From Thu Oct 23 09:14:18 1997
>Date: Thu, 23 Oct 1997 09:12:27 -0700
>From: Mike Potter
>Organization: Artecon, Inc.
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01Gold (WinNT; I)
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Cc: dbolton@adnc.com
>Subject: NKorea Doubts US Military Strength
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>NKorea Doubts US Military Strength
>
>By Robert Burns
>Associated Press Writer
>Tuesday, October 21, 1997; 3:40 p.m. EDT
>
>WASHINGTON (AP) — North Korea believes the United States would abandon
>the Korean Peninsula in less than a month if an opening rocket and
>artillery barrage could inflict at least 20,000 U.S. casualties, a North
>Korean defector said Tuesday.
>
>Choi Joo-Hwai, who was a colonel in the Korean People’s Army when he
>defected to the South in 1995, told a congressional panel that North
>Korea’s leaders do not view America’s superior military strength as an
>assurance the South would prevail in a war.
>
>”If a war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, the North’s main target
>will be the U.S. forces based in the South and in Japan,” Choi said
>through an interpreter. “That is the reason that the North has been
>working furiously on its missile programs.
>
>”Kim Jong Il believes that if North Korea creates more than 20,000
>American casualties in the region, the U.S. would roll back and North
>Korea will win the war.”
>
>There are about 37,000 American troops in South Korea, and an additional
>45,000 in Japan. The United States is committed to defending South Korea
>against the communist North; American forces fought alongside the South
>in its war against the North in 1950-53, and a sizable American force
>has remained on the peninsula ever since.
>
>U.S. estimates of likely wartime casualties in Korea vary widely. Army
>Gen. Gary Luck told Congress in 1995 while he was commander of U.S.
>forces in Korea that a war with the North could cost 80,000 to 100,000
>American lives and a million overall on both sides.
>
>Choi said the North’s leader, Kim Jong Il, who has held command of the
>military since 1991, figures his forces would prevail over the South if
>American reinforcements could be held at bay for 20 to 30 days. Central
>to this strategy is the North’s development of ballistic missiles
>capable of reaching Japan and Okinawa, he said.
>
>Choi testified before the international security subcommittee of the
>Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, along with Ko Young-Hwan, a
>Foreign Ministry official who defected from his post at the North Korean
>Embassy in the Congo in 1991.
>
>The two defectors spelled out in detail the evolution of North Korea’s
>ballistic missile development, which Ko said dates to 1965 when Kim Il
>Sung, the communist nation’s founder, declared it “imperative” to have
>missiles that could reach Japan.
>
>The United States has engaged North Korea in negotiations aimed at
>curbing its missile buildup, including its exports of missiles to Egypt
>and other Middle Eastern nations. North Korea broke off the talks in
>late August after a high-level defection by a diplomat believed to have
>extensive knowledge of North Korea’s missile exports.
>
>Ko said his brother, Ko Bang-nam, was a missile engine designer who
>shared sensitive information with him before he lost contact when he
>defected in 1991. Ko said he feared that his public testimony before
>Congress might lead to further retribution against his brother, who was
>made a political prisoner after Ko’s defection.
>
>Ko said his brother had told him North Korea managed to obtain
>French-made Exocet anti-ship missiles and American Stinger air defense
>missiles, which it then reverse-engineered to produce copies of its own.
>He said he did not know who sold the missiles to the North.
>
>Choi said North Korea has developed longer-range surface-to-surface
>missiles with a range of 1,000 kilometers (about 620 miles), and is in
>the “final stage” of developing a missile, dubbed the Taepodong, with a
>range of 5,000 kilometers (3,100 miles). That would, in theory, put the
>western edge of Alaska within North Korea’s range.
>
>Sen. Thad Cochran, R-Miss., chairman of the subcommittee, said of the
>testimony: “This is more than a wake-up call. This ought to be a call to
>general quarters.”
>
>Adm. Joseph Prueher, commander in chief of U.S. forces in the Pacific,
>said last month the United States has seen no evidence that North Korea
>has deployed the new missiles with a range of 620 miles.
>
>© Copyright 1997 The Associated Press

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Thu Oct 23 20:48:19 1997
>Date: Thu, 23 Oct 1997 23:42:17 EST
>From: EDWARD WITTENBERG
>To: MAHAN@MICROWRKS.COM, MILHST-L@UKANVM.CC.UKANS.EDU
>CC: wew@papa.uncp.edu
>Subject: Coronel and the Falkland Islands – part 1
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>Several weeks ago I came across and purchased a work entitled _Sea
>Battles of the 20th Century_ (London: The Hamlyn Publishing Group
>Limited, 1975) by George Bruce. Since I’ve always had an interest in
>World War I naval tactics (especially those connected with commerce
>warfare — raiders and submarines) I was particularly pleased to see
>that the work included a comprehensive section dealing with the Battle
>of Coronel and the Battle of the Falkland Islands. I have extracted this
>section and am posting it to the list for others to enjoy. I have found
>this book to be a very good read, and would urge list members to
>attempt to acquire their own copies. As always, questions or comments
>are welcome.
>
>Edward Wittenberg
>wew@papa.uncp.edu
>
>
> Coronel and the Falkland Islands
> November-December 1914
>
> Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee, commander of Germany’s East
> Asiatic Squadron, had concentrated his five ships at the secret meeting
> place of Easter Island from 12-19 October 1914. The squadron consisted
> of the two armoured cruisers, the Scharnhorst (flagship) and Gneisenau,
> and three light cruisers, Nurnberg, Dresden and Leipzig, with their
> attendant chartered steamers for coaling and supplies.
>
> Von Spee’s situation was not an enviable one when war broke out.
> If he tried to make for Germany, sooner or later his course would
> become known and the British fleet would concentrate to destroy him. If
> he had tried to help hold the German colony and base of Tsingtau, in
> China, he would merely have invited a Japanese blockade and brought to
> an end his squadron’s useful life. His role, therefore, was clear: he was
> to carry out hit-and-run warfare against enemy merchant ships and
> neutral vessels carrying enemy supplies, while inflicting any other
> damage possible upon the British overseas.
>
> It was a role that was bound to end in disaster. Count von Spee,
> seen in contemporary photographs as tall and burly with a neatly
> trimmed iron-grey beard and that look of moral earnestness which
> bespeaks a stern sense of duty, described his situation thus: ‘I cannot
> reach Germany. I must plough the seas of the world doing as much
> mischief as I can, until my ammunition is exhausted, or a foe far
> superior in power succeeds in catching me.’
>
> The very mobility of von Spee’s squadron was a threat to the
> Allies, for until it was destroyed he could strike both at merchant
> shipping in the vital South Atlantic trade routes and vessels sailing
> across the Indian Ocean with urgently needed food and wool from
> Australia and New Zealand.
>
> Rear-Admiral Sir George Patey’s powerful cruiser squadron on the
> Australian station was, of course, more than able to deal with the best
> of Spee’s ships. This squadron included the 18,000-ton battle-cruiser
> Australia, with a speed of 25.8 knots and eight 12-inch guns, as well as
> the light cruisers Sydney and Melbourne, and the older Encounter, with
> a speed of 25 knots and eleven 6-inch guns. Unfortunately Patey’s
> squadron was at this time engaged in the seizure of German colonies in
> the Bismarck Archipelago and Samoa, although this operation, in terms of
> priorities, should have come second to the destruction of Spee’s ships.
