Archive for January, 2009

THE NOT-SO-FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Sat Dec 13 18:56:11 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom7.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Sat, 13 Dec 1997 19:55:34 -0600 (CST)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom7.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: consim-l@net.uni-c.dk, Mahan@microwrks.com,
> “William D. Anderson” ,
> “Louis R. Coatney”
>Subject: Re: THE NOT-SO-FORGOTTEN HOLOCAUST
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
> > Jonathan Gingerich wrote:
> > >
>Which is *exactly* what Jonathan Spence is doing, Jonathan.
>
> > but those numbers seem way off. Jonathan
> > Spence in his history of China says 20,000 rape victims many murdered,
> > 30,000 executed soldiers, 12,000 murdered civilians. Notably absent
> > was any comparison to CCP killings… >>
>
>The American intellectual/academic Left … in its ongoing attack on
> America’s (use of the) nuclear weapon/deterrent and military
> establishment, generally … has not only attacked the justification
> for the atom bombings … minimizing what the human holocaust of
> a U.N. assault on the home islands would be, for example … but in
> a few cases has even attempted to question and/or de-emphasize the
> bestial — un-negotiable, you see — fanaticism of the World War II
> Japanese fascists. It thus joins the Japanese Right’s attempt to
> minimize holocausts of which Nanking is only the most famous. (I
> sense that Japanese Left intellectuals are more hesitant to join
> their Right on this tack … or on anything, knowing how easily
> it(s evil) can resurrect … although there is that one leftist …
> from Nagasaki? … who made the news. (Does anyone have his name?)
>
>But both the Japanese Right and Left are dedicated against Japan’s
> ongoing struggle to be democratic — not that we aren’t losing
> the struggle for democracy, ourselves, these days — and are eager
> to attack America’s credibility as a democratic symbol and ally
> in any way possible.
>
>There have been academic/intellectual “missions” — intellectual
> diplomats, you see — by American Hiroshima revisionist
> historians which have supported … instigated? … Japanese
> historians’ call on American historians to “reassess” the atom
> bombings … i.e., blame Americans for the nuclear holocausts,
> rather than the Japanese fanatics whose refusal to surrender
> necessitated them … shifting the weight of war-guilt off of the
> lid on the A-bomb-sealed tomb of Imperial Japanese militarism.
>
>A year ago, I got kicked off H-Diplo basically because I protested
> the censorship of my mention of this “historical appeasement”
> (… and of my point that the Hiroshima revisionists’ methods and
> fallacies are similar in principle to those of Holocaust revisionists)
> … by America’s pre-eminent diplomatic historian, John Lewis Gaddis
> — now the *chair* of the history department of (where else?) YALE —
> from my summation post on Hiroshima and Nagasaki … which was
> well-received by some of my fellow H-Japan and H-War members
> when it *was* posted there.
>
>[ Nonetheless, the moderators of those lists — Pat Goodwin of UCLA(?)
> and Mark Parillo of KSU — went along with my H-Net-wide purge …
> like good academic careerists. I still haven’t seen/heard any
> announcement of who the new Smithsonian military historian is to
> be, but this fall Kansas State listed an open military historian
> position. Mark has written a good book on America’s submarine war
> in the Pacific, and I’m sure his credentials look impeccable …
> to the unaware … but if *he*’s the new SI military historian,
> there will be another snake loose in the Smithsonian henhouse
> … and I have another reason for this opinion, as well. See my
> written “Enola Gay” testimony in U.S. Senate Hearing 104-40. ]
>
>We are now seeing members of the historical academic Left trying to
> equate us atom bombing the Japanese with Nazis Holocaust exterminations.
> (See one of the articles in the Spring 1995 issue of DIPLOMATIC HISTORY,
> edited at the time (I believe) by Melvyn Leffler … a member of the
> H-Diplo Advisory Board which approved Gaddis’s censorship, incidentally.
> It’s all very inter-connected/”networked,” you see. I should write
> this up. Can anyone suggest where it could get published?) And,
> naturally, analogizing the atom bombings to the *Nazi Holocaust* has
