>Your first point reminds me of the old Anglophobe question, “What is it
>about the British that gives them the ‘divine right’ to have the world’s
>most powerful navy?”
>

No divine right, but in the context of the time and given Britain’s
geographic position and four hundred years of historic momentum, I think
it’s safe to say the Bitish were not going to yield naval supremecy to
Germany without a struggle.

>The second point clarify’s your interpretation. All I can say is that
>anyone who swallows Fischer’s socialist polemics needs to do some more
>reading on the neutral nature of the “relative balance of power.” Paul
>Kennedy’s “The Realities Behind Diplomacy” is a good place to start.

Fischer’s books are tough to take on every point. Yet there is no doubt that
he found the diplomatic smoking guns and nobody will ever look at Imperial
Germany in quite the same way. The German “wish list” very much included
colonial gains. They were secondary to central Europe, as one might expect
given the map, but they were there. I am not trying to deny the differences
between the 2d Reich and the Third. However, the perception throughout most
of Europe of Germany as a threat, as opposed to the bastion of a
conservative political order, was the gift of the Kaiser to his grateful
nation. For what its worth, many of his own ministers cringed when their
Ceaser had a bad day. The German Navy, as designed by Tirpitz, and supported
by the Kaiser, was a prolonged bad day and did more than any single factor
in bringing England into the midst of pre-1914 European diplomatic affairs.
It is true that on some issues London and Berlin cooperated. Yet the outline
of two hostile alliances was clear to anyone with eyes by August 1914. In my
opinion, this development would have been very unlikely without the
poisoning of relations between Britain and Germany. Perhaps the war would
have taken place anyway: if it had, there may well have been a
different winner.

>Fischer is an odd choice for you to use anyway, as the main victims of
>expansionist wartime (I won’t even bring up Fischer’s retroactive
>errors) German war aims were in Eastern Europe, not the British or
>French overseas empires.
>
>Timothy L. Francis
>Historian
>Naval Historical Center
>email address: Francis.Timothy@nhc.navy.mil
>voice: (202) 433-6802
>
>The above remarks are my opinions, not those of the U.S. Navy or the
>Department of Defense
>
>> ———-
>> From: rickt@cris.com[SMTP:rickt@cris.com]
>> Reply To: mahan@microworks.net
>> Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 1998 8:53 PM
>> To: mahan@microworks.net
>> Subject: RE: The Kaiser’s Fleet
>>
>>If I may respectfully disagree with Mr. Francis there was a very big
>>difference between the High Seas Fleet and any other European Navy. As
>>Hegel reminds us, “quantity changes quality.”
>[snip]
>>In light of Fritz Fischer’s findings, I don’t think we
>>dismiss the threat as simple paranoia.
>
>
>
>
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

>
> Furthermore, his assessment of Tirpitz and Wilhelm II being fools that
>essentially got what they deserved is unfortunate because it is not only
>a gross generalization and misrepresentation, but it borders on
>character assassination. If I may, I’d also like to point out that the
>British declared war not because of the actions of the High Seas Fleet,
>but because the Imperial Army violated the treaty safeguarding the
>territorial integrity of Belgium. And as to the building of a
>medium-sized navy to deal with “Russia or France”, it appears that the
>treaty obligations of both aforementioned countries would have ensured
>that the Germans would have had to have a navy capable of dealing with
>both Russia and France. Finally I would like to say that “creating the
>impression” that you are a threat, does not necessarily mean that an
>actual threat is posed, at least as it is perceived by those who make
>policy.
>
> Chris Havern
>

I have seen every self-evident truth in the field of diplomatic history
“revised” in my generation. It’s the best way to get noticed. If you watch
carefully you can see the rehabilitation of at least elements of the Nazi
regime. Churchill has recently been portrayed as the man who unnecessarily
prolonged WWII, but also destroyed the British Empire in the process. Our
own various Cold War “revisionist” debate says a lot more about the US than
it does about the history of the Cold War. So allow me to be a little less
than impressed by news of “new research” concerning the Anglo-German naval
race.