> For Patey had next to make ready for convoying the Australian and New
> Zealand expeditionary forces to Europe.
>
> When, on 14 September 1914, the Admiralty learned that Spee’s
> squadron had been sighted off Samoa and that the commerce raider
> Emden, the sixth ship of his squadron, was at large in the Indian Ocean,
> fears for the safety of the Anzac convoy were voiced. Despite the need
> for these troops to help stem the German drive through France, the
> sailing of the convoy was delayed until the situation became clearer.
>
> Vice-Admiral Sir Martyn Jerram’s China Squadron could also have
> contributed to the destruction of Spee’s force. It consisted of the
> armoured cruisers Minotaur (flagship) and Hampshire; the light cruisers
> Newcastle and Yarmouth; and at Hongkong, in reserve, the pre-dreadnought
> battleship Triumph. In mid-August a signal to Jerram, evidently sent by
> the First Lord, instructed him to proceed with the destruction of the
> Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, ‘as soon as possible’, with the Minotaur,
> Hampshire and the French cruiser Dupleix, although no indication was
> given as to the enemy’s whereabouts.
>
> Jerram believed that interference with British trade in the East
> Indies was probably the object of the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and
> for two weeks he carried out an unsuccessful search around the Java
> Sea. Then, in mid-September, when Spee was off Samoa some 3,000 miles
> to the west, Jerram signalled that he believed the enemy squadron
> would next appear off the South American coast. He then proposed that
> he should establish his flag ashore so as to control his force more
> effectively. and this he did, at Singapore.
>
> Hampshire, originally ordered to reinforce the Anzac convoy soon
> to sail for Europe, was now ordered to join the search for the
> brilliantly successful commerce raider Emden, with Yarmouth, Dupleix and
> the Japanese cruiser Chikumo. The Minotaur and another Japanese
> cruiser, Ibuki, replaced her in the Anzac convoy. Thus, Jerram’s ships
> seemed to have been fully occupied.
>
> At this point, just before Cradock was set on the course which
> was to end in his encounter with von Spee, one still marvels, even after
> the passage of sixty years, at the hopelessly muddled handling of the
> danger posed by von Spee. Almost from the start there was a failure to
> establish as overriding priorities the destruction of the enemy’s naval
> forces in the South Pacific and the creation of the kind of force there
> capable of doing so.
>
> Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock was in the West Indies when
> he began to be drawn into the drama which was to end so tragically for
> him. Perhaps it was a devotion to duty beyond the high sense of it
> common to nearly all of the Navy’s senior officers that led him to
> assume charge of the entire west coast of South America.
>
> In mid-August two of von Spee’s cruisers, Dresden and Karlsruhe,
> appeared in the Atlantic. Cradock pursued them through the West Indies
> and along the South American coast. The Karlsruhe escaped east into the
> Atlantic and for some weeks was not heard of, while the Dresden
> rounded Cape Horn on 16 September 1914, steamed up the coast of Chile,
> then turned west to join Admiral von Spee at Easter Island on 12
> October.
>
> Cradock, who had transferred his flag from the Suffolk to the
> faster armoured cruiser Good Hope, sailed south, and at Santa Catarina
> Island, about 400 miles southwest of Rio de Janeiro, received from the
> Admiralty these curiously vague instructions:
>
> There is a strong probability of the Scharnhorst
> and the Gneisenau arriving in Magellan Straits
> or on west coast of South America. Germans
> have begun to carry on trade on west coast of
> South America. Leave sufficient force to deal
> with Dresden and Karlsruhe. Concentrate a
> squadron strong enough to meet Scharnhorst
> and Gneisenau, making Falkland Islands your
> coaling base. Canopus is now en route to
> Abrolhos. Defence is joining you from
> Mediterranean. Until Defence joins, keep at
> least Canopus and one County class cruiser with
> your flagship. As soon as you have superior
> force, search Magellan Straits, with squadron,
> being ready to return and cover River Plate, or,
> according to information, search north as far as
> Valparaiso, break up the German trade and
> destroy German cruisers. Anchorage in the
> vicinity of Golfo Nuevo and Egg Harbour should
> be searched. Colliers are being ordered to
> Falkland Islands. Consider whether colliers
> should be ordered south.
>
> As if the Navy’s most powerful and up-to-date battle cruisers
> were Cradock’s to command, the Admiralty instructions spoke in a matter
> of fact way of his dealing with Dresden and Karlsruhe, while at the
> same time concentrating a squadron ‘strong enough to meet Scharnhorst
> and Gneisenau’, when these last two ships alone were more than a match
> for his entire squadron. Both of them, launched in 1906, were protected
> by a belt of 6-inch armour, mounted eight 8.2-inch, six 5.9-inch and
> eighteen 21-pounder guns, and had a speed of no less than 23 knots.
>
> At this time Cradock’s squadron consisted of the obsolete
> battleship Canopus, which had a speed of 12 knots and a main armament
> of four 12-inch guns of obsolete design; the armoured cruiser Good
> Hope, launched in 1903, with a speed of 23 knots, two 9.2-inch, sixteen
> 6-inch and twelve 12-pounder guns; the armoured cruiser Monmouth,
> also launched in 1903, with a speed of 22.S knots and a main armament
> of fourteen 6-inch guns; the Glasgow, a light cruiser launched in 1910,
> with a speed of 25 knots, two 6-inch, ten 4-inch guns; and the Otranto,
> a merchantman armed with a mere eight 4.7-inch guns. All of these
> vessels were weak in both armament and speed compared with Admiral
> von Spee’s powerful squadron.
>
> In addition, von Spee was fortunate in having crack crews on his
> two big armoured cruisers. The Scharnhorst had recently won the Battle
> Practice Cup, for which the entire German Navy competed. Of course,
> Cradock was promised the armoured cruiser Defence which, with four
> 9.2-inch and ten 7.5-inch guns, would enable him to face the enemy on
> more equal terms, but the Canopus, with its hopelessly slow speed, was
> in fact a liability.
>
> Cradock was not to know that, owing to the activities of the
> Emden, a proposal to provide an adequate reinforcement of no less than
> three armoured cruisers had been opposed not only by Prince Louis of
> Battenberg, the First Sea Lord, but also by Jellicoe, who, obsessed with
> the apparent threat of an invasion on England’s east coast, opposed
> releasing any Grand Fleet battlecruisers for the purpose. Churchill
> lamentably failed to assert his authority on this issue.
>
> By mid-October von Spee had received information about the
> presence in the South Atlantic of Cradock’s flagship, Good Hope,
> Monmouth and Glasgow. It led to a decisive change in policy, which he
> outlined to his captains: ‘The presence of strong enemy forces on the
> east coast makes it impossible for the Squadron to carry out its original
> intention of a war against commerce for the present. This purpose is
> therefore renounced and the destruction of the enemy forces is
> substituted for it.’
>
> In early October events began to move towards their conclusion.
> An Admiralty telegram, sent on 5 October 1914, told Cradock that von
> Spee’s squadron was ‘working across to South America.’
>
> The message went on to say that Cradock ‘must be prepared to
> meet them in company. Canopus should accompany Glasgow, Monmouth
> and Otranto, and should search and protect trade in combination’. The
> telegram meant that these four ships alone were considered strong
> enough to meet the enemy force and that they were to move north up
> the west coast of South America as far as Valparaiso, where trade in the
> area was centered.
