Does anyone have any knowledge of Ltjg. Donald E. Runyon? He was born
in 1913 so he may not be alive. My last contact with him was March 1944. He
was regular Navy so he may have stayed in after the war.

Just curious,

Glen Boren

“We get so soon old and so late smart” – – Sign in a hardware store
window, 1933, Manhattan Ks.

In the last few days, I been re-reading E.B. Potter and Chester Nimitz’s
work _Sea Power: A Naval History_. While reading the sections concerned
with World War I, a question occurred to me regarding German and
British capital ship design. Why, when it is apparent that German ship
design surpassed Britain in most categories (i.e. compartmentization,
distribution of armor, etc.) did Germany persist in using coal when
Great Britain, through conversion and new construction, had adopted
fuel-oil? Further, did the German High Seas Fleet ever deploy a capital
ship which used fuel-oil? Thanks in advance, Ed.

Edward Wittenberg
ewitten507@aol.com

P.S. As an aside, does anyone know whether any of the German ships
which were scuttled at Scapa Flow on June 21, 1919 and later salvaged
served in either the Royal Navy or USN as part of the battle line?

From TheHistoryNet Newsletter:

* USS Laffey’s Pacific Ordeal **
Picket duty some 30 miles north of Okinawa proved to be a
harrowing experience for the crew of USS Laffey. On April 16,
1945, her third day on station, the American destroyer was
attacked by 22 Japanese planes.

http://thehistorynet.com/WorldWarII/articles/1998/0398_cover.htm

Tom Robison
Ossian, Indiana
tcrobi@adamswells.com
_|_
–X-X-(ô)-X-X–

Service life may perhaps be considered as dating from Commissioning,
but my impression is that Operational life could start several weeks
or months later. AFAIK Commissioning is not equivalent to the RN
Completion which is handover from shipbuilder to the navy.

So US carrier Operational lives could be even shorter than shown.

Ian Buxton

>
> In looking up the histories of certain Aircraft Carriers of WWII
> vintage, I discovered that the USS Bismark Sea CVE-95 was commissioned on
> 20 May 1944 and sunk in battle on 21 Feb 1945 for a total service life of 9
> months and 1 day.
>
> The USS Gambier Bay CVE-73 was commissioned 28 Dec 1943 and sunk in
> battle 25 October 1944 for a total service life of 9 months and 27 days.
>
> Two questions,
>
> 1. Does anyone know of any Aircraft Carrier with a shorter lifespan in
> combat than these ?
>
> 2. Any idea on which combat ship, regardless of type or size, that had
> the shortest lifespan being lost in combat during WWII ?
>
>
> Glen Boren
>

**********************************************************
Dr Ian L Buxton Dept of Marine Technology
Reader in Marine Transport University of Newcastle
Phone +44 191 222 6712 Newcastle upon Tyne
Fax +44 191 222 5491 NE1 7RU U K
E-mail i.l.buxton@newcastle.ac.uk

US War Plan Red covered possible conflict with Britain (Red and hues
thereof for
other parts of the empire: Scarlet, Ruby, etc). US Army planners argued that
Britain might intervene in a US-Japan (Blue-Orange) conflict because USN plans
to blockade Japan would inevitably cause losses to neutral shipping. The Army
hoped for a 4.6 million-man army to subdue Canada. The USN predicted Canada
would simply declare neutrality. The USN gave it lip service as War Plan
Red-Orange until 1930, then effectively ignored it. War Plan Red was cancelled
in 1939.

For Canada’s current (1998!) preparations to invade the USA, such the build up
of a huge
guerrilla army all along the northern border, see
http://www.neptunenet.com/antican/.

> > I seem to
> >recall reading, years ago, that as late as 1915, both British and American
> >naval dons were still working diligently on war plans aimed at
likelihood of
> >fighting one another!
>
> Uh … this planning was extremely hectic on both sides of the Great Puddle
> in ’19, ’20, and ’21. For a while, it looked like a UK-Japanese-Italian
> alliance would be scarfing it up with a US-French alliance, a development
> subvented by the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922. See the first volume of
> Roskill’s NAVAL POLICY BETWEEN THE WARS for details.

Here is the section on The Good Shepherd in my biography of CSF. Copyright
1998, John Forester.