> a powerful emotionalizing/enrighteousing effect on people.
> (Isn’t it interesting that *this* Holocaust analogy is OK, though.)
>
>ABC had 2 programs on the atom bombings in 1995. The first one was
> OK, but the second one (also) dealing with the “Enola Gay” exhibit at
> the Smithsonian was researched by No. 1. Hiroshima revisionist Gar
> Alperovitz and mouth-pieced by Peter Jennings himself, who ended
> it by claiming that it was *U.S. veterans* who were trying to keep
> the truth about what happened from the American people!
>
>The *truth* is that the veterans were protesting the Smithsonian’s
> portrayal of the Japanese fascists as just (innocently?) trying to
> defend their “unique culture” [!!] and of the Americans/Allies/U.N.
> as waging only a war of vengeance. There was only brief/incidental
> mention of the Imperial Japanese fascist *policies* of atrocities.
> The real reason *Smithsonian* cancelled the exhibit, of course, was
> that under pressure from U.S. historical (and academic, generally)
> establishment, it had reneged on its promise to our veterans that it
> would display more realistic death toll figures for the possible
> invasion of Japan.
>
>[ Indeed, we’re lucky we still have a few veterans left to serve as a
> “reality check” to our errant intellectuals. (On WWII-L — before I
> got kicked off … AGAIN … 🙂 … for daring to disagree with a
> pro-IRA diatribe by a favored member of that list … and for joining
> in discussion of non-military topics — I saw the discussion of Yuki
> Tanaka’s claim that U.S.invasion/occupation forces had committed mass
> rape in Japan in 1945-46. This has yet to be picked up on by our Left,
> but I’m sure it’s only a matter of time. Fortunately, a senior member
> of the Occupation MPs is still living to refute this falsehood (like
> General Sweeney has refuted the Hiroshima revisionists). (Mr. Tanaka
> seems to be quoting contemporary charges by Imperial propaganda/
> resistance officials who were yet to be disbanded.) However, our
> “ground truth” veterans are fast dying off.) … ]
>
>That evening (on “Night Line”) however, Ted Koppel presented a more
> balanced treatment of the atom bombings and Smithsonian controversy.
> I think Koppel — who recently did a remarkable job moderating a C-Span
> panel discussion by former national security advisors — may be one
> of the few TV journalists who is genuinely fair … no matter how
> liberal(-minded) he may be. Thus, I am not at all surprised to see
> him making sure that the truth of the Nanking holocaust is known.
> His “Get it right!” [Frank Reynolds/ABC] integrity does honor to his
> profession, and if he were running for President, he’d have *my* vote
> without question. Seriously. As to Jennings, I’ve never watched …
> trusted … his “ABC News” since … wondering who/what is running him.
>
>[I’ll never forget seeing Koppel interviewing a Grenada operation
> battalion commander. The guy was … understandably, considering
> the era … adamantly distrustful and unforthcoming. Ted was treating
> him respectfully — even sympathetically — and you could see how the
> guy’s incorrigible hostility/alienation(/hatred?) was getting to him …
> anguishing him.]
>
>However, Koppel is the remote, uncommon exception among Vietnam generation
> intellectuals/journalists, and our history is being re-written and
> distorted for ideological/political purposes, everywhere. And, it is
> only going to get infinitely … and terminally … worse.
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
>
>On Sat, 13 Dec 1997, David Bolt wrote:
> > Johnathan Spence’s figures are way too low. I spent several weeks > in Taiwan,
> > HK and mainland China researching this holocaust in 1994: interviewing
> > survivors, poring over archives and the like.The death toll at Nanjing
> > undoubtedly runs into six figures, based on records assembled > after the war,
> > including Imperial Japanese Army histories.
> >
> > “Notably absent was any comparison to CCP killings” — this is the standard
> > line from right-wing apologists for Imperial Japan. Does the mass murder of
> > one group of people diminish in importance because someone else came along
> > later and murdered more? The apologists for Imperial Japan in WWII,
> > particularly in the Japanese nationalist political organizations, have been
> > touting this angle since 1949.