>
> Churchill subsequently made it clear that, in his view, Cradock’s
> squadron was perfectly safe as it was accompanied by the Canopus. ‘The
> Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would never have ventured to come within
> range of her 12-inch guns’, he wrote. ‘To do so would have been to
> subject themselves to very serious damage without any prospect of
> success. The old battleship, with her heavy armour and artillery, was in
> fact a citadel around which all our cruisers in those waters could find
> absolute security.’
>
> It was an opinion founded upon the theoretical situation, not upon
> the speed and firepower of Canopus as she then was, for her 12-inch
> guns had in fact a few hundred yards less range than the 8.5-inch
> guns of the two big German cruisers.
>
> Some anxiety over his position now began to appear in Cradock’s
> signals to the Admiralty. In the first of two signals on 8 October,
> referring to intelligence of the concentration of von Spee’s squadron, he
> said: ‘I intend to concentrate at Falkland Islands and avoid division of
> forces. I have ordered Canopus to proceed there, and Monmouth,
> Glasgow and Otranto not to go farther north than Valparaiso until
> German cruisers are located again … When does Defence join my
> command ?’
>
> In a second telegram that day, Cradock proposed that it was
> ‘necessary to have a British force on each coast strong enough to bring
> them into action’, in the event of the enemy’s heavy cruisers
> concentrating on the west coast of South America. Cradock was now
> tactfully informing the Admiralty that he doubted whether his force
> alone was strong enough to meet the enemy, even with the Defence,
> which had not yet joined him, and Canopus.
>
> On 7 October, Glasgow, Monmouth and the armed merchant cruiser
> Otranto steamed north up the west coast of South America while Good
> Hope put into the Falklands. Having deliberated on Cradock’s telegrams,
> the Admiralty finally concluded that the destruction of von Spee’s force
> must be the first priority. On 14 October it sent a telegram to Cradock:
> ‘Concur in your concentration of Canopus, Good Hope, Glasgow,
> Monmouth, Otranto for combined operation. We have ordered Stoddart in
> Carnarvon to Montevideo as Senior Naval Officer north of that place.
> Have ordered Defence to join Carnarvon. He will also have under his
> orders Cornwall, Bristol, Orama and Macedonia.’
>
> Now, for a second time, Cradock expressed his misgivings to the
> Admiralty: ‘I trust circumstances will enable me to force an action, but
> fear that strategically, owing to Canopus, the speed of my squadron
> cannot exceed 12 knots.’
>
> He was saying that at this speed he could not force an action
> upon a squadron capable of 21 knots, which could easily escape him if it
> wished. No less important was the implication that, with its greater
> speed, the enemy could cross his ‘T’, or steam across his course at
> right angles and bring broadsides to bear, while in this situation he
> could return fire only with his forward guns. Cradock reminded the
> Admiralty in this telegram that he was likely to face destruction by this
> classic tactical move.
>
> Fears that von Spee’s squadron might now be nearing the west
> coast of Chile, where his three ships would be at its mercy, now beset
> Cradock. He waited until Canopus arrived on 22 October at Port Stanley,
> only to be faced with the unwelcome news that her engines needed
> overhauling. Leaving instructions for the Canopus to meet him on the
> west coast ‘by way of the Straits’, he steamed off alone to rejoin his
> four ships, without the ‘citadel’ the Admiralty believed was the one
> guarantee of security against the crack enemy squadron.
>
> Good Hope ploughed through the grey seas towards the Horn.
> Dark storm clouds scudded overhead, the wind tugged at masts and
> stays. Cradock would have known that, although he was still under
> orders to bring the enemy to action, he was almost certainly steaming to
> destruction. On 26 October 1914, after rounding the Horn, in his third
> and final telegram on the issue, he made a bold move to strengthen his
> squadron.
>
> ‘With reference to orders to search for enemy and our great
> desire for early success, I consider that owing to slow speed of Canopus
> it is impossible to find and destroy enemy’s squadron. Have therefore
> ordered Defence to join me after calling for orders at Montevideo. Shall
> employ Canopus on necessary work of convoying colliers.’
>
> Admiral Stoddart at once contended to the Admiralty that he
> should be given two fast cruisers to replace Defence, if this vessel was
> given to Cradock. The Admiralty accepted Cradock’s challenge,
> countermanded his order and bluntly replied: ‘Defence is to remain on
> East Coast under orders of Stoddart. This will leave sufficient force on
> each side in case the hostile cruisers appear there on the trade routes.
> There is no ship available for the Cape Horn vicinity. Japanese
> battleship Hixen shortly expected on North American coast. She will join
> with Japanese Idzumo and Newcastle and move south to Galapagos.’
>
> There is no absolute proof that this telegram reached Cradock. On
> the other hand, the intelligence officer with the squadron, Lieutenant
> Lloyd Hirst, who was on board the Glasgow at Vallenar on the evening
> of 27 October, relates that Cradock sent her on ahead to Coronel to
> collect local intelligence reports and to find out the Admiralty reaction
> to his bold order for Defence to join him. Also, as the Official History
> states: ‘He was still hoping, it would seem, to receive a modification of
> the instructions, which, as he conceived them appeared impracticable . . .
>
> Hirst boarded the Monmouth and Good Hope to collect letters from
> home before leaving for Coronel. ‘In the wardroom, a fight within a few
> days was considered inevitable’, he relates, ‘but there was not much
> optimism about the result; two of the Lieutenant-Commanders in
> Monmouth, both old shipmates of mine, took me aside to give me farewell
> messages to their wives . . .’
>
> On the night of the 20th, as the Glasgow steamed towards Coronel,
> her wireless operator heard the Leipzig sending signals less than 150
> miles away. Cradock, in Good Hope, therefore steamed northwards with
> Monmouth early on 30 October, having ordered Canopus to follow. The
> armed merchantman Otranto, which had been seeking information in
> Puerto Montt, joined Cradock on 31 October. He also ordered Captain Luce
> of the Glasgow to rendezvous with him some 80 miles southwest of Coronel
> at 1pm on the following day. Evidently, Luce then brought him the
> Admiralty’s signal countermanding his order for Defence to join him.
> It was decisive.
>
> Cradock was known to be a fearless, even impetuous officer, as
> well as an experienced one. Three times he had told the Admiralty that
> his ships were not up to the task of destroying Admiral von Spee’s
> squadron. At last, half an hour after reading his last telegram, he
> appears to have felt that he had reached the point of no return. He
> hoisted the fateful signal: ‘Spread 20 miles apart and look for the
> enemy.’
>
> More wireless signals now indicated the presence of a single
> German ship, the Leipzig, to the north. Cradock, believing on the basis
> of the earlier signals that he was about to meet one ship-an illusion
> which the enemy had skillfully fostered -ordered his squadron to form a
> line of search fifteen miles apart northwest by north and to proceed at
> a speed of ten knots in the order, from east to west, of Good Hope,
> Monmouth, Otranto and Glasgow. But at 4.20pm, before this manoeuvre
> was completed, Glasgow sighted smoke on her starboard bow and altered
> course to steam towards it.
>
> Admiral von Spee had taken on coal from the collier Santa Isabel
> some 40 miles off Valparaiso on 31 October and at 2.50am a German
> steamer signalled him that the British cruiser Glasgow had anchored at
> Coronel at 7pm the previous evening. Von Spee, therefore, had formed a
> line of search and steamed south towards Coronel in the hope of
> trapping and destroying the cruiser after she had left Coronel.
