Archive for January, 2009

The Battle of Dogger Bank – part 1

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

While browsing through the stacks at my local library this summer, I
came across a work entitled “Warships and Sea Battles of World War I”
(Bernard Fitzsimons, Ed. London: BPC Publishing Ltd. 1973. ISBN 0-517-
130912). Last week, I checked it out again to review certain sections
concerning the German U-boat effort. While reading those sections, I
happened to re-read the section by Patrick Kennedy which deals with
the Battle of Dogger Bank. Since I’ve posted messages dealing with
Tsushima, Coronel and the Falklands, and Jutland, this section seemed to
fit in admirably. As always, questions and comments are welcome.
Take care, Ed.

Edward Wittenberg
ewitten507@aol.com

Dogger Bank: Clash of the Battle Cruisers

January 24, 1915 saw the largest naval clash of the
war up to that date: four German battle-cruisers
pitted against five British ones. The conflict was
confused, and poor British signalling was mainly
responsible for the major elements of the German
squadron slipping away, leaving only the hybrid
battle-cruiser Blucher to be finally crushed by the
storm of British fire. In the battle, however, points of
enormous importance for future naval operations had
become apparent. Signalling had to be improved,
gunnery, in the British vessels particularly, needed
drastic attention, armour protection for the ships’
vitals needed strengthening and a way of stopping
flash travelling down to the magazines needed
devising. These lessons were apparent to both
admiralties, but whether or not the lessons had been
learnt fully would have to wait till the next clash.

Shortly before noon on January 23, 1915, Winston Churchill
returned to his room at the Admiralty after a long talk with Admiral
Fisher, who was laid up in bed with a cold. Hardly had he sat down,
Churchill recounts, when Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson strode hurriedly into
the room with a ‘glow in his eye’ and baldly announced: ~First Lord,
those fellows are coming out again.’ The fellows referred to were of
course the Germans, and the decisions and orders which followed from
this announcement were to lead to the greatest clash in the North Sea
since the war began.

The movements had begun only a short while earlier at 1025 hours
that same morning when Rear-Admiral Hipper, resting with his
battle-cruisers off Wilhelmshaven, received orders to take them, together
with some cruisers and destroyers, and to sweep into the Dogger Bank
area that night. The German intentions were not very clear but it was
hoped to disrupt the British fishing fleet there and to sink a few of
their escorts. Moreover, the report of British scouting operations in that
area, brought in by a German seaplane on the 19th, had aroused
curiosity at the German admiralty and also the anticipation that some
light forces of the British might be caught unawares by a swift.
one-day reconnaissance mission from Wilhelmshaven. Such a sweep was
in any case well in line with the Kaiser’s recent decision that the
battle-cruisers could sortie to harass the British, although a major fleet
action was still considered to be undesirable.

It was the efficiency of its Intelligence services which enabled the
Royal Navy to learn so very quickly about the planned German operation
and to take steps to meet. it. The chance recovery by the Russians in
August 1914 of the German navy’s cipher signal books and squared
reference charts from the wrecked cruiser Magdeburg had been a boon
to the British deciphering team, who, from then on, were able to decode
the Germans’ intercepted wireless messages. In addition, the
establishment of radio direction-finder stations along the east coast of
England enabled the Admiralty to pinpoint the position of German
vessels when they used their radios. Thus Churchill had news of the
German plans and the probable size of their forces only one hour and a
half after Hipper had received his instructions.

Shortly after Hipper’s ships slid out of the Jade estuary on the
evening of January 23, a variety of British squadrons emerged from
harbour and also proceeded towards the Dogger Bank.

Rear-Admiral Hipper’s force consisted of the 1st and 2nd Scouting
Groups and two flotillas of destroyers. The 1st Scouting Group had to
sail without the Von der Tann, which was in dockyard hands, and
therefore was composed of four battle-cruisers, Seydlitz, Hipper’s
flagship, Moltke, Derfflinger and Blucher. The first three vessels were
similar, each carrying ten 11-inch guns, (the Derfflinger had eight
12-inch guns), adequately armoured and able to steam at about 25/26
knots. The Blucher however was an older, large armoured cruiser rather
than a battle-cruiser. Her armour, main armament and displacement were
consequently all much smaller than that of the rest of her squadron.
Most important of all, her maximum speed was some 2/3 knots less than
theirs and this tended either to slow down the whole squadron when in
action or to cause the Blucher to gradually fall behind. Tactically she
was a liability to the squadron.

The 2nd Scouting Group consisted of’ the four light cruisers
Stralsund, Rostock, Kolberg, and Graudenz, all of which carried twelve
4.1-inch guns. These were accompanied by 18 destroyers.

In numbers the balance of strength clearly lay with the British.
but in gun-power there was less of a discrepancy since the German
11-inch gun was superior to the British 12-inch gun. Hipper’s main
opponents were to be Vice-Admiral Beatty’s powerful battle-cruisers
Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand and Indomitable, all based on
Rosyth. Although the last two ships were smaller and not as well
armoured as their German opposite numbers and the Indomitable,
constructed in 1908. was slightly slower, they both carried eight 12-inch
guns as main armament. Moreover the Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal
were faster than Hipper’s squadron and each carried the powerful
13.5-inch guns, although the British battle-cruisers carried less armour
than Hipper’s three big ships.