It is no secret that Fischer had a lot of things on his fertile mind. (The
US for one.) The battlecruiser was a bad idea that sounded good. However it
is very bad history indeed to equate the arms race between Britain and
Germany with Fischer. He he was only one party and not the most important.
As E. Kehr argued in the 1930’s, the German fleet became the symbol of an
expansionist Germany (or at least a nation deprived of its “place in the
sun”) both inside Germany and out. The poisoning of relations between the
Germans and London should hit one on the head if you stand back a foot or
two. Prior to the German naval bills, Anglo-German relations were very good,
and had been for generations. Britain had maintained neutrality during
Bismarck’s wars and existed in a state of “splendid isolation” with no
evident desire to grow intimately involved in continental rivalries. We can
now see the Kaiser as a misunderstood, basically nice enough fellow who
wanted to please everybody if we like. At least he wasn’t Hitler.
(Personally, I think the Kaiser was the Crown Prince’s father in every sense
of the term and that is not a compliment.) At the time, his bombast, love of
military display, escapades in Morocco made Germany appear to be aggrieved
at its position in Europe, militarily powerful and potentially very
dangerous. The Kaiser chucked a perfectly good relationship with Russia out
the window soon after he fired Bismarck. (We take it for granted, but an
alliance between Czarist Russia and Republican France – when the French
Revolution was still very much alive in Europe’s political memory – came as
quite a shock.) Only the Kaiser could have shifted Britain from a position
of lofty neutrality to something close to a binding alliance with France by
1914. (The “division of labor” between the British and French navies prior
to 1914 would have had traditional British statesmen spinning in their
graves. It also says something about Tirpitz’s bathtub toys and their impact
on diplomacy.)

I do not argue for a mono-casual approach to the beginning of WWI. However,
I don’t see how you can chuck 75 years of diplomatic history out of the
widow and not see that when Britain was confronted by a naval rivalry from
Germany it had a drastic impact on British policy and was central to
Britain’s addition to the Triple Entente. Britain in the years before the
war was undergoing a series of domestic trials. The empire itself was under
domestic scrutiny. Yet not even the Labor Party was able to stop the British
naval expansion. The reason was simple: the Germans were building ships and
the British were determined not to be equalled in an area where their
survival had traditionally rested. That point was so simple and so basic to
the diplomatic history of Europe for three hundred years, it should need no
elaboration.

Play a simple mind game. Picture in 1900. The Kaiser proclaims the intention
of Germany to equal the naval might of Russia or France. In a decade Germany
builds a fine fleet, but one that is significantly smaller than Britain’s.
In the meantime, Tirpitz, the Kaiser and their imperialist supporters keep
their mouth shut. Do you think Britain would have been closely aligned with
France and Russia by 1914? They might have protested, but do you think they
would have declared war on Germany because of Belgium. And had they done so,
would the staff talks between Paris and London that allowed Britain’s
intervention to play a crucial role at the Marne taken place? I doubt all of
these things very much.

I was in Washington on and off during the 70’s. Even US military leaders and
think-tank gurus that didn’t really believe the Red Army was going to come
blasting through the Fulda Gap could not figure out why the Red Navy was
expanding so fast. And they were worried. Put yourself in the shoes, not of
Jackie Fischer, but of Asquith and his government. What would you think
about a very rapid and very substantial increase in German naval power? What
do you see as the motivation in Berlin? Would this effect your diplomacy.
Betcha it would.
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

Bill,

I checked w/my boss who was a junior officer back in the ’50s. He says
that seniority was based on the individual first (if known) and the size
of the ship second–which can be tricky if the warships are roughly the
same size. It was never based, to his knowledge, on a “senior” Navy.

Apparently, when operating in a region with lots of other warships,
local commanders tend to circulate lists of officer and ship seniority
lists precisely to avoid the error of a junior officer of one navy not
rendering honors to a senior officer of another.

I guess that would mean the U.S. destroyer would not hesitate to render
honors to the British CV.

Timothy L. Francis
Historian
Naval Historical Center
email address: Francis.Timothy@nhc.navy.mil
voice: (202) 433-6802

The above remarks are my opinions, not those of the U.S. Navy or the
Department of Defense

> ———-
> From: Bill Riddle[SMTP:riddleb@fhu.disa.mil]
> Reply To: mahan@microworks.net
> Sent: Thursday, January 22, 1998 8:44 AM
> To: mahan@microwrks.com
> Subject: Passing Honors
>
> A thought in passing…
>
> When war ships pass each other (usually in the channel) they
> render
> “Passing Honors.” Which is the junior saluting and the senior
> returning the salute, based on the rank/date of rank or the
> captain.
>
> Again, I seem to recall that, when this involved ships of
> different
> nations, it was the “junior” navy that saluted the senior navy.
> And
> the US Navy was the senior navy in the world, so did not render
> honors
> to anyone, rather returned the salute when it was rendered.