>
> Thus, as Captain T. G. Frothingham states in Naval History of The
> World War:
>
> The German sweep southward in search of
> Glasgow, was thus taking place at the very time
> the British squadron was sweeping north in its
> search for the Leipzig, which the deceptive
> German signals had described as being alone.
> Consequently . . . each squadron was seeking
> one ship of the other squadron, in belief that it
> was an isolated enemy ship-and each squadron
> in ignorance of the fact that finding the enemy
> single ship would mean finding the whole enemy
> squadron. This was the strange situation which
> brought on the Battle of Coronel.

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Thu Oct 23 20:56:34 1997
>Date: Thu, 23 Oct 1997 23:43:14 EST
>From: EDWARD WITTENBERG
>To: MARHST-L@POST.QUEENSU.CA, WWI-L@RAVEN.CC.UKANS.EDU,
> MAHAN@MICROWRKS.COM, MILHST-L@UKANVM.CC.UKANS.EDU
>CC: wew@papa.uncp.edu
>Subject: Coronel and the Falkland Islands – part 2
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>Taken from _Sea Battles of the 20th Century_ (London: The Hamlyn
>Publishing Group Limited, 1975) by George Bruce.
>
>Edward Wittenberg
>wew@papa.uncp.edu
>
>
> Not long after altering course to identify the smoke to starboard,
> the Glasgow sighted three ships-one three-funnelled light cruiser and
> two four-funnelled armoured cruisers. Admiral von Spee’s squadron
> immediately turned in her direction and the Glasgow closed at full speed
> towards the Good Hope, signalling at the same time, ‘Enemy armoured
> cruisers in sight’. Soon another cruiser with three funnels joined the
> enemy ships, which were steaming south in line ahead nearer to the
> South American coast, which was about twelve miles distant.
>
> During Cradock’s search to the north, the Good Hope had steamed
> northwest by north and the other ships northeast by east, so that by
> 4.20pm, when the enemy was sighted, Admiral Cradock’s flagship was
> considerably westward of them. At 4.47pm, after the Glasgow had
> identified the enemy, the Glasgow, Monmouth and Otranto turned west at
> full speed with the intention of forming line of battle in the following
> order: Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow and Otranto.
>
> Inevitably, having regard to the distance, this took time, so the
> chance was lost of forcing an early action before the enemy squadron
> was concentrated. It also allowed von Spee more than an hour to get up
> the necessary steam, for earlier the Gneisenau had started to clean two
> of her boilers and could not approach the 22 knots at which the
> Scharnhorst chased the Glasgow.
>
> An hour later, at 5.57pm, with the enemy approaching about ten
> miles to the north, Cradock attempted to cross in front of the enemy,
> but finding this impossible, owing to the low speed of fifteen knots
> imposed by the Otranto, gave this up and altered course in succession
> to south, with the enemy eastward, on a parallel course.
>
> Lieutenant Hirst, on board the Glasgow, noted: ‘We then tried by
> altering slightly towards them to force an immediate action, the
> conditions being then in our favour, as the setting sun was strong in
> the enemy’s eyes. They declined action, however, by edging away and
> thus maintained their distance at about 15,000 yards.’
>
> Having failed to win this decisive tactical advantage, Cradock
> could still avoid action and steam some 250 miles south while awaiting
> reinforcement by the Canopus. In doing so, however, he would run the
> risk of the enemy escaping him during the darkness or subsequently
> outstripping the slower, but by now more evenly matched British
> squadron.
>
> In the light of his orders he chose to engage at once, and at
> 6.18pm he signalled Canopus: ‘I am now going to attack the enemy.’
> Cradock faced a double handicap, for in these heavy seas his crew of
> RNR reservists and recruits would encounter special problems in
> gunlaying, while many of the 6-inch guns on the Good Hope’s and
> Monmouth’s main decks would not be fought because their casemates,
> constructed too near the waterline, could not be opened in this heavy
> weather.
>
> Shortly before 7pm the sun dipped below the horizon. Admiral von
> Spee had succeeded in snatching the tactical advantage from the
> British. ‘We were now silhouetted against the afterglow, with a clear
> horizon behind to show up splashes from falling shells’, Hirst observed,
> ‘while their ships to us were smudged into low black shapes scarcely
> discernible against the background of gathering night clouds’.
>
> While this significant change was taking place, von Spee gradually
> closed the range. A minute or two after 7 pm, his squadron-Scharnhorst,
> Gneisenau, Leipzig and Dresden-opened fire at a range of 12,000 yards;
> Nurnberg was still some miles away. All that Cradock had feared, but
> had felt himself in honour bound not to avoid, now overwhelmed him.
> From the outset he was faced by twelve of the enemy’s 8.2-inch guns,
> against which he could at this range pit only the Good Hope’s two
> 9.2-inch guns.
>
> The Scharnhorst’s first salvo fell short; her second salvo
> overshot; but her third knocked out the Good Hope’s forward 9.2-inch
> gun before it had fired a single shell, while at the same time the
> Gneisenau hit the Monmouth and set her fore turret afire, which burned
> furiously despite the waves breaking over her bows. Good Hope and
> Monmouth both scored hits on the two heavy enemy cruisers, but none
> of them caused serious damage.
>
> By now the battle was raging furiously. Good Hope was hit
> amidships time after time, shells twice struck her after turret, and soon
> flames raging below were licking out through the portholes. More than
> 30 shells struck the Monmouth, too, and suddenly a great column of fire
> rocketed up on her starboard side. The armed merchant cruiser Otranto,
> whose 4-inch guns were ineffective, had moved out of the action, while
> the Glasgow was dealing effectively with both the Leipzig and Dresden
> with her 6-inch guns.
>
> At 7.45pm Lieutenant Hirst noted that both Good Hope and
> Monmouth were in distress. ‘Frequently either ship flashed into a vivid
> orange as a lyddite shell detonated against her upperworks. Ears had
> become deafened by the roar of our guns and almost insensible to the
> shriek of fragments flying over head from the shells which burst short.’
>
> Monmouth, by now blazing furiously and listing, moved out of line to
> starboard and slowed, forcing the Glasgow, which was behind her, to
> slow down to avoid overtaking her and receiving the stream of shells
> the Gneisenau hurled at her. The flames from the Good Hope, now a
> battered hulk, increased in brilliance, but those few gunners alive still
> fired as and when they could.
>
> The end of the Good Hope came suddenly. ‘At 7.50pm’, noted Hirst,
> ‘there was a terrific explosion on board between her mainmast and her
> after-most funnel, and the gush of flames, reaching a height of over 200
> feet, lighted up a cloud of debris that was flung still higher in the air .
> . . Her fire then ceased, as did also that of the Scharnhorst upon her,
> and she lay between the lines, a low black hull, gutted of her
> upperworks, and only lighted by a dull red glare which shortly
> disappeared’.
>
> The Glasgow, firing upon the dim outline of an enemy light cruiser
> in the half darkness, now received her first hit, on her waterline above
> the port outer propeller, which made a big dent in her plating but
> caused no real damage. But now that the Monmouth had turned away to
> the west, where she was busy trying to put out her fires, the Glasgow
> became the new target for both the enemy heavy cruisers. At 8.15pm
> she stopped firing, so as to avoid drawing the enemy’s fire by the flash
> of her guns.