Administrative and tactical reasons had caused the British
battle-cruisers to be divided into a fast and a slow division. Thus
Beatty directly controlled the 1st Battle-Cruiser Squadron which
included the Lion (his flagship), Tiger and Princess Royal, while
Rear-Admiral Moore, his Second-in-Command. directed the newly-formed
2nd Battle-Cruiser Squadron, which consisted of the New Zealand
(Moore’s flagship)and Indomitable – though remaining under Beatty’s
control throughout. These ships were accompanied from Rosyth by
Commodore Goodenough’s 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, consisting of
Southampton, Birmingham, Nottingham and Lowestoft, all carrying eight
or nine 6-inch guns.

Other British forces were also on the move on the evening of the
23rd. As soon as the Admiralty had received the news of an imminent
German sweep, Wilson and Vice-Admiral Oliver (the Chief of Admiralty
War Staff) had worked out in Churchill’s office the most likely position
for an interception. With professional expertise they ordered Beatty to
be at a point about 30 miles north of the Dogger Bank at 0700 hours on
the 24th and also ordered Commodore Tyrwhitt with his three light
cruisers Arethusa (his flagship), Aurora and Undaunted, together with
35 destroyers, out of Harwich, to join Beatty there and provide the
escort for the battle-cruisers.

NSC-68

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

This is truly an arcane question. Do any of you Cold War specialists
out there know where I can find a copy of the 14 April 1950 report
NSC-68? Perhaps a website? I want to see if someone has scanned or
printed it before going to NARA.

Timothy L. Francis
Historian
Naval Historical Center
email address: Francis.Timothy@nhc.navy.mil
voice: (202) 433-6802

The above remarks are my opinions, not those of the U.S. Navy or the
Department of Defense

> ———-
> From: Mike Potter[SMTP:mike.potter@artecon.com]
> Reply To: mahan@microworks.net
> Sent: Friday, January 30, 1998 12:21 PM
> To: mahan@microworks.net
> Subject: Carrier ops
>
> San Diego Union-Tribune reported this morning that USS Independence is
> proceeding to the Persian Gulf (USN’s “Arabian Gulf”) and is expected
> to
> arrive in a about a week.
>
> Carriers/Airwings at Sea:
> USS Nimitz (CVW-9): SOUTHERN WATCH, Arabian Gulf
> USS George Washington (CVW-1): SOUTHERN WATCH, Arabian Gulf
> USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74): JTFEX 98-1, west Atlantic
> USS Independence (CVW-5): west Pacific
>
> Each CVW has about 50 strike-capable aircraft, mostly F-18Cs. F-14Ds
> and
> S-3Bs have ground-attack capability. No word about surface combatants
>

Carrier ops

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

San Diego Union-Tribune reported this morning that USS Independence is
proceeding to the Persian Gulf (USN’s “Arabian Gulf”) and is expected to
arrive in a about a week.

Carriers/Airwings at Sea:
USS Nimitz (CVW-9): SOUTHERN WATCH, Arabian Gulf
USS George Washington (CVW-1): SOUTHERN WATCH, Arabian Gulf
USS John C. Stennis (CVN-74): JTFEX 98-1, west Atlantic
USS Independence (CVW-5): west Pacific

Each CVW has about 50 strike-capable aircraft, mostly F-18Cs. F-14Ds and
S-3Bs have ground-attack capability. No word about surface combatants

Naval War College Analyses

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

Wondered if there was a way to obtain copies of the War College Analyses of
World War 2 battles. They seem to be insightful reading and very helpful to
understand the actions. Can one get them sent?

Tim

Tim Lanzendoerfer | “I have just taken on a great
Amateur Naval Historian | responsibility. I will do my
Email: BWV_Wiesbaden@t-online.de | utmost to meet it” – Nimitz
—————————————————————–
The United States Navy in the Pacific War 1941 – 1945
http://www.microworks.net/pacific
The ships, the men, the battles
—————————————————————–

A radical Arab opinion

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

I received this from a private security firm, the Emergency Response &
Research Institute, Chicago. Al-Quds is a Palestinian paper, I think.
This gives an idea of how Saddam Hussein’s regime might portray possible
air and missile attacks, much of which could be launched from US and
possibly UK ships:

“‘Ali Al-Khalili writes in reference to the slaughter of tourists in
Egypt (at the Luxor temple):
“All the lines have been crossed in the degradation of the Arabs,
their suppression, robbery of their resources, and the attempts to expel
them from history ….
“The Arabs learned on their cut and burnt skin what their role is
… and are trying to exit the dark wells into the light. Washington and
Israel fear this Arab exit, and therefore they choose for each Arab
state a [different] form of disaster that will hit it and sink it ….
“One form [of disaster] for Egypt, and other [forms] for Iraq,
Libya, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and the Sudan, until the end of the
list of the cut and burnt skin. Until when will the planned disasters
continue? ….”
[Source: Al-Quds (Independent Daily), November 20, 1997 – Translated
from Arab sources.]

