remove from Mahan list, please

Aplogies to the lists where this is slightly off topic; it is posted for
general information:

The US Navy’s Naval Historical Center Web Site (main site at:

http://history.navy.mil/

)is building a set of pages dealing with the Centennial of the Spanish
American War:

Enter the pages at:

http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/events/spanam/eve-pge.htm

Already on line are photo pages covering the US battleships, the MAINE,
the US Armored cruisers BROOKLYN and NEW YORK, and Spanish battleship
and cruisers. More is planned over the next couple of months, and the
availability of these photos on the internet is a welcome event.

-Brooks A Rowlett

>The last thing I want to do is start a debate on the movie
“Titanic,” which is
>somewhat off-subject and has been lavishly covered in other on-line groups.
>But I cannot let this statement pass without objection. Stoicism
might not be
>a valued virtue in this country in the Age of Oprah, but I do not understand
>why More/Lightoller’s “stiff upper lip” deserves such scorn. As for “real
>history,” the new movie smears real-life characters (notably First Officer
>Murdoch) with vignettes of murder and bribery for which there is no evidence
>(it is so wonderfully easy to libel the dead), while throughout conveying a
>simplistic fairy-tale portrait of evil, repressed bourgeois and
happy, dancing
>proletarians. The movie undeniably has many virtues, and the engine-room
>scenes that you mention are among them.
>Regards, Keith Allen
>keacla1@aol.com
>

Perhaps I put my comments badly. I am not defending the poor chronology of
Cameron’s Titanic (as I noted in an earlier msg Californian isnt mentioned:
quite an ommission) and certainly agree the love story was dopey. (I do not
dismiss the possibility that a teenager might have found a better party in
steerage than in 1st class however. Not real sure I’d dismiss the class
stereotypes either: a modern American would find that aspect of 1912 an
insult to human dignity of unbearable porportion. Our ruling class has
learned much.) As a historian I expect little from the movies in terms of
chronological accuracy and am rarely disapointed.

However, there is an underlying spirit of an event or an epoch that good
fiction can capture even if it takes liberties with “the facts.” Night to
Remember took fewer liberties but I found it fundamentally bogus – something
akin to a bad propaganda movie made with no war on. I do not for ONE minute
dismiss or degrade the extraordinary courage shown by many of the officers
and men of the Titanic. No do I think that the British “stiff upper lip” is
anything to be sneered at. It was one factor among many that built – for
better or worse – a great empire. What I objected to was the earlier movie’s
portrayal of it. Kenneth Moore was given two bit lines that came across as
utterly phony: a parody of the real thing. Cameron’s portrayal of the ship’s
band, regardless of what they REALLy played, is a far better picture of the
the British spirit than anything in NIGHT TO REMEMBER. And, as much as I
hope to never compare it to the real thing, I was most convinced by the
scene at the end where the lifeboat rows about among frozen corpses floating
by the score. That was good filmmaking.

What really struck me about TITANIC was the reaction of the audiance. When I
saw it the theater was well filled, but you could have heard a pin drop at
the end of the show. People were shaken. Their reaction was VERY different
than I’ve noticed after good action movies like Air Force One, ConAir or The
Fugitive. A properly contented audiance, digesting their popcorn and
considering their money well spent, chats pleasently as they head for the
door, even if half of Los Angeles has been demolished on screen. But TITANIC
frightened people: reached them somehow. And considering the nature of the
story, I would submit, that Cameron created good history. After all, the
story does scare the hell out of you if you dwell on it.

The hard-core study of the Titanic will certainly survive Cameron’s
transgressions. Wouldn’t doubt of the various clubs devoted to its study are
doing pretty well right now. If one wants to know the story accurately and
at length (people still argue about a number of points: that’s history)
nothing can replace books and journals.

Lastly, I dont think some comments on TITANIC are out of place here. It may
end up being the most successful movie in history and will be viewed by
millions of people for the next generation. The story is based on arguably
the greatest nautical epic in modern times. Wish Cameron would make a movie
about Magellan.
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

>Please consider the following quotation. I original proferred it to the
>Marhst-l almost a month ago, but no body bit. I’m hoping the Mahan list
>might prove to be more fruitful ground.
>
>”The tests to which the Admirals in high command are subjected during a
>naval engagement are far more searching that those of Generals in a land
>battle. The Admiral actually leads the Fleet in person and is probably
>under as severe fire and in as great danger as any man in it; a General,
>whatever his wishes, has no choice but to remain in his headquarters in
>complete tranquillity, ten, fifteen, or even twenty miles away.