>
> The enemy vessels now lost contact with both the Glasgow and the
> Monmouth in the darkness, with the moon obscured by clouds most of
> the time. Glasgow, recalled Hirst, closed to Monmouth’s port quarter and
> signalled by lamp: ‘Are you all right ?’ Monmouth replied: ‘I want to get
> stern to sea. I am making water badly forward.’ She was listing to port,
> down by the bows, and fire glowed from her.
>
> In a flash of moonlight, Captain Luce, on the Glasgow, briefly saw
> the enemy ships approaching some distance away in line abreast. ‘Can
> you steer northwest ?’ he signalled. ‘The enemy are following us astern.’
>
> There was no answer. ‘The moon was now clear of the clouds’,
> Hirst observed, ‘and it was obvious that Monmouth could neither fight
> nor fly; so our Captain had to decide whether to share her fate, without
> being able to render any adequate assistance, or to attempt to escape
> the enemy’. Since it was considered essential that the Canopus,
> approaching the area alone, should be warned, Captain Luce reluctantly
> turned away at full speed and lost sight of the enemy at about 8.50pm.
> Afterwards he counted 75 flashes of enemy gunfire upon Monmouth
> before silence, except for wind and sea, returned.
>
> The Nurnberg, approaching the scene of the action at high speed,
> had been ordered to make a torpedo attack. She came upon the
> fireswept Monmouth in the darkness, fired a torpedo which failed to
> strike home, then opened fire at point-blank range. Monmouth seemingly
> had neither her guns working nor gunners living with which to reply,
> but she turned as if to ram. ‘The Nurnberg let loose a hail of shells and
> at 9.28pm the Monmouth capsized and went down.
>
> So ended the Battle of Coronel. It had lasted 61 minutes. Admiral
> von Spee steered north and signalled his squadron: ‘With God’s help a
> glorious victory, for which I express my recognition and congratulations
> to the crews.’ His gunners had fired salvoes at fifteen-second intervals,
> knocking the Good Hope’s forward turret out before she had fired a
> shot. Von Spee noted that the Germans had scored 35 hits on Good Hope
> and that the British ships, handicapped in the heavy sea, were firing
> one salvo to every three from his squadron.
>
> The Admiralty Staff had sent Good Hope and Monmouth to an area
> known for its heavy seas, despite the knowledge that their main deck
> guns could not be fought in these conditions. Both this and the
> inexperience of the gunners resulted in the Good Hope hitting the
> Scharnhorst only twice; the Monmouth hit Gneisenau three times, and the
> Glasgow hit her once. As at Heligoland, the poor design of British shells
> was evident, for the two that struck Scharnhorst both failed to explode.
> In all respects the battle was a disaster for both Britain and her Allies.
> The prestige of the Royal Navy was questioned as never before and
> immediate orders were given for a decisive counter-blow.
>
> Admiral Lord Fisher, ‘Jacky’, the ruthless fighting admiral who
> had re-fashioned the Royal Navy in the pre-war years, had returned to
> his post as First Sea Lord on 30 October 1914, two days before the
> battle, succeeding Prince Louis Battenberg, who was forced to resign
> owing to his German origin. Winston Churchill recalls in The World Crisis
> how on 3 November the Admiralty received the first certain report that
> Spee’s squadron had been located off the west coast of South America
> and how in the evening he, Lord Fisher and Admiral Sturdee, Chief of
> Naval Staff, in a recognition of the realities of Cradock’s situation,
> signalled Admiral Stoddart: ‘Defence to proceed with all possible dispatch
> to join Admiral Cradock on west coast of America.’
>
> At last, posthumously, Admiral Cradock had been granted decisive
> reinforcements. But Churchill discovered that no reinforcements could
> help him now, early on 4 November, when he received a telegram from
> the British Consul General in Valparaiso telling of the disaster at
> Coronel. The news was confirmed a few hours later by a message
> dispatched from Port Stanley by Captain Luce of the Glasgow. Occurring
> as it had done on the same day, 1 November 1914, as the entry of
> Turkey into the war on Germany’s side, it seemed, at the time, an almost
> equal calamity. Lord Fisher acted at once with a bold and comprehensive
> strategical move which totally overshadowed Churchill’s tentative
> proposals. Less than six hours after receiving the news Fisher, risking
> the narrow supremacy of Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet over the German High
> Seas Fleet, ordered Jellicoe to detach two battlecruisers, Invincible and
> Inflexible, for urgent service elsewhere. Admiral Sturdee, whom
> Fisher had replaced by Admiral Oliver as Chief-of-Staff, was appointed
> C-in-C South Atlantic and Pacific, a station covering one half of the
> world’s oceans, and the two ships were ordered to coal at once and
> proceed forthwith to Plymouth to make ready ‘with the utmost despatch’.
> They sailed on their vital mission on 11 November.
>
> Admiral Sturdee’s secret instructions were to steam southwards at
> the maximum economical speed with the Invincible and the Inflexible, coal
> at St Vincent, Cape Verde, and rendezvous with Rear-Admiral Stoddart
> at Abrolhos Rocks, off the coast of Brazil, with the cruisers Carnarvon,
> Cornwall and Kent, which had steamed southwest from Sierra Leone, as
> well as the Glasgow, the Bristol and the armed merchant cruisers
> Macedonia and Otranto.
>
> His task was to seek out and destroy Admiral von Spee’s entire
> squadron. Numerous other dispositions, amounting to 30 vessels, 21 of
> them armoured cruisers, were made to cover the possible appearance of
> Spee in the Pacific, or off the west coast of South America or the Cape
> of Good Hope or, in case he should try to make for home across the
> South Atlantic, the Cape Verde Islands.
>
> Captain Grant, on the Canopus, still beset by boiler troubles, was
> ordered by Lord Fisher to moor his ship so that the entrance of Stanley
> Harbour, Falkland Isles-a very likely target for von Spee-was
> commanded by his guns, if necessary grounding his ship to do so. He
> was also instructed to turn his ship into a fort, stimulate the Governor
> to organize local defence and put guns ashore to help him.
>
> The tabulated list on the next page gives the tonnage, speed,
> armament and completion date of the British vessels under Admiral
> Sturdee which were to take part in the intended battle against Admiral
> von Spee’s squadron:
>
> Ships Classification Completed Displacement Speed Armament
> ————————————————————————–
> Inflexible Battlecruiser 1908 17.250 26.5 8 12-in
> 16 4 in
> Invincible Battlecruiser 1908 17.250 26.5 8 12-in
> 16 4 in
> Carnarvon Cruiser 1904 10.850 22.1 4 7.5-in
> 6 6 in
> Cornwall Cruiser 1904 9.800 24.0 14 6 in
> Kent Cruiser 1903 9.800 24.1 14 6-in
> Glasgow Light Cruiser 1911 4.800 26.0 10 4-in
>
>
> Meanwhile von Spee, putting into Valparaiso with his two heavy
> cruisers and the Nurnberg, had received from the German ambassador
> there a message that the German Admiralty did not believe cruiser
> warfare in the Pacific promised good results-despite the Emden’s and
> Konigsberg’s successes-and that he should try to make his way home.