Mr. Rowlett,

It is not my intent to engage in an ad hominem exchange, but I would
suggest to you that Jon Sumida’s book is very broad and implicitly takes
the conventional wisdom head on and proves, not that it is wrong or
stupid, but that it could not possibly be right. This is borne out by
the depth and breadth of the documentation cited in the footnotes.
Further, the associated scholarship of Nicholas Lambert on Fisher’s and,
by association, Churchill’s plans to build submarines and flotilla craft
for the defense of England against invasion not only bolsters this
conclusion, but carries it even further. In short, the “conventional
wisdom” on the subject of the Anglo-German Naval Race and the outbreak
of World War I has been shown to be not only inaccurate from a
historical perspective, but from a contemporary one as well. If that
were not the case, then Jon Sumida’s and Nichaolas Lambert’s scholarship
would not be the exceptions to the “conventional wisdom” that they are.

May I respectfully suggest that you read, or reread, In Defence of
Naval Supremacy, The Pollen Papers, and Jon Sumida’s articles in various
journals along with Nicholas Lambert’s book and recent articles. Then if
you still disagree with me, then we will have to just agree to disagree.

Sincerely,

Chris Havern
>

Taking a quick look in Sumida’s “Inventing Grand Strategy and Teaching
Command: The Classic Works of Alfred Thayer Mahan Reconsidered” (1997),
one finds that a) Mahan has more than just “one thesis” b) it seems
Mahan’s viewed individual ship designs as unimportant and c) I might
speculate that if Mahan rejected a Dreadnought-type program, it was done
so not because of its design, but for financial reasons. He wrote (in
1911) that “To prepare for war in time of peace is impractical to
commercial representative nations, because the people in general will
not give sufficient heed to military necessities, or to international
problems, to feel the pressure which induces readiness.” (88)

Of course, he wrote that line when the British government was still
struggling with vast amounts of social spending, to the significant
detriment of the Royal Navy. That probably influenced his thinking.

Timothy L. Francis
Historian
Naval Historical Center
email address: Francis.Timothy@nhc.navy.mil
voice: (202) 433-6802

The above remarks are my opinions, not those of the U.S. Navy or the
Department of Defense

> ———-
> From: Brooks Rowlett[SMTP:brooksar@indy.net]
> Reply To: mahan@microworks.net
> Sent: Thursday, January 22, 1998 12:12 PM
> To: mahan@microworks.net
> Subject: Re: The Kaiser’s Fleet
>
>And by the way, didn’t Mahan say the DREADNOUGHT was a mistake and >the
US should not follow suit? The idea being that individually powerful
ships
>wre contrary to his thesis? Of course he said this before director
>control and the advantages of all big guns combined with the produciton
>rates to make dreadnought – style BB’s the new standard.

>
> Mr. Rowlett,
>
> Quite simply, if the conventional wisdom “is not correct” then why
> continue to press an argument based on it?
>
> Chris Havern

Note my phrasing: The origin of how the British battlefleet came to be
created in the manner that it was. I was discussing, and I believe the
argument that I partly agree with was also discussing, the origin of
the First World War itself, with also reference to the FUNDING of the
British battle fleet (one of Sumida’s points being ‘affordable Imperial
defence’). That is a very different issue from the creation of the
DREADNOUGHT and the desire for battlecruisers being subsumed into repeat
dreadnought-type BB’s instead of BC’s. The conventional wisdom on
that subject, rather broader than Sumida’s topic, does still seem to
apply. To me it appears that the Kaiser & Tirpitz chose the wrong
answer to what I call ‘The US Naval War College Question*’ – “What do you
want the world to look like in ten years and what steps are you going to
take to make it turn out that way?”

* I call it that because it seems to have been a prominent question
offered by NWC moderators in political seminar games in the late 80’s.

And by the way, didn’t Mahan say the DREADNOUGHT was a mistake and the US
should not follow suit? The idea being that individually powerful ships
wre contrary to his thesis? Of course he said this before director
control and the advantages of all big guns combined with the produciton
rates to make dreadnought – style BB’s the new standard.

