At 08:46 AM 22/1/98 -0500, Chris Havern wrote:
>SNIP A BIT Mr Bergerud engages in argument that I believe is
>misguided because it is based on an incomplete knowledge of the latest
>scholarship on the subject. The work of Jon Sumida and the
>soon-to-be-published work of Nicholas Lambert make clear that the
>British, while certainly wary of the burgeoning naval might of Germany,
>were not consumed with countering the threat posed by the High Seas
>Fleet. If they were obsessed with the Germans, then why build
>battlecruisers? The answer is concern with imperial defense and the
>countering of guerre de course along with having a vessel that was
>capable of serving like a battleship, not because of its armor, but
>because of its speed and ability to hit at greater range. This is what
>Fisher intended. I make this point, because Mr. Bergerud states that we
>cannot view the situation in 1914. I agree. Yet having said that, Mr.
>Bergerud fails to have an appreciable sense of what British goals were >in
the years of Fisher’s first stint as First Sea Lord. If he had, then >he
would know that there were several important factors influencing >British
policy that were totally unrelated to German building programs. >These
include finance, technological developments, and domestic politics
>vis a vis social spending.
Earlier in the decade I acquired material from what I believe to be most of
the more important relevant sources and discussed with Nicholas Lambert his
interpretation of these sources and naval and other developments touched on
in the discussion so far. This was in connection with my research for my
study of the development of an independent Australian navy, published in
1995 under the title Statesmen & Sailors.
I agree with the general thrust of what both Chris Havern and Timothy
Francis have said, but would add the following remarks.
Capital ships didn’t grow on trees. They took many years from ordering to
commissioning and, once you started to build a battleship, that’s what you
ended up with. It was therefore crucial to order the right type of ship in
the first place.
Coupled with this was the fact that the supply of ordnance and mountings
for the main armament of the British ships was a constricting factor. There
was a shortage of the pits in which the 13.5 inch mountings could be
assembled. Export orders for large calibre ordnance and mountings from
Japan and Turkey had also to be met.
The British building crunch came in late 1908 when the British cabinet had
to decide what capital ships to order to meet what they understood to be
German building plans, with the intention to match these plans by 1912. A
mix of battleships and battlecruisers emerged.
As an aside, Churchill, who was President of the Board of Trade, allied
with Lloyd George to oppose any increase in government spending, being
still convinced of Germany’s peaceful intentions. It would be some time
before he changed his mind.
Fear of the effects of a German were reinforced by the
appreciation that the larger ships of the German merchant fleet, including
its transatlantic fleet and those ships trading with the Far East, were
carrying their wartime armament ready to be installed at the outbreak of
hostilities. In parenthesis, in the days when control of the main armament
of most warships was a very rudimentary affair, the prospect of a fast,
bulky merchant ship bristling with 6inch guns or their equivalent, was one
that had to be taken seriously.
This, coupled with the deployment of armoured cruisers such as Scharnhorst
and Gneisenau to distant waters, was a problem that battlecruisers were
ideally suited to handle.
Armoured cruisers were too old-fashioned, light cruisers were just that –
too light – to guarantee success.
This was, in my assessment, one of the principle reasons for the
establishment of the Fleet Units.
The German desire to acquire colonies, having ‘missed out’ in the first
round through not having been a nation, was realised by the British, and in
my opinion the task of the Grand Fleet was not only to protect the United
Kingdom but to prevent the High Seas Fleet from slipping by and taking part
in an overseas adventure as escort for a convoy of troopships.
Finally, in this quick and dirty response, the fear that the Netherlands,
with its valuable overseas colonial possessions, might decide to side with
Germany, never seems to get a mention, yet, in my assessment, the prospect
was taken seriously in Whitehall. Had this eventuated it would have placed
an entirely different cast on the situation.
As I said, a quick and dirty response. Always remembering that the thread
started off with a question about German developments and not the British
response.
Discussion, either on or off list, more than welcome.
Nothing at this stage on the Fisher destroyer flotilla and submarine
theories. That’s another kettle of fish/can of worms.
Yours aye Bob Nicholls