> This, apparently, was his ultimate intention. Leaving Valparaiso the next
> day, he joined up with the rest of his squadron at Mas-a-Fuera, on the
> same latitude in the South Atlantic, about 350 miles west.
>
> He left a single supply ship with orders to give the impression,
> by constant signalling, that the entire squadron was still there, then
> steamed south and stayed coaling and carrying out repairs in the
> hidden anchorage of St Quentin Bay from 21 to 26 November. Then he
> went south and rounded the Horn on 2 December.
>
> Four days later, at a council of captains, Admiral von Spee
> decided on a plan to destroy Britain’s base in the Falklands, thus
> disrupting her naval operations in the South Atlantic. Captain
> Pochhammer of the Gneisenau wrote later:
>
> We knew to our cost what it meant to
> traverse the seas without a refuge, to cruise
> along interminable coasts without a shelter from
> the wind, the sea or the enemy, with no other
> assistance than that of the cargo steamers we
> had brought with us.
>
> If we succeeded, even temporarily, in
> rendering useless Stanley Harbour, the chief
> port, as a revictualing station for the British
> Fleet, in destroying stocks of coal and
> provisions and the plant installed for refitting
> ships, and finally in paralysing the big wireless
> station which formed part of the network of
> communications of our enemies, we might acquire
> by this feat complete freedom of action for our
> subsequent operations.
>
> A report that the base was undefended because the British
> warships there had sailed for South Africa was decisive. But von Spee
> still intended to make for Germany. One of the German Admiralty
> telegrams which reached him after Coronel asked what his future plans
> were, and Spee replied, ‘A breakthrough by the cruisers to Germany is
> intended’.
>
> Thus he made a fatal error of judgement in deciding to launch the
> Falkland attack. First, because the secrecy of his movements would be
> lost by warning messages by the Falklands wireless station before its
> destruction. Secondly, because German occupation of the base would
> inevitably be of the shortest duration. Third, because the ruse he had
> successfully used of sending out signals at Mas-a-Fuera to give the
> impression that he was still on the west coast of South America would
> be jeopardized, just when it could have been of most use to him in his
> voyage across the Atlantic from south to north.
>
> National and personal pride had marred Spee’s judgement. Having
> had one great success he now yearned for another, evidently not
> realizing that to bring his ships safely home across the world would be
> the greatest triumph, not only because of the new strength it would
> give the High Seas Fleet, but also because of the problems that seeking
> him far and wide all that time would mean for the Allies.
>
> Forgetting all secrecy now, von Spee sailed his squadron along
> the southern coast of Tierra del Fuego, past the straggling coastline of
> Staaten Island, then 300 miles northeast for the Falklands, whose dark
> land masses emerged on the northern horizon just before dawn on 8
> December 1914. At 5am Gneisenau and Nurnberg, with the landing
> parties, went on fifteen miles ahead so as to reach Cape Pembroke at
> 8am, ready for the job of destruction which von Spee had given them.
> Clearly, his arriving so long after daylight with landing parties, instead
> of launching a surprise artillery attack at dawn by the whole squadron
> prior to landing, shows beyond doubt that von Spee was sure he would
> find the base undefended.
>
> Sturdee, steaming down towards the Falklands, had no precise
> information as to von Spee’s whereabouts. He might be anywhere in the
> South Atlantic or Pacific. It was, in the words of Lieutenant-Commander
> Barry Bingham, a gunnery specialist on the Inflexible, like ‘looking for
> a needle in five bundles of hay, if the ships had dispersed and were
> acting independently’.
>
> Lord Fisher’s orders of 24 November were that having joined
> forces with those of Stoddart, Sturdee should ‘move south to the
> Falklands, use this as his base, and then to proceed to the coast of
> Chile, search the channels and inlets of Tierra del Fuego, while keeping
> his big ships out of sight.’ A message Sturdee had received on 4
> December, that the supply ship Prinz Eitel Friedrich-which von
> Spee had left behind on the west coast as a subterfuge-had been
> sighted off Valparaiso, persuaded him that the whole squadron was
> likely to be somewhere off the west coast.
>
> Von Spee now departed from his agreed plan to make a dash for
> home mainly on the strength of an unconfirmed rumour put out by
> British seamen that the base was undefended. Sturdee, led mainly by
> the success of von Spee’s ruse off the coast of Chile with his supply
> ship, forgot his earlier uncertainty and put his entire squadron in at
> the Falklands for coaling before steaming on to the west coast.
> Misjudgment on both sides thus led to the Battle of the Falkland Isles;
> and the main source of illusion, which led to the end of von Spee and
> his squadron, was the presence of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich, signalling
> on the west coast.

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Thu Oct 23 20:48:18 1997
>Date: Thu, 23 Oct 1997 23:44:15 EST
>From: EDWARD WITTENBERG
>To: MARHST-L@POST.QUEENSU.CA, WWI-L@RAVEN.CC.UKANS.EDU,
> MAHAN@MICROWRKS.COM, MILHST-L@UKANVM.CC.UKANS.EDU
>CC: wew@papa.uncp.edu
>Subject: Coronel and the Falkland Islands – part 3
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>Taken from _Sea Battles of the 20th Century_ (London: The Hamlyn
>Publishing Group Limited, 1975) by George Bruce.
>
>Edward Wittenberg
>wew@papa.uncp.edu
>
>
> Admiral Sturdee’s squadron arrived at the Falklands at 10.30am on
> 7 December 1914. Bristol and Glasgow anchored in the inner harbour of
> Port Stanley and the remainder in Port William, the outer harbour. The
> Canopus, already in position, had done much to organize the defence of
> the base. The two light cruisers, Bristol and Glasgow, began coaling
> almost at once and finished in the evening, a wise decision as it turned
> out. Coaling all the remaining ships began at dawn next day, and the
> two battlecruisers had already taken on 400 tons of coal when, at
> 7.35am, came a message from one of the shore look-outs to Canopus: ‘A
> four-funnel and a two-funnel man-of-war in sight from Sapper Hill
> steering northwards.’
>
> Glasgow repeated the message with the signal by flag, ‘Enemy in
> sight’; and to make doubly sure Captain Luce fired a gun. Lieutenant
> Hirst went up to the Glasgow’s masthead and swiftly identified the two
> vessels as Gneisenau and Nurnberg. Surprised while coaling in harbour,
> the British squadron was extremely vulnerable to an immediate attack by
> the German squadron, since most of the ships had colliers alongside.
> Unfortunately, von Spee had thrown away his chances by arriving at
> leisure with only two ships. Not until 8.20am were his other ships seen
> on the horizon.
>
> And not for some time did the German squadron realize that enemy
> cruisers were getting up steam behind the high ridge of Cape Pembroke,
> for they were taken in by the clouds of smoke. ‘Here and there behind
> the dunes’, noted Captain Pochhammer, on the Gneisenau, ‘columns of
> dark yellow smoke began to ascend, and then coalesced and expanded,
> as if stores were being destroyed to prevent them from falling into our
> hands’.
>
> Admiral Sturdee had given his orders at once, the bugles on the
> British ships had sounded ‘Action’, the colliers were cast off, coils of
> smoke poured from the big battlecruisers’ funnels as the stokers fought
> to get up steam in time, and by 8.45 am the cruiser Kent had taken
> position at the mile-wide entrance to the great harbour, with orders not
> to let the enemy out of sight if he chose to move off.