I think it would be news to any of the operational leaders in any large
surface engagement that they had very much control of anything. The night
battles off Guadalcanal were the essence of chaos: I think you could say
much the same about the carrier engagements. In one regard all military
action has changed in modern times: larger forces and more powerful arms
have forced dispersion of force and decentralization of control.
Subordinates are MUCH more important now than in previous eras. (This goes
down to the level of junior officers and noncoms.) The brass don’t really
like this of course. Consequently we and other militaries are spending
billions to restore a degree of “control” over operations to higher echelons
via sophisticated communication.

I do take issue with the relative level of lethality between the services.
Division and corps commanders during WWII were frequently under fire. It is
true that we did not lose very many top generals during the war, but I think
you’d find the list of KIA in the Wehrmacht quite large.

This may not be true in contemporary affairs. It did not miss the notice of
soldiers in Vietnam that no Generals and only a handful of Colonels were
KIA. (A few died in noncombat helicopter crashes). Must say that the
“peaceniks” had a point when they claimed that the top officers of SAC would
have been probably the safest people in the US had a general nuclear war
broke out. It’s been quite a change from the day when someone like Alexander
was EXPECTED to be in battle. As I recall, all of Napoleon’s Marshalls were
wounded at one time or another. The US Civil War was a deathtrap for general
officers, particularly Confederates.

One thing that bothered me about Desert Storm is the notion that it is
possible to engage in a large military action and suffer almost no
casualties. I feel to the tip of my toes that that episode was unique. In a
way I hope so. If governments come to the conclusions that they can strike
their enemies without danger of losss … one removes a powerful barrier
from striking enemies. That could be dangerous.
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

I’ve run across a few oddities and questions I would like to know
about…if you
don’t mind, I have them right here:

1. About famous Lord Louis Mountbatton, Viceroy of India (wasn’t he?), and
Admiral. Reading a book lately, I have come across a sentence which
stated that
he was actually a (comparatively) pretty low-rated officer (Captain?
Lieutenant?) with a high acting rank. The question is, can anybody
tell me what
exactly Lord Louis’ rank(s) was/were? How high did he get in “acting”
rank, and
how high was his normal rank?

2. S.E.Morison in “The Two-Ocean War” states that six American Admirals were
killed in action: Kidd, Scott, Callaghan, Chandler, Mullinnix, Royal. I found
out about the deaths of the former five, but the latter, Royal, was not
mentioned anywhere. He was I believe Rear-Admiral Frederick B. Royal,
commanding
several smaller landing operations in the Visayas (Philippine
Archipelago), but
the circumstances of his death are not related. Does anybody know them?

Thanks,
Tim

Tim Lanzendoerfer | “I have just taken on a great
Amateur Naval Historian | responsibility. I will do my
Email: BWV_Wiesbaden@t-online.de | utmost to meet it” – Nimitz
—————————————————————–
The United States Navy in the Pacific War 1941 – 1945
http://www.microworks.net/pacific
Last Updated: 7th February 1998
—————————————————————–

Relevant to the discussion of the MAINE, is the issue of the LEONARDO
DA VINCI and the other Italian ship that blew up in port – BENEDETTO
BRIN was it? The Italians have always asserted both these ships were
sabotaged, rather than blew up accidentally, and claimed that material
burgled from the safe at the Austro-Hungarian Embassy somewhere –
Switzerland? proved it. Apparently, too the Italians still possess
large quantities of Autro-Hungarian material that has never been
researhed properly or translated. This is one of the intriguing little
mysteries of WWI that would be nice to get resolved someday….