> > > >———-
> >From: Brooks Rowlett[SMTP:brooksar@indy.net]
> >Sent: Thursday, January 22, 1998 9:56 AM
> >To: mahan@microworks.net
> >Subject: Re: The Kaiser’s Fleet
> >
> > Sumida et al effectively point out that the conventional wisdom of how
> >the British Battle Fleet of World War I came to be, is not correct.
> >However, the PUBLIC PERCEPTION of the threat of the German battlefleet, and
> >its
> >continual harping by British politicians and naval officers, cannot be
> >discounted. Whatever the reasons that the British Battle Fleet evolved as
> >it did, all those other historians weren’t WRONG, they were INCOMPLETE:
> > There was considerable public opinion that the Imperial German Fleet was
> >a threat; there was a public perception of challenge and rivalry; and
> >there was public support driven by this perception of threat for the taxes
> >that payed for the British Battle Fleet. While it may be true that the
> >crossing of the Belgian border by German troops was the final impetus
> >toward war, nontheless the succession of crises and the buildup of the
> >Hochseeflotte, contributed to the mood that made the declaration of war
> >publicly acceptable.
> >
> >Navies don’t declare war; politicians and governments do. Those are far
> >more vulnerable to public perceptions. From that viewpoint, the remarks
> >about the lack of wisdom of Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II retain validity.
> >I would suggest, however, that they might have found it more preferable
> >to publicly declare the nature of the ‘Riskfotte’ concept, that while
> >they didn’t necesarily think they could beat the Royal Navy, they could
> >cause it so much damage that Britain would aquiesce to various German
> >goals rather than be drastically weakened and left vulnerable to a much
> >more minor power. This might have been perceved as less of a challenge.
> >
> >I think my point is that in politics and saber-rattling, perceptions are
> >very important – the perceptions and blunders that led to the outbreak fo
> >the First World War being the classic case in point. Whatever the truth
> >about the design origins and missions of the fleets of Britain and
> >Imperial Germany, nonetheless it was the perceptions of those in the minds
> >of the politicians that contributed to the outbreak of the war – and the
> >accuracy of those perceptions was irrelevant to the decisions. One makes
> >decisions on what one THINKS one knows -even if that later turns out to
> >not be true!
> >
> >- A ‘middle of the road’ answer,
> > – Brooks.
> >
> >
> >
>

Mr. Rowlett,

Quite simply, if the conventional wisdom “is not correct” then why
continue to press an argument based on it?

Chris Havern

>———-
>From: Brooks Rowlett[SMTP:brooksar@indy.net]
>Sent: Thursday, January 22, 1998 9:56 AM
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Subject: Re: The Kaiser’s Fleet
>
> Sumida et al effectively point out that the conventional wisdom of how
>the British Battle Fleet of World War I came to be, is not correct.
>However, the PUBLIC PERCEPTION of the threat of the German battlefleet, and
>its
>continual harping by British politicians and naval officers, cannot be
>discounted. Whatever the reasons that the British Battle Fleet evolved as
>it did, all those other historians weren’t WRONG, they were INCOMPLETE:
> There was considerable public opinion that the Imperial German Fleet was
>a threat; there was a public perception of challenge and rivalry; and
>there was public support driven by this perception of threat for the taxes
>that payed for the British Battle Fleet. While it may be true that the
>crossing of the Belgian border by German troops was the final impetus
>toward war, nontheless the succession of crises and the buildup of the
>Hochseeflotte, contributed to the mood that made the declaration of war
>publicly acceptable.
>
>Navies don’t declare war; politicians and governments do. Those are far
>more vulnerable to public perceptions. From that viewpoint, the remarks
>about the lack of wisdom of Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II retain validity.
>I would suggest, however, that they might have found it more preferable
>to publicly declare the nature of the ‘Riskfotte’ concept, that while
>they didn’t necesarily think they could beat the Royal Navy, they could
>cause it so much damage that Britain would aquiesce to various German
>goals rather than be drastically weakened and left vulnerable to a much
>more minor power. This might have been perceved as less of a challenge.
>
>I think my point is that in politics and saber-rattling, perceptions are
>very important – the perceptions and blunders that led to the outbreak fo
>the First World War being the classic case in point. Whatever the truth
>about the design origins and missions of the fleets of Britain and
>Imperial Germany, nonetheless it was the perceptions of those in the minds
>of the politicians that contributed to the outbreak of the war – and the
>accuracy of those perceptions was irrelevant to the decisions. One makes
>decisions on what one THINKS one knows -even if that later turns out to
>not be true!
>
>- A ‘middle of the road’ answer,
> – Brooks.
>
>
>