>
> Canopus at last came into her own. Captain Pochhammer had
> already signalled Scharnhorst that he had identified three British
> cruisers (not Inflexible or Invincible) and that he was soon going to
> open fire. Suddenly, at 9.20am, two shells from the 12-inch guns of the
> Canopus dropped a few hundred yards short, seeming to the Germans to
> come from a land battery, for the Canopus was hidden from seaward by the
> spit of land leading to Cape Pembroke, her aim being controlled by
> telephone from a shore observation post. A salvo of three more shells
> followed, one of which hit the Gneisenau by a ricochet.
>
> Von Spee had looked forward to attacking a defenceless base, but
> to find warships there and to see his own ships shelled by an
> apparently powerful concealed land battery was too much. ‘He had no
> desire whatever to engage in a new battle here off the Falkland Islands’,
> declared Pochhammer. Von Spee ordered operations to be suspended and the
> Gneisenau and Nurnberg to rejoin the flagship with all speed. The guns of
> Canopus had saved the ships in harbour and the wireless station from a
> destructive shelling.
>
> Shadowed at 9.45am by the Glasgow and the Kent, the enemy
> squadron made off eastwards at about 21 knots, followed by the rest of
> the squadron at 10am. It was a fine clear morning, with a bright sun
> and almost dead calm. ‘So great was the visibility’, noted
> Lieutenant-Commander Bingham, ‘that on clearing the entrance of the
> harbour we were able at once to take the range of the enemy, the tops
> of whose masts and funnels were just above the horizon. The distance
> was found to be 38,000 yards, i.e., nineteen miles, or nearly twenty-two
> sea miles’.
>
> Probably this was an overestimate, for at 10.48am Glasgow, which
> was three miles ahead, signalled that they were twelve sea miles away.
> The British ships were steaming at 24 knots and gaining steadily, but
> making such dense clouds of black smoke that Admiral Sturdee, on
> board the Invincible, could no longer see the enemy. For this reason,
> and because he was aware that in about two hours he should be able to
> open fire and that Carnarvon, only capable of 20 knots, was dropping
> far behind, Sturdee signalled to Inflexible at 11.26 am that he was
> reducing speed to 20 knots so that his squadron could keep together.
>
> Captain Fanshawe, commanding the Bristol was now ordered to
> proceed with the armed merchant cruiser Macedonia to attack and
> destroy two transports then signalled to be approaching the Falklands.
> They turned out to be the colliers Santa Isabel and Baden.
>
> At 12.20pm, when Sturdee’s officers and men had finished their
> midday meal, the Carnarvon, then steaming at only 18 knots, was still
> far behind. Sturdee, realizing that he could wait no longer, decided to
> press the action and increased speed to 22 knots, and by 12.50 to 25
> knots. He then gave the general signal to engage.
>
> Soon after one o’clock, at 16,000 yards, the Invincible fired its
> first sighting shot at the Leipzig, last in the enemy’s line. It > fell short,
> but the following shots sent great columns of water up all around her,
> and at 1.20pm Admiral von Spee signalled to his three light cruisers,
> ‘Turn off, try to escape’. It was an heroic though desperate attempt to
> save them by drawing on to Scharnhorst and Gneisenau the fire of the
> British heavyweights.
>
> But Sturdee, foreseeing just such an eventuality, had earlier
> instructed his captains that the battlecruisers would fight the enemy
> armoured cruisers, leaving the rest of his squadron to pursue and
> destroy the light cruisers. As the light cruisers Leipzig, Dresden and
> Nurnberg turned away to the southwest, Glasgow, Kent and Cornwall
> immediately swung round to the south and took up the chase without
> Sturdee making any signal.
>
> At the same time, the enemy armoured cruisers turned in
> succession eight points to port, making right-angled left turns to the
> northeast, and increased speed to about 23 knots in line ahead, a move
> which Sturdee followed. Before von Spee had finished his manoeuvre,
> Invincible and Inflexible were racing along on his beam at a distance of
> 16,000 yards.
>
> The battle thus began at 1.20 pm. The Scharnhorst, soon followed
> by Gneisenau, opened fire on the Invincible, Sturdee’s flagship, but
> their shots fell short. Von Spee shortened the range by turning about
> 20 degrees to port, then at 13,000 yards opened fire again and hit
> Invincible. Both British ships replied. Sturdee then turned away to port
> to keep the range beyond the power of the enemy guns, only to obscure
> both his and the Inflexible’s aim by the smoke from his funnels and his
> guns.
>
> But both enemy ships were already hit, the Gneisenau twice, the
> first shell exploding on the upper deck after grazing the third funnel,
> badly wounding an officer and three men, killing a stoker and
> temporarily putting one of her 8-inch guns out of action. The second
> struck her on the waterline, pierced the armour and lodged in a light
> ammunition chamber. Fire threatened, but the chamber was flooded at
> once and the damage limited.
>
> Meanwhile, under cover of the smoke, von Spee turned ten points
> to starboard, thus altering his course right round to southward and
> increasing the range to 19,000 yards. A lull in the battle followed as
> Sturdee followed suit and chased at increased speed, at the same time
> gradually lessening the range, until at 2.47 pm both British ships again
> opened fire at 18,000 yards, and as salvo followed salvo the enemy was
> hit again and again.
>
> Von Spee countered this hail of fire by a sharp turn towards the
> British line, so as to try to bring his twelve 5.9-inch and sixteen
> 8.2-inch guns into action, a move calculated to give him an advantage,
> because the two British battlecruisers mounted only 4-inch guns as
> their secondary armament. Soon, in the face of accurate shooting,
> Sturdee turned away again to stay out of range.
>
> By now the Gneisenau was listing, the Scharnhorst was on fire
> forward and her fast rate of fire was falling off. Certain now that he
> had the enemy mastered, Sturdee swung both his ships in a circle
> outwards and to windward at 3.15pm, to get clear of the curtain of
> smoke obscuring his targets, returning, with the Inflexible leading, on
> the opposite course. According to the British squadron intelligence
> officer, Lieutenant Hirst, ‘the Germans copied this turn, which was
> completed by 3.25pm, leaving both sides steering west by south about
> 12,000 yards apart’.
>
> Frequently now the British 12-inch shells were striking the enemy
> ships. Soon the Gneisenau was in a bad way; Captain Pochhammer noted:
>
> Owing to the great range of the fight, the
> shells fell aslant and consequently hit the thin
> armoured deck more often than the strong side
> plates. Thus they found their way more easily
> into the ship and wrought considerable
> destruction, even in the lower compartments . . .
> The wireless station was destroyed and a deck
> officer had his head blown off there. Another
> shell fell into the after-dressing station, and
> freed some of the wounded from their sufferings.
> The doctor was killed there, and the squadron chaplain
> ended his life of duty.
>
> Several hits below the waterline had flooded two of Gneisenau’s
> stokeholds, despite all the pumps being in action. Dead, mutilated and
> wounded men lay in heaps where they had fallen, her speed fell rapidly
> and she heeled over to starboard, but her gunners fought on with
> steady and accurate fire.
>
> Meanwhile the Scharnhorst had been hit by a hail of 12-inch
> shells. Pochhammer, 2,000 yards away, observed a large hole forward,
> another gaping hole where her third funnel had been, smoke, flames and
> steam rising from her, and flames visible inside her through shell holes
> in her hull. But still her guns thundered.