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BENSON/GLEAVES?-LIVERMORE?-BRISTOL? hist. summ. and questions .

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Sat Dec 06 11:48:04 1997
>X-Authentication-Warning: ecom4.ecn.bgu.edu: mslrc owned process doing -bs
>Date: Sat, 6 Dec 1997 12:46:10 -0600 (CST)
>From: “Louis R. Coatney”
>X-Sender: mslrc@ecom4.ecn.bgu.edu
>To: consim-l@net.uni-c.dk
>cc: “‘mahan@microworks.net‘” ,
> “The Paper Modellers’ List” ,
> marhst-l@qucdn.queensu.ca, Mahan@microwrks.com,
> MilHst-L@ukanvm.cc.ukans.edu
>Subject: RE: BENSON/GLEAVES?-LIVERMORE?-BRISTOL? hist. summ. and questions .
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>On Fri, 5 Dec 1997, Francis.Timothy wrote:
> > I believe John Reilly’s book is pretty self-explanatory.
>
>I’ll check John again, when I can.
>
> > >As I noted, the previous one-stack SIMS class … of similar >
> > dimensions … seemed to have a superior armament. Why were there >
> > more BENSONs produced instead of SIMS?
> >
> > I don’t pretend to be an expert but a quick look in Friedman, and a
> > quick question of John Reilly, seems to indicate that:
> > a) the Sims were top heavy and overweight, a function of putting a lot
> > of stuff in the 1937 design.
>
>And, as I said, the BENSONs were topheavy too. See below.
>
> > b) they were heavily armed with guns and torpedo tubes with fleet combat
> > in mind–i.e. fleet support missions
> > c) the 1939 design Bensons, on the other hand, stressed depth charges
> > and automatic guns, reflecting a growing concern for convoy ASW and
> > defense from air attack–i.e. sea control missions
>
>But the SIMS had extensive ASW, and they had 40mm guns equalling BENSONs,
> too … with 3 more torpedo tubes, to boot. Did the BENSONs *two*
> (tall) stacks make them *more* topheavy? I think height is often
> overlooked as a de-stabilizing factor.
>
> > d) the latter destroyer was being built during the 1940-41 build-up of
> > the Navy, the Sims were not (too early). Plus we needed lots of these.
>
>Latter (and *slightly* larger), yes, but better? ??
>
> > e) the Fletcher’s are basically the successor to the Sims, these big
> > destroyers were freed from the space limitations of the arms control
> > treaties of the 30s.
>
>The BENSONs were heavier than the SIMSs, and their “ideal” 5-5″/10-tube
> prewar configuration was what the larger wartime (treaty-free) FLETCHERs
> could sport. The BENSONs also had … like the FLETCHERs … *two*
> stacks. Weren’t the BENSONs actually more like the FLETCHERs than
> the SIMSs?
>
>Lou Coatney, mslrc@uxa.ecn.bgu.edu
> www.wiu.edu/users/mslrc/ (FREE game and model MONITOR and WWII DE)

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“Combat Damage”

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Wed Dec 10 20:07:32 1997
>X-Mailer: SuperTCP Internet for Windows Version 5.1 (Mailer Version 1.02)
>From: Peter Sinfield
>Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1997 14:13:20 cst
>Subject: Re: “Combat Damage”
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>At 09:28:36 cst on Thu, 11 Dec 1997 Marc Small wrote in part:
> >
> >torpedo. ZR’s just fell out of the sky … — HTA advocates were
> >made to feel like distant cousins from an unsavory … — LTA was
> >never given a fair trial …
> >
>and more in similar vein.
>
>While those “in the know” might consider it tedious, can I ask – on
>behalf of us who don’t have an in-depth knowledge of (presumably) USN
>terminology and acronyms – that abbreviations such as ZR, HTA and LTA
>are at least explained the first time they are used? It’s most
>frustrating to read what appears to be an interesting thread, but not
>fully understand what is being said!
>
>Thanks for your time.
>
>Peter
>
>
>
>
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>Peter Sinfield
>email: sinfip@anao.gov.au
>~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

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“Combat Damage”