Brooks Rowlett wrote:
SNIP
>>>From that viewpoint, the remarks about the lack of wisdom of Tirpitz and
Kaiser Wilhelm II retain validity. I would suggest, however, that they might
have found it more preferable to publicly declare the nature of the
‘Riskfotte’ concept, that while they didn’t necesarily think they could beat
the Royal Navy, they could cause it so much damage that Britain would
aquiesce to various German
goals….>>>
SNIP

An interesting parallel with one of the IJN concepts 40 years later–make it
so costly that the U.S. would sue for peace on terms favorable to Japan. It
didn’t work then, either, bringing to mind the old saws about those who
ignore history…and the cost of history going up every time it’s repeated.

John Snyder
John_Snyder@bbs.macnexus.org

Sumida et al effectively point out that the conventional wisdom of how
the British Battle Fleet of World War I came to be, is not correct.
However, the PUBLIC PERCEPTION of the threat of the German battlefleet, and its
continual harping by British politicians and naval officers, cannot be
discounted. Whatever the reasons that the British Battle Fleet evolved as
it did, all those other historians weren’t WRONG, they were INCOMPLETE:
There was considerable public opinion that the Imperial German Fleet was
a threat; there was a public perception of challenge and rivalry; and
there was public support driven by this perception of threat for the taxes
that payed for the British Battle Fleet. While it may be true that the
crossing of the Belgian border by German troops was the final impetus
toward war, nontheless the succession of crises and the buildup of the
Hochseeflotte, contributed to the mood that made the declaration of war
publicly acceptable.

Navies don’t declare war; politicians and governments do. Those are far
more vulnerable to public perceptions. From that viewpoint, the remarks
about the lack of wisdom of Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II retain validity.
I would suggest, however, that they might have found it more preferable
to publicly declare the nature of the ‘Riskfotte’ concept, that while
they didn’t necesarily think they could beat the Royal Navy, they could
cause it so much damage that Britain would aquiesce to various German
goals rather than be drastically weakened and left vulnerable to a much
more minor power. This might have been perceved as less of a challenge.

I think my point is that in politics and saber-rattling, perceptions are
very important – the perceptions and blunders that led to the outbreak fo
the First World War being the classic case in point. Whatever the truth
about the design origins and missions of the fleets of Britain and
Imperial Germany, nonetheless it was the perceptions of those in the minds
of the politicians that contributed to the outbreak of the war – and the
accuracy of those perceptions was irrelevant to the decisions. One makes
decisions on what one THINKS one knows -even if that later turns out to
not be true!

– A ‘middle of the road’ answer,
– Brooks.

Your first point reminds me of the old Anglophobe question, “What is it
about the British that gives them the ‘divine right’ to have the world’s
most powerful navy?”

The second point clarify’s your interpretation. All I can say is that
anyone who swallows Fischer’s socialist polemics needs to do some more
reading on the neutral nature of the “relative balance of power.” Paul
Kennedy’s “The Realities Behind Diplomacy” is a good place to start.

Fischer is an odd choice for you to use anyway, as the main victims of
expansionist wartime (I won’t even bring up Fischer’s retroactive
errors) German war aims were in Eastern Europe, not the British or
French overseas empires.

Timothy L. Francis
Historian
Naval Historical Center
email address: Francis.Timothy@nhc.navy.mil
voice: (202) 433-6802

The above remarks are my opinions, not those of the U.S. Navy or the
Department of Defense

> ———-
> From: rickt@cris.com[SMTP:rickt@cris.com]
> Reply To: mahan@microworks.net
> Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 1998 8:53 PM
> To: mahan@microworks.net
> Subject: RE: The Kaiser’s Fleet
>
>If I may respectfully disagree with Mr. Francis there was a very big
>difference between the High Seas Fleet and any other European Navy. As
>Hegel reminds us, “quantity changes quality.”
[snip]
>In light of Fritz Fischer’s findings, I don’t think we
>dismiss the threat as simple paranoia.