After finishing the last revisions to The Nightmare in January, 1954,
Cecil made a lengthy trip to England, where he attended a cocktail party at
the American embassy and was also entertained in the office of the First
Lord of the Admirality. On his return to Berkeley in July, he started work
on the convoy novel, The Good Shepherd. This is the story of Commander
Krause, USN, captain of a destroyer escorting a convoy to Britain at the
height of the U-Boat battle. Because Cecil was not sure of American naval
phrasing and proceedures, he arranged, for a fee of $1,000, that the
retired American submarine admiral, Ralph Christie, who lived in San
Francisco, would advise him and correct his errors. Christie was “really
patient Â… [with] trifling details Â… like the actual wording of a report or
an order; heÂ’s a bit puzzled that I can deal with strategy and tactics
without any help from him.” “The admiral approves­he’s quite interested and
each morning over the telephone we fight terrific battles, destroyer versus
submarine.” “He’s as interested in watching a novel being composed as I am
watching a destroyer being handled.” As the book progressed, Christie
brought Cecil genuine plotting sheets with the destroyerÂ’s tracks all
plotted out as the battle progressed. “His heart just bleeds for Krause­he
shook his head sadly over him yesterday and said ‘That poor guy’s in a
mess.”

However, Cecil had returned to his standard complaining mode that had left
him as he was writing The Nightmare. “Sixty more days.” “Fifty two more
working days. They go on and on. Â… The damn thing may run as high as
100,000 words. ItÂ’s all right from one point of view; if the action
compells that length well and good Â… I believe a longer book sells better
than a shorter book­and similarly if all the action can be crammed into a
shorter length well and good too. But damn me if I like the idea of three
more working weeks, which it would look like. Hell.” “Forty four more
damned dreary days of work.”

Shortly after Cecil started The Good Shepherd, it became more likely that
The Gun would be filmed, offering Cecil release from his misery. “It will
be just too bad if I finish work on the Good Shepherd and find that I
neednÂ’t have done it after all because these film rights have made me rich
for life. I’m tempted to tear up what I’ve done and wait and see.” When the
film contract was signed in September, “If I hadn’t signed that damned
contract for 1812 [a history of the War of 1812] I could retire this minute
and leave the Good Shepherd unfinished which would intrigue my biographers.
A great temptation.” “I’m really thoroughly tired. Me and Krause. I don’t
think anyone who hasnÂ’t endured it can appreciate the particular kind of
flatnes and fatigue­there’s nothing else like it. Late nights spent playing
bridge or sitting up with a sick child don’t compare with it.”

Commander Krause of The Good Shepherd was an ingenious mixture of CecilÂ’s
previous military characters, a blend which could have resulted in his
finest characterization, but which, to my mind, did not. Krause had the
single-minded devotion to his service of Rifleman Dodd and Leading Seaman
Brown, the professional doubts of the early Hornblower, the conquered but
well-remembered temper of Captain the Honorable Miles Ernest
Troughton-Harrington-Yorke, and he had survived a passionate awakening like
Rose SayersÂ’s with more than a trace of General CurzonÂ’s prudery and
Hornblower’s detachment. To this was added one great advantage — he started
this mixture as the son of a loving, compassionate, religious and respected
father, an entirely new figure in CecilÂ’s works (but who appears only in
KrauseÂ’s memories). Instead of the complex, fascinating character that
could be made from these materials, Krause is a dull man who finds his
competence in the self-limiting, unlimited agony of war, and his peace in
utter weariness, face down, spread-armed, only half undressed and half in
bed, at the close of his duty. The creative talent that started these
half-men fifteen and twenty years before was now only strong enough to mix
their parts without synthesizing a whole man.

Cecil and the admiral finished revising The Good Shepherd in the second
week of October. Commander John Dale Hodapp, whom Cecil had met as first
lieutenant in the destroyer Abner Reed in 1943, had recently retired to be
the financial officer of the San Francisco Episcopal diocese; he took one
carbon copy of the completed manuscript home to read. He telephoned Cecil
to say that the book used submarine language rather than surface ship
language and required several hundred changes. “All the technical orders
and bearings and ranges have to be changed.” Finally, Cecil had to transfer
HodappÂ’s corrections to the publisherÂ’s typescripts while between planes in
New York. There were still further corrections to be made in January,
despite Little, Brown’s hurry to skip proof reading. “We’ll all look like
fools if [the changes] don’t [go in]. I’d rather cancel the contracts.”

Part of the reason for hurry was that Life paid $20,000 for a 30,000 word
condensation for their WashingtonÂ’s Birthday issue. In August, 1955,
Columbia Pictures bought the film rights for $75,000, with the intention of
starring Humphrey Bogart as Commander Krause. Harry Cohn, of Columbia, used
the promise of that role, when he recovered from cancer, to comfort Bogart
in his last year of life. In May, 1956, Admiral Christie threatened to sue
Cecil for $20,000, on the argument that he had contributed far more to the
story than had originally been planned. Hodapp offered to testify that
Christie had not done a good job, describing the number of ChristieÂ’s
errors he had had to correct. Contractually, Cecil was correct; Christie
had agreed to a fee of $1,000 for vetting the orders and procedures, and he
had vetted the orders badly. Equitably, CecilÂ’s own letters demonstrate
that Christie had contributed far more to the story, and had probably
provided a realistic battle sequence and avoided the errors and
contradictions that would otherwise have existed in CecilÂ’s account. Eight
years after assisting with The Good Shepherd, Hodapp became CecilÂ’s
secretary, calling himself literary assistant.