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Thu Dec 11 10:27:54 1997
>From: “Francis.Timothy”
>To: “‘mahan@microworks.net‘”
>Subject: RE: “Combat Damage”
>Date: Thu, 11 Dec 1997 12:26:28 -0500
>X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.0.1457.3)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
> > ———-
> > From: Brooks A Rowlett[SMTP:brooksar@indy.net]
> > Reply To: mahan@microworks.net
> > Sent: Thursday, December 11, 1997 6:41 AM
> > To: mahan@microworks.net
> > Subject: Re: “Combat Damage”
> >
> >V, of course, arose from the carrier designation. CA, for carrier,
> >aircraft, could not be done because it was already cruiser, armored.
> >A lighter-than-air tender, could not be a CL, because that was a light
> >cruiser. And H could not be used, because that was for hospital ship.
> >So, two letters of no previous usage were picked – V and Z.
>
> A couple of clarifications. When the Navy switched to an
>alpha-numeric hull numbering system on 17 July 1920, “C” was used for
>the Cruiser designation. CA referred to “Cruiser, First Line” and CL to
>”Light Cruiser,” a distinction based on size, power, and function, with
>CL covering scouting cruisers. “C” retroactively covered the old
>protected and unarmored cruisers while “ACR” covered armored cruisers.
>These classifications were phased out as the older ships were
>decommissioned. It was not until the London Treaty of 1930 that the
>arbitrary concept of classing cruisers by armament came into being.
>Then CA came to mean heavy cruiser (guns of 6.2-8″) while CL covered
>those 6.1″ or less.
> The CV designation originally meant “Aircraft Carrier, First
>Line.” Carriers were also grouped in the cruiser type-category,
>reflecting the contemporary concept of their mission as reconaissance.
>Not until 6 June 1928 was a separate category for aircraft carriers
>established.
>
>Timothy L. Francis
>Historian
>Naval Historical Center
>email address: Francis.Timothy@nhc.navy.mil
>voice: (202) 433-6802

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LTA and HTA

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Wed Dec 10 20:39:48 1997
>X-Sender: msmall@roanoke.infi.net
>X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.3 (32)
>Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 22:39:03 -0500
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>From: Marc James Small
>Subject: LTA and HTA
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>At 02:13 PM 12/11/97 cst, Peter Sinfield wrote:
> >While those “in the know” might consider it tedious, can I ask – on
> >behalf of us who don’t have an in-depth knowledge of (presumably) USN
> >terminology and acronyms – that abbreviations such as ZR, HTA and LTA
> >are at least explained the first time they are used? It’s most
> >frustrating to read what appears to be an interesting thread, but not
> >fully understand what is being said!
>
>
>Sorry! “HTA” is ‘heavier-than-air’ and “LTA” is ‘lighter-than-air’: these
>are both still current acronyms. The Navy’s rigid dirigible airships were
>given abbreviations to fit them into the Fleet’s schemata for bluewater
>boats, “ZR” was ‘Zeppelin Rigid’, “ZRS” was ‘Zeppelin Rigid Scouting’,
>”ZRN” was ‘Zeppelin Rigid Training’ and a ZRCV for ‘Zeppelin Rigid Aircraft
>Carrier’ was proposed by Burgess for the follow-ons to the AKRON and MACON.
>
>ZR-1 was the US-built SHENANDOAH, a craft seen by both my (then very young)
>parents on her last flight. I’ll get a gutburger next spring at the
>MacDonald’s near her crash site on Interstate 77 in Ohio; she wrecked in
>’25.
>
>ZR-2 was the British R-38, never named, as she exploded before the USN took
>her over. Politics and poor handling caused her demise.
>
>ZR-3 was the German-built LOS ANGELES, one of the two most successful
>airships of all time. She was scrapped in ’38 at Lakehurst.
>
>ZR-4 was the Goodyear-Zeppelin AKRON, which carried four scouting aircraft
>in her belly. She crashed off New Jersey in ’33.
>
>ZR-5 was AKRON’s sister ship, MACON, which carried five aircraft. She
>crashed off of California in ’35, the only rigid airship to meet her end
>in the Pacific.
>
>With all the crashes, it isn’t hard to see why the Fleet rather ignored LTA!
>
>Marc
>
>
>msmall@roanoke.infi.net FAX: +540/343-7315
>Cha robh bas fir gun ghras fir!

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RIMPAC

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Wed Dec 10 18:16:31 1997
>Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 20:15:29 -0500
>From: “Mark J.Perry” >X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.02 [en] (Win95; I)
>To: consim-l@net.uni-c.dk
>CC: MAHAN-L
>Subject: Re: RIMPAC
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>As Terry said earlier, it doesn’t make sense to take 5,000 people out of the
>training loop too early. As for paper exercises, the same thing tends to
>apply. If you take out the centerpiece, it tough to exercise the plan.
>Remember, wargames in the military are less about winning and losing and more
>about training.
>
>Mark Perry
>
>Tracy Johnson wrote:
>
> > > >> the CV Independence was “sunk,” by a Chilean sub, > >
> > This brings into remembrance the old wargame story about how U.S.
> > Navy officials would “not allow” carriers to get sunk in wargames.
> > Although I’m not sure whether this applied to paper exercises only or did
> > it also include fleet maneuvers?
> >
> > Tracy Johnson
> > Computer Associates International Inc.
> > Manufacturing Knowledge (MK) Group
> > – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
> > Minister of Propaganda, Justin Thyme Productions
> > tjohnson@adnetsol.com
> > “Trust No One”
> > “Semper Pollus”
> > ADC-2239-5531