-Brooks

In a message dated 98-02-21 09:09:32 EST, you write:

<< From most of what I have read concerning the early steel navy, anthracite or "hard" coal was the type preferred for use on naval vessels. Welsh anthracite was highly sought after, so much so that Dewey had it shipped over for his squadron, and Clark of the OREGON stowed his meager supply of it for use only in battle during his epic trip. Recently, in the book mentioned by Mark Hayes (Remembering the MAINE by Samuels - an intriguing book that asked some interesting questions about the MAINE bunker fire theory, but which still has problems of its own), an alternative view was presented. The book mentions polls of U.S. naval officers concerning coal types. In the poll (Virginia?) Pocahontas coal was found to be the favored coal. This seems odd, since Pocahontas coal was bituminous or soft coal. Anthracite of hard coal burns hotter with less waste than bituminous coal. Ships could develop more speed with less work and at a more rapid rate with anthracite. >>

Actually, anthracite was not the preferred fuel for ships. It was used in
some early steamships, when the anthracite fields of northeastern Pennsylvania
were the main American source of coal and the much larger bituminous fields of
West Virginia and Kentucky had not yet been seriously exploited. Anthracite
burns cleanly and has a high thermal content, but it is difficult to burn
because the percentage of volatile matter is much lower than in soft coal. It
requires big grates and fireboxes to get an adequate fire. Anyone familiar
with railroads might recall the humpback steam locomotives used on some of the
anthracite roads in Pennsylvania: the anthracite required such a huge firebox
that the cab was moved to center of the engine so the view of the engineer
would not be obscured. Apart from these technical disadvantages, anthracite
was more expensive once large-scale bituminous production began, and after the
turn of the century it was largely confined to small-scale uses like home
heating.
Welsh Admiralty coal was not anthracite. Like the West Virginia
Pocahontas coal preferred by the United States Navy, it was a so-called semi-
bituminous coal: a fairly hard “soft” coal that fell somewhere between
anthracite and standard bituminous coal, but was considered a grade of
bituminous coal.

Regards, Keith Allen
keacla1@aol.com

Hello Folks!

There has been some discussion concerning coal on this list. This brings
to mind a question.

>From most of what I have read concerning the early steel navy,
anthracite or “hard” coal was the type preferred for use on naval
vessels. Welsh anthracite was highly sought after, so much so that Dewey
had it shipped over for his squadron, and Clark of the OREGON stowed his
meager supply of it for use only in battle during his epic trip.

Recently, in the book mentioned by Mark Hayes (Remembering the MAINE by
Samuels – an intriguing book that asked some interesting questions about
the MAINE bunker fire theory, but which still has problems of its own),
an alternative view was presented. The book mentions polls of U.S. naval
officers concerning coal types. In the poll (Virginia?) Pocahontas coal
was found to be the favored coal. This seems odd, since Pocahontas coal
was bituminous or soft coal.

Anthracite of hard coal burns hotter with less waste than bituminous
coal. Ships could develop more speed with less work and at a more rapid
rate with anthracite.

I had always assumed that the advantages of anthracite coal were widely
known even at the time of the Spanish American War. The Samuels’ book
indicates it was not.

Does anyone have any more information on this debate?

Patrick McSherry

Fellow Naval Historians, (amateur, professional, and otherwise):

Attention bibliographic (and bibliophilic!) sleuths, in particular.

Please consider the following quotation. I original proferred it to the
Marhst-l almost a month ago, but no body bit. I’m hoping the Mahan list
might prove to be more fruitful ground.

“The tests to which the Admirals in high command are subjected during a
naval engagement are far more searching that those of Generals in a land
battle. The Admiral actually leads the Fleet in person and is probably
under as severe fire and in as great danger as any man in it; a General,
whatever his wishes, has no choice but to remain in his headquarters in
complete tranquillity, ten, fifteen, or even twenty miles away. The General
is forced to rely on the reports of others which flow upwards to him from
Brigades, Divisions, and Corps, and transmits his orders through the same
channel after consultation with his staff; the Admiral sees with his own
eyes, and with his own lips pronounces the orders which move the whole
mighty event. The phases of a naval action succeed one another at intervals
of two or three minutes; whereas in modern [land] battles two or three
hours, and sometimes even days, elapse before fresh decisions are required
from an Army Commander. Once the sea battle is joined, the whole event is
in the hands of the Admiral or his successor as long as he can signal;
whereas on land, after zero hour has struck, it escapes for the time being
almost entirely from control of the General. There are a hundred ways of
explaining a defeat on land and of obscuring the consequences of any
mistake. Of these the simplest is to continue the attack next day in a
different direction or under different conditions. But on the sea, no
chance returns. The enemy disappears for months and the battle is over.
The Admiral’s orders uttered from minute to minute are recorded forever in
the log-book of every vessel engaged. The great ships, unless their
mechanism ceases to function, obey punctually and inexorably the directions
they receive from human will. The course and speed of every vessel at every
moment are recorded. The value of every vessel sunk is known. Their names
are published. The charts and compasses are produced, and with almost exact
accuracy the position and movement of every ship can be fixed in relation to
each other. The battlefield is flat and almost unvarying. Exact
explanations can be required at every point, and the whole intense scene can
be reconstructed and analysed in the glare of history. This should always
be borne in mind in forming judgments.”