John Forester 408-734-9426
forester@johnforester.com 726 Madrone Ave
http://www.johnforester.com Sunnyvale, CA 94086-3041

On 12 Feb 98, Bill Riddle wrote:

> “The Good Shepherd” is one I have not read. Didn’t think there were
> any CSF that I had missed. That goes to the top of my acquisition
> list.

The book has been described (ask your Dad to forgive me for this John) as
“Hornblower in WWII”. The qualities shared by both characters are rather
surprising at first, but in no way detract from the description of the many
instances of soul-searching that encumber what those not in command
consider easy decisions.

Regards,

James

PS: Check your clock Bill, you’re sending out incorrect date/time groups.
In the Heart of the Pine Barrens 39 54 03 N, 74 49 26 W

While re-reading Edwin Hoyt’s _Guerilla: Colonel Von Lettow-Vorbeck and
Germany’s East African Empire_ (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc.
1981 ISBN 0-02-555210-4), a question occurred to me which, despite my
best efforts, I have been unable to answer: Was SMS Konigsberg a
sister of SMS Emden?

I have managed to obtain photographs of the Emden and Konigsberg
(available upon request), but since both are similar in appearance a
visual comparison is of little value. Each carried ten 10.5-cm (4.1 inch)
rapid fire guns and gross speed characteristics were similar (24.5 vs.
24.1 knots maximum speed). Emden was 395 while Konigsberg was 376
feet in length, although both possessed a beam of approximately 43 feet.
Cruising economically both could cover approximately 6,000 miles while
supporting a crew of nearly 320. Thanks in advance, Ed.

Edward Wittenberg
ewitten507@aol.com

I have a photo of a Flettner helicopter doing trials on a platform on top
of the ‘X’ (or BRUNO, auf Deutsch) turret on one of the “K-Kreuzern”
(is that the right plural?) – KARLSRUHE, KOLN or KONIGSBERG – but the ship
is not identified in the Schiffer book on German helicopters, and the
trails aren’t mentioned in Whitley’s book on German Cruisers; I have teh
first Marine-Arsenal volume by Breyer on these vessels but it only covers
their careers through ’37. Does anybody know which cruiser hosted these
trials?

(KOLN, at least, should have an umlaut…)

Also, does anyone know which vessels beside the DRACHE ex Yugoslav ZMAJ
carried the service model Flettner helicopter in the Aegean in 43-44?

Thanks,
-Brooks

Perhaps we should bear in mind that war has been analyzed in two different
modes.

The older mode was that expressed by Clausewitz, that ‘war is the extension
of politics’. A Clausewitz-esque analysis would say that you set your war
aims in accord with your political wishes and, when these are achieved, you
Declare a Victory and go home.

The slightly newer style was that of Napoleon, best exemplified in the
writings of Jomini, one of his staff officers. Napoleon advocated war aims
be set as the destruction of the enemy’s will to resist, regardless of
political realities. Once this destruction of the will to resist was
accomplished, peace terms could be nasty or nice as political realities
dictated.

The US military has traditionally followed Jomini; the US political
establishment has traditionally followed Clausewitz. This dichotomy is
normal in Western countries. In both World Wars, the political
establishment adopted Jominian war aims (‘squeeze them ’til the pips
squeak’, shrieked Lloyd George, ‘and Hang the Kaiser!’, ‘unconditional
surrender’ intoned FDR). But, in Korea, for instance, the Western Alliance
strongly argued for Clausewitzian war aims, and, hence, the clearance of
South Korea and the status quo ante bellum was regarded as sufficient. No
one bothered to apprise GA MacArthur of the change, and, so, he ended up
making a fool of himself, believing that the two World Wars had marked a
complete change in American and European political thought. Similarly, in
the Viet-Nam imbroglio, the political establishment early and firmly
established Clausewitzian war aims, in so far as they established ANY war
aims, and only ‘bomb ’em back to the Stone Age’ LeMay was a significant
dissenting voice. (Well, GEN Harold K Johnson as well, but he didn’t speak
up at the time, so he doesn’t count.)

In the Persian Gulf, the Alliance early and firmly adopted a Clausewitzian
policy, that is, that the clearance of Kuwait was the war aim and that the
War would stop when that was accomplished. And so it did.

It really is a bit more complex than simply ‘the military wanted to fight
on and the politicians didn’t’. Most senior officers understood this;
Schwartzkopf didn’t, and it cost him a shot at a fifth star.

Marc

msmall@roanoke.infi.net FAX: +540/343-7315
Cha robh bas fir gun ghras fir!