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RIMPAC

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Wed Dec 10 16:29:37 1997
>From: Brooks Rowlett
>Subject: Re: RIMPAC
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 18:03:32 -0500 (EST)
>X-Mailer: ELM [version 2.4 PL23]
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>I can tell you that as a participant in the Global War Game series at the
>Naval War College, I saw US carriers sunk. This included essentially
>manually scored, computer-tracked games; fully computer-scored games; and
>seminar games.
>
>There is a bit of a misconception in this story, but also a consideable
>basis in fact. In an exercise at sea, time , energy, fuel, and the
>inherent danger of operatin on the high seas all are in play. It is
>vitally important that all these resources or danger exposures not be
>wasted; to do otherwise would be shorting the taxpayers their money. thus
>even if an umpire in a naval exercize assess a kill, the loss is not
>’extracted’; rather the ships go through a damage control exercize and
>then continue to play on as if nothing had happened. More recently it
>appears that short – term removal in long-term exercizes has been
>implemented as we saw in the RIMPAC show on Discovery Channel, where ‘
>sunk’ vessels would be out of the tactical picture for six hours, then
>perhaps re-enter the scene as “reinforcements”.
>
>IN the SEACON 89 game at the Naval War College (SEACON was a game series
>designed to take engineers and scientists out of the lab and expose them
>to fleet operations, a larger version of what I did on a small scale when
>I was running training wargames at work) I participated as a player in the
>RED Air Defence Cell. We watched as our comrades in the Strike Cell
>planned and executed a massive attack that destroyed one of three BLUE
>carrier battlegroups to the last ship (we also allocated them a cet of
>fighters out of our assets for strike escort, but these were operated uner
>the strike command so we didn’t really get to play that out).
>
>BLUE knew absolutley that they had suffered a disaster. But this was on
>the second day of a five day game. It would have been a waste to send
>these thirty or so BLUE players home early. So when they arrived for the
>third day, they were told that (a) Effective jamming and a cover and
>deception plan had prevented about half the RED missiles from being
>launched, (b) those missile were restored for game purposes to RED’s
>inventory; (c) Nonetheless half the escorts of this Battle Group were
>sunk, more were damaged, and the carrier was crippled but afloat – and
>their new task was to rescue it and the surviving BG escorts. This new
>task was also a real situation that might be faced, and more to the point
>it klept the people in play and still learning about potential real
>operational problems.
>
>So, yes, the BLUE umpires ‘refloated’ a carrier that had been sunk, but it
>was definitely out of commission, conributed only minimally to future
>operations, and the players didn;t go out thinking tha carriers were
>unsinkable.
>
>Now on the other hand there does till seem to be a persistent belief that
>submarines are an easily handled problem, and a spirit of denial seems to
>exist. Watchers of the RIMPAC show might note the diesel boat which
>notionally put three torps in INDEPENDENCE about 1/2 through the RIMPAC
>exercize….
>
>BUt yet on the other hand, sub drivers have been known to deny that BLUE
>exercize ASW measures had come anywhere close. A GUPPY captain surfaced
>came up to the connig position on the sail and radioed that the
>dummy-warhead torpedo had missed him, but was told by the observing
>airplane to look behind him….where the tail of the torp was
>sticking out of the GUPPY’s plastic sail structure where it had hit,
>pierced, and stuck….
>
>Brooks A Rowlett

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“Combat Damage”