>
> At 4 pm, when Admiral Sturdee signalled her to surrender, she
> made no reply, but signalled Gneisenau to try to escape while she
> endeavoured to turn her bows towards the British ships and launch
> torpedoes. It was too late. At 4.04pm she heeled over to port, her bows
> submerged and her propellers still revolving. A few surviving crew
> members scrambled from the decks up on to her side. At 4.17pm she
> went down bows first; fifteen minutes later, when the Carnarvon
> approached the spot, there was not a single survivor.
>
> Gneisenau, stricken as she was, with her speed down to about 15
> knots, now turned towards the two enemy cruisers to try to shorten the
> range and bring her 5.9-inch guns to bear, but Sturdee countered the
> move. For nearly two hours Gneisenau doggedly fought on against the
> three British ships from three different bearings at ranges of from
> 10,000 to 12,000 yards. From time to time dense smoke interrupted their
> fire, but one after another the Gneisenau’s guns were put out of action.
> Captain Pochhammer recorded:
>
> The armour-plate of the 9-inch casemate was
> pierced and when the smoke had cleared away,
> the men were all found dead and the gun out of
> action. Another shell exploded on the upper
> deck just above the bed of the 8-inch fore gun.
> It swept the men away as if they had been
> bundles of clothes . . . Our ship’s resistance
> capacity was slowly diminishing . . . Debris and
> corpses were accumulating, icy water dripped in
> one place and in another gushed in streams
> through shell-holes. Wherever it was possible to
> do so efforts were made to man the guns. The
> after turret had long been jammed, only the
> fore turret remaining intact and continuing to
> fire all alone as long as its ammunition lasted.
>
> The last shot the Gneisenau’s stubborn gunners, fired in answer
> to Sturdee’s call to surrender, buried itself deeply in the Invincible’s
> hull. The British ships re-opened fire at 10,000 yards, struck the
> forward turret with a 12-inch shell which flung it skywards and
> overboard, and for a further fifteen minutes devastated the Gneisenau
> until she was a floating, blazing hulk, her foremast shot away, the
> upper deck a shambles of torn steel and blood, and her shattered guns
> pointing drunkenly in the air.
>
> As she began to go down, survivors among her crew paraded in
> an orderly manner on deck, gave three cheers for the Kaiser and their
> ship, then at the order ‘All men overboard’, jumped into the sea or
> slithered down the hull and swam clear. The British ships, between five
> and six miles away, steamed up at full speed as the Gneisenau slowly
> went down stern first, with her bows high. Boats were lowered and some
> 200 of her crew of 850 were picked up, but many of them died of their
> wounds during the night. They were buried at sea next day with full
> military honours.
>
> Admiral Sturdee’s tactics had been brilliantly successful, for in
> this long-range action, although the Invincible had been hit about 20
> times and Inflexible just once or twice, not a single officer or man had
> been killed and none seriously wounded.
>
> During this ruthless encounter, the three German light cruisers
> had been fleeing south with a ten miles start over the Glasgow, Cornwall
> and Kent. The Dresden, fastest of the enemy ships, apparently built up
> to 27 knots and escaped her pursuers to the southwest in the rain
> squalls that intermittently drove across the sea. Captain Luce,
> commanding Glasgow, therefore joined with Captain Ellerton of Cornwall
> to destroy the Leipzig, last ship in the enemy line, while the Kent
> chased eastward after the Nurnberg.
>
> At about 4.15pm the two British cruisers were both hitting the
> Leipzig from about 9,000 yards; later together on the port side to inflict
> the most damage. The Leipzig’s gunners were firing back with their
> smaller, but accurate and destructive 4.1-inch guns and registering hits.
>
> There were some narrow escapes and some casualties on the
> Glasgow. A dud shell ripped through her foretop and tore off a young
> signalman’s right hand. A minute later, while an officer was applying an
> emergency dressing to this wound, another dud shell crashed through
> the foretop, tearing the officer’s trousers just above his knee, but
> barely grazing him. A third shell struck the mast near the top, exploded
> violently, killed a petty officer standing below and destroyed some
> electrical circuits.
>
> Captain Ellerton shortened the range so as to inflict more damage
> with the Cornwall’s old 6-inch guns, receiving for his pains ten
> successive hits, mostly harmlessly on his ship’s armour. But the Leipzig
> was hit again and again for more than an hour. Her foremast was shot
> away and by 6.30pm she was on fire fore and aft, yet her gunners still
> fought back, until at 7pm, when she fired her last shell, she was hardly
> moving.
>
> Captain Luce signalled her to surrender, circled round and waited,
> but the surviving Germans, surrounded by fires on board, had no
> effective means of replying. Unaware of this, and anticipating that her
> captain might be hoping to sink the Glasgow at the last moment by
> torpedo, the two British ships moved nearer and ruthlessly shelled her
> until her mainmast and both her funnels were gone and she was a
> blazing wreck.
>
> Two green signal lights then rose from her, which were accepted
> as a token of surrender. Luce moved in to within 500 yards of her, then
> both ships lowered two boats each into the choppy sea to take off
> survivors. ‘Night had closed in rather misty’, noted one of the Glasgow’s
> officers.
>
> Two hundred yards ahead was the blazing
> ship, James high up on her quarter-deck and
> shooting out of ports and jagged shell-holes in
> the side, showing the white-hot furnace within .
> . . Small explosions would occasionally scatter
> sparks like a firework-the white steam escaping
> seemed to complete her national flag-black
> smoke, white steam and red flames-our
> searchlights poked hither and thither to assist
> the cutters in their search for survivors-our
> guns’ crews
> leaning silently against their guns . . .
>
> The Leipzig turned on to her beam ends and went down at 9.23pm
> while the flames and red hot metal hissed furiously in the water. Of her
> complement of over 400, only five officers and thirteen men were lifted
> from the sea alive. About 230 were alive when she fired her last shot; of
> these all but 50 were slaughtered in the final shelling and 32 of them
> either drowned or failed to survive the icy water. The British ships’
> crews were lucky this time, reversing Coronel. Cornwall was hit eighteen
> times, but not one man was wounded, while two hits on the Glasgow had
> killed one man and wounded four.
>
> Meantime, the cruiser Kent, commanded by Captain Allen, had a
> long chase after the Nurnberg. It ended 150 miles south of the
> Falklands. Burning even every scrap of wood on board to supplement
> her coal and build up steam, Kent came within 11,000 yards of the
> enemy just after 5 pm. The first two of Nurnberg’s salvoes missed, as
> did the Kent’s first; then the Nurnberg hit Kent’s upper deck and a
> 6-inch shell from Kent penetrated the after steering-flat below the
> waterline, killing several men.
>
> But it still appeared that the Nurnberg might escape before
> nightfall. Suddenly two of her over-worked boilers exploded, her speed
> fell to barely 19 knots and she turned to port at 5.45pm to fight at
> short range. The Kent followed suit, and at 6pm range was down to
> 3,000 yards. A shooting match began in which Kent’s fourteen 6-inch
> guns struck heavier blows than Nurnberg’s 4.1-inch guns.
>
> Soon fires blazed on the Nurnberg and her topmast was toppling
> over, but one of her shells penetrated one of Kent’s 6-inch gun
> casemates, scattering red hot splinters which killed one and wounded
> nine of the gun crew. The Nurnberg was, by comparison, ‘riddled like a
