrons emerged from
harbour and also proceeded towards the Dogger Bank.

Rear-Admiral Hipper’s force consisted of the 1st and 2nd Scouting
Groups and two flotillas of destroyers. The 1st Scouting Group had to
sail without the Von der Tann, which was in dockyard hands, and
therefore was composed of four battle-cruisers, Seydlitz, Hipper’s
flagship, Moltke, Derfflinger and Blucher. The first three vessels were
similar, each carrying ten 11-inch guns, (the Derfflinger had eight
12-inch guns), adequately armoured and able to steam at about 25/26
knots. The Blucher however was an older, large armoured cruiser rather
than a battle-cruiser. Her armour, main armament and displacement were
consequently all much smaller than that of the rest of her squadron.
Most important of all, her maximum speed was some 2/3 knots less than
theirs and this tended either to slow down the whole squadron when in
action or to cause the Blucher to gradually fall behind. Tactically she
was a liability to the squadron.

The 2nd Scouting Group consisted of’ the four light cruisers
Stralsund, Rostock, Kolberg, and Graudenz, all of which carried twelve
4.1-inch guns. These were accompanied by 18 destroyers.

In numbers the balance of strength clearly lay with the British.
but in gun-power there was less of a discrepancy since the German
11-inch gun was superior to the British 12-inch gun. Hipper’s main
opponents were to be Vice-Admiral Beatty’s powerful battle-cruisers
Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand and Indomitable, all based on
Rosyth. Although the last two ships were smaller and not as well
armoured as their German opposite numbers and the Indomitable,
constructed in 1908. was slightly slower, they both carried eight 12-inch
guns as main armament. Moreover the Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal
were faster than Hipper’s squadron and each carried the powerful
13.5-inch guns, although the British battle-cruisers carried less armour
than Hipper’s three big ships.

Administrative and tactical reasons had caused the British
battle-cruisers to be divided into a fast and a slow division. Thus
Beatty directly controlled the 1st Battle-Cruiser Squadron which
included the Lion (his flagship), Tiger and Princess Royal, while
Rear-Admiral Moore, his Second-in-Command. directed the newly-formed
2nd Battle-Cruiser Squadron, which consisted of the New Zealand
(Moore’s flagship)and Indomitable – though remaining under Beatty’s
control throughout. These ships were accompanied from Rosyth by
Commodore Goodenough’s 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, consisting of
Southampton, Birmingham, Nottingham and Lowestoft, all carrying eight
or nine 6-inch guns.

Other British forces were also on the move on the evening of the
23rd. As soon as the Admiralty had received the news of an imminent
German sweep, Wilson and Vice-Admiral Oliver (the Chief of Admiralty
War Staff) had worked out in Churchill’s office the most likely position
for an interception. With professional expertise they ordered Beatty to
be at a point about 30 miles north of the Dogger Bank at 0700 hours on
the 24th and also ordered Commodore Tyrwhitt with his three light
cruisers Arethusa (his flagship), Aurora and Undaunted, together with
35 destroyers, out of Harwich, to join Beatty there and provide the
escort for the battle-cruisers.

This is truly an arcane question. Do any of you Cold War specialists
out there know where I can find a copy of the 14 April 1950 report
NSC-68? Perhaps a website? I want to see if someone has scanned or
printed it before going to NARA.

Timothy L. Francis
Historian
Naval Historical Center
email address: Francis.Timothy@nhc.navy.mil
voice: (202) 433-6802

The above remarks are my opinions, not those of the U.S. Navy or the
Department of Defense

> ———-
> From: Mike Potter[SMTP:mike.potter@artecon.com]
> Reply To: mahan@microworks.net
> Sent: Friday, January 30, 1998 12:21 PM
> To: mahan@microworks.net
> Subject: Carrier ops
>
> San Diego Union-Tribune reported this morning that USS Independence is
> proceeding to the Persian Gulf (USN’s “Arabian Gulf”) and is expected
> to
> arrive in a about a week.
>
> Carriers/Airwings at Sea:
> USS Nimitz (CVW-9): SOUTHERN WATCH, Arabian Gulf
> USS George Washington (CVW-1): SOUTHERN WATCH, Arabian Gulf
> USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74): JTFEX 98-1, west Atlantic
> USS Independence (CVW-5): west Pacific
>
> Each CVW has about 50 strike-capable aircraft, mostly F-18Cs. F-14Ds
> and
> S-3Bs have ground-attack capability. No word about surface combatants
>

San Diego Union-Tribune reported this morning that USS Independence is
proceeding to the Persian Gulf (USN’s “Arabian Gulf”) and is expected to
arrive in a about a week.

Carriers/Airwings at Sea:
USS Nimitz (CVW-9): SOUTHERN WATCH, Arabian Gulf
USS George Washington (CVW-1): SOUTHERN WATCH, Arabian Gulf
USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74): JTFEX 98-1, west Atlantic
USS Independence (CVW-5): west Pacific

Each CVW has about 50 strike-capable aircraft, mostly F-18Cs. F-14Ds and
S-3Bs have ground-attack capability. No word about surface combatants

Wondered if there was a way to obtain copies of the War College Analyses of
World War 2 battles. They seem to be insightful reading and very helpful to
understand the actions. Can one get them sent?

Tim

Tim Lanzendoerfer | “I have just taken on a great
Amateur Naval Historian | responsibility. I will do my
Email: BWV_Wiesbaden@t-online.de | utmost to meet it” – Nimitz
—————————————————————–
The United States Navy in the Pacific War 1941 – 1945
http://www.microworks.net/pacific
The ships, the men, the battles
—————————————————————–

I received this from a private security firm, the Emergency Response &
Research Institute, Chicago. Al-Quds is a Palestinian paper, I think.
This gives an idea of how Saddam Hussein’s regime might portray possible
air and missile attacks, much of which could be launched from US and
possibly UK ships:

“‘Ali Al-Khalili writes in reference to the slaughter of tourists in
Egypt (at the Luxor temple):
“All the lines have been crossed in the degradation of the Arabs,
their suppression, robbery of their resources, and the attempts to expel
them from history ….
“The Arabs learned on their cut and burnt skin what their role is
… and are trying to exit the dark wells into the light. Washington and
Israel fear this Arab exit, and therefore they choose for each Arab
state a [different] form of disaster that will hit it and sink it ….
“One form [of disaster] for Egypt, and other [forms] for Iraq,
Libya, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and the Sudan, until the end of the
list of the cut and burnt skin. Until when will the planned disasters
continue? ….”
[Source: Al-Quds (Independent Daily), November 20, 1997 – Translated
from Arab sources.]

“[ERRI analysis: This report is one of several Arab writings that we
have reviewed, blaming the U.S. and Israel for the recent massacre in
Luxor, Egypt. Most give the impression that there is an on-going
conspiracy to commit terrorist acts and then blame them on
fundamentalist radical Moslems. It would appear part of a larger
disinformation campaign to discredit the American and Jewish {Israeli}
governments and incite further anger in Arab populations.]”