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Wed Dec 10 15:41:38 1997
>X-Sender: msmall@roanoke.infi.net
>X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Light Version 3.0.3 (32)
>Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 17:40:45 -0500
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>From: Marc James Small
>Subject: “Combat Damage”
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>At 04:48 PM 12/10/97 -0500, Eric Bergerund wrote:
> >No doubt wiser heads can fill in this one better than I, but US CVs were
> >most certainly sunk in fleet exercises of the 1930’s. The lessons that the
> >USN drew was that a carrier engagement would be chaotic, fast and very
> >violent for carriers. Not a bad description of 1942 I’d say. The admirals
> >didn’t get it all right prior to Pearl Harbor, but I think they earned their
> >supper during the 1930’s.
>
>
>Well, there was a significant bias in the way damage was assessed in the
>1930’s. BB’s were almost never sunk or even significantly damaged.
>Submarines were sunk with ease. CV’s were blown away by a single shell or
>torpedo. ZR’s just fell out of the sky.
>
>The results were good in one regard, and bad in others:
>
>– Battleship fans were convinced their ships remained invulnerable, a
>feeling not really disposed of until Leyte Gulf
>– HTA advocates were made to feel like distant cousins from an unsavory
>branch of the family, but were allowed to remain at the table and were
>ignored sufficiently to allow them to develop both some >senior admirals
>(King and Halsey, among others) and some fine doctrine which >proved itself
>at Coral Sea, Midway, and on a few occasions thereafter
>– LTA was never given a fair trial
>– Submarines were discounted as unimportant, a factor which did not
>encourage young hard-chargers to volunteer and which did not >cause a fair
>test of the torpedo’s faults. Both of these resulted in a hard time for
>the Silent Service when the strike on Pearl Harbor left our subs as the
>only effective force available in quantity. (Fortunately, the IJN had
>reached the same conclusions, and never gave its submarines >the emphasis
>it should have.)
>
>The lessons of the 1930’s exercizes, fortunately, were not to damn the USN
>into losing the War, as, ultimately, they caused the IJN to lose. But, I
>still wish we’d had a squadron of ZRS’s based at Pearl and patrolling out a
>couple of thousand miles in early December, 1941. It would have been the
>swan song for lighter-than-air, but, how sweet a song it would have been!
>
>Marc
>
>
>msmall@roanoke.infi.net FAX: +540/343-7315
>Cha robh bas fir gun ghras fir!

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Clarification of naval trivia quiz

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Wed Dec 10 14:58:12 1997
>Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 13:56:22 -0800
>From: Mike Potter
>Organization: Artecon, Inc.
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01Gold (WinNT; I)
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Subject: Clarification of naval trivia quiz
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>To clarify: Both ships were sea-going warships with significant
>contemporary combat value. I didn’t have the river gunboat USS =Panay=
>in mind. Question #3 is inapplicable to =Panay= so if you offer her as
>either ship, you might be outscored!
>
>Until Friday 12/12 midnight GMT (Friday 4pm PST) please post guesses/
>answers to potter4@worldnet.att.net or mike.potter@artecon.com. After
>that send to potter4@worldnet.att.net. I’ll post the answers Monday,
>12/15!
>
>You must answer at least 2 correctly to earn a naval historian salute:
>
>1. Identify the first major surface warship to be sunk in combat from
>damage inflicted by hostile air attack.
>
>2. Identify the first major surface warship to be sunk in a naval action
>in which the victor used aircraft for gunfire spotting.
>
>3. Before they were sunk, what did the victim warships from these
>actions have in common?
>
>–

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

RIMPAC

Friday, January 2nd, 2009

From Wed Dec 10 14:48:56 1997
>X-Errors-To:
>Date: Wed, 10 Dec 1997 16:48:18 -0500 (EST)
>X-Sender: rickt@pop3.cris.com
>X-Mailer: Windows Eudora Version 1.4.4
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>From: rickt@cris.com (Eric Bergerud)
>Subject: Re: RIMPAC
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
> >
> >> >> the CV Independence was “sunk,” by a Chilean sub, > >
> >This brings into remembrance the old wargame story about how U.S.
> >Navy officials would “not allow” carriers to get sunk in wargames.
> >Although I’m not sure whether this applied to paper exercises only or did
> >it also include fleet maneuvers?
> >
> >Tracy Johnson
> >Computer Associates International Inc.
> >Manufacturing Knowledge (MK) Group
> >- – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –
>No doubt wiser heads can fill in this one better than I, but US CVs were
>most certainly sunk in fleet exercises of the 1930’s. The lessons that the
>USN drew was that a carrier engagement would be chaotic, fast and very
>violent for carriers. Not a bad description of 1942 I’d say. The admirals
>didn’t get it all right prior to Pearl Harbor, but I think they earned their
>supper during the 1930’s.
>Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

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The Mahan Naval Discussion List hosted here at NavalStrategy.org is to foster discussion and debate on the relevance of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's ideas on the importance of sea power influenced navies around the world.
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