Well…pretty impressive, and — no doubt to many — controversial stuff!
However, if we can put aside, (at least for the moment), any debate on the
veracity of its substance, I would like to ask fellow list-members’ help
with regard to discovering its author.

This quotation was passed on to me by a kind old soul in New Delhi — in
fact, the official post-independence historian of the Indian Navy:
Rear-Admiral Satyindra Singh, AVSM, (Ret’d). It is obviously excerpted from
a much larger work. Unfortunately, Adm Singh overlooked noting the
bibliographical particulars of that work. It’s a wonderful quotation which
I would love to be able to cite on occasion. Does any one happen to have
any idea WHOSE words these are, as well as WHEN, and WHERE they were
written?; (ie., can anyone give me a full reference citation for it?).

I have the following additional evidence which hopefully will help along the
necessary deductive logic.

As mentioned, what Admiral Singh gave me is quite obviously a photocopy of a
page from a book. At the bottom it is marked p. “285”, and at the top
“Admirals in High Command”. What I don’t know, is whether this is the title
of the book from which the quotation is taken, or only the name of the
particular chapter/section of the book. As mentioned, I have no idea as to
the author, or the date of publication, (but from other internal clues, I
would assume he was a retired high ranking RN (Flag) Officer, who probably
served in some capacity in the RN during WWI. The book in question might
very well be his memoirs. In fact, a footnote to the above quotation says:
“These are the author’s comments and reflections on the action of the Dogger
Bank, 24 January 1915, written several years afterwards.”.

Much obliged for any/all assistance,

Glen

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Glen “I-was-a-teenage-fogey” Hodgins

A Medal Collector and Commonwealth/Empire Naval Historian
temporarily imprisoned at:

Her Canadian Majesty’s C/O Po Box 500 (CLMBO)
High Commission for Sri Lanka Station A
6 Gregory’s Road OTTAWA, Ontario, K1N 8T7
(PO Box 1006) Dominion of CANADA
Cinnamon Gardens
Colombo 7, Sri Lanka [still Canada’s OFFICIAL title!]

Fax, (from overseas): 94-1-687-815

I attended the talk, given by Dana Wagner, last night on Admiral Rickover and
the Destruction of USS MAINE. For the record, Hansen, Price, Wagner and
Duncan (the scientists and historians that worked on Rickover’s book) dispute
the assumptions and findings of the AME study which is the basis of the NAVAL
HISTORY article. In particular, the “Rickover team” is convinced that a mine
could NOT have caused the reserve six-inch magazine to explode. Both sets of
technical experts examined the same photographic and documentary evidence,
including the bottom plates bent inward and back (mentioned by Bill and
Brooks). Yet, they have come to very different conclusions.

I understand that not everyone in the AME study agrees with the official
conclusions. I was given a verbal summary of this contrary view (which agrees
with the Rickover team). It was difficult for me to follow, but suffice it to
say that the technical evidence is more thorough than what we have seen in
print. There will be a conference on the Destruction of the MAINE in the D.C.
area in April. Hopefully, the papers will be published and understanding on
this issue will be advanced.

>>The article in NAVAL HISTORY states that the Rickover investigation
said that the *inrush of water flooding into the ship* caused the inward
deformation. Not the same thing at all, and the inrush of water would
likely have a much lower load applied to the hull plating than the
shock effect.<< My recollection is that the *inrush of water* is part of the Hansen-Price Study's explanation for the inward deformation of the bottom plates, which is generally stated as caused by *the dynamic effects of the sinking subsequent to the explosion.* I'll check my copy at the office on Monday. BTW, REMEMBERING THE MAINE by Peggy and Harold Samuels does indeed provide deeper analysis/speculation on who could have planted the mine and how than anyone else in print. Mark Hayes Naval Historical Center Early History Branch Washington, D.C.