“[ERRI analysis: This report is one of several Arab writings that we
have reviewed, blaming the U.S. and Israel for the recent massacre in
Luxor, Egypt. Most give the impression that there is an on-going
conspiracy to commit terrorist acts and then blame them on
fundamentalist radical Moslems. It would appear part of a larger
disinformation campaign to discredit the American and Jewish {Israeli}
governments and incite further anger in Arab populations.]”

Queen Mary WW2 sinking cruiser

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

We are now working on volume 2 of our QM set covering the period
1936-46.

We run run into a problem with the exact spelling of the name of the
cruiser sunk in WW2. Even places like NMM and IWM have differrent
spellings

Was it CuracOA
or
Was it CuracOA

The latter seems to be the concensus of opinion, the former being a mis-
reading for the Venezuela port.

Perhaps a war ship enthisiast may have and answer.

Ron

ron streater
jasmine@junk1234.demon.co.uk
http://www.junk1234.demon.co.uk

1 Highfield Close,
Blean, Canterbury, Kent,
CT2 9DX
UK

Tel/Fax: 01227 – 780259

“That which was and is the strength of this nation –
the shipping”
Oliver Cromwell

“Right Wing Conspiracy”

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

Lou wrote:

>some academic raised
> question about a 1945 right-wing military coup d’etat supposedly being
> concocted/considered by MacArthur and Patton. (Can you *imagine* THOSE
> two as junta partners?! 🙂 (I pointed out that both M & P had pressing
> matters at the time which would have made any such conspiracy impossible
> … let alone being on opposite sides of the globe.)
>
>Has anyone here heard about these historical episodes … and charges?

I recall hearing something once about a MacArthur/Patton conspiracy, which
I reject out of hand. Those two could not possibly exist in the same room,
as there is not nearly enough oxygen therein for both.

I suggest that Mac and George would have shot each other in a duel before
they could stage a successful coup d’etat. Besides, Georgie had only four
stars, and Doug had five… Doug had time-in-grade and time-in-service. No
way could they have been equals in any kind of a conspiracy, and Georgie
would never play second fiddle to Mac.

Tom

Tom Robison
Ossian, Indiana
**Please Note NEW E-mail Address*
tcrobi@adamswells.com

Political messages don’t belong on Mahan-L

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

At 14:54 28/01/98 EST, Sanartjam wrote:
>I agree – enough politics, let’s talk about ships and naval history.

More to the point enough USA politics, unless you really want a minority of
the list to start sending totally off list and non USA personal political
views – I hesitate to call them messages – to the list, whose detail and
characters will be as foreign to you as as Aaron Burr is to me.

Frank Dunn, London, UK.
http://www.brazen.demon.co.uk/

Carrier damage, 1945

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

In re: my mention of the BUNKER HILL – the DANFS entry says her damage
was 11 May, not 11 April.

Thanks also to John Forester for pointing out that at least one of the
CVE’s, OMMANEY BAY also had notable losses to personnel in ready rooms –
I am fairly certain that the main example cited is BUNKER HILL, though,
with over 300 personnel killed.

Presumably the USN moved the ready rooms back up to the gallery deck
(the deck under the flight deck and above the hanger) in FORESTAL et
seq. because (1) the flight deck was now essentially armored and
(2) it was not convenient to design escalators in….

-Brooks

Politics & Naval Construction

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

Conversely, to Timothy Francis’s list of the ships built from the
National Industrial Recovery Act, and the point about shipbuilding
capacity – >Warship< Construction, for cruiser size and up, remained concentrated on the East Coast during WWII with the important exception of the Kaiser Coffins - the CASABLANCA class escort carriers, and the 'ultimate' COMMENCEMENT BAY class escort carriers, built at Todd-Pacific. I am drawing attention here to the difference between warship construction as a special skill and shipbuilding in general. WWII US East Construction, including Two-Ocean Navy ships, included: ALL the ESSEX class, and all the MIDWAY class ALL the BB-55 and later Battleships ALL cruisers (and therefore light carriers) EXCEPT for some ATLANTA and/or repeat/modified ATLANTA class. However, the 50 CASABLANCA class were all constructed at a new yard specifically built for them. Destroyer and mercantile-standard construction was fairly significant on the West Coast however. One reason for this is likely that what heavy warship construction there had been on the US West Coast was concentrated in the Navy Yards, which were far better employed in battle damage repair and overhaul, in time of Pacific War. I noted this when i started trying to get an output capacity of US WW2 shipyards. I was trying to figure out why the production system of SPI's WAR IN THE PACIFIC typically generated US ships at a greater rate than historical.. Turns out it models raw material/expenditure capacity fairly well, but doesn't model the actual slipway capacity, so the system doesn't put a numerical limit on types/sizes that can be under construction at any given time. And for some reason, information on ships doesn't easily give you an idea of the capacity of the shipyard that built them.... 🙂 -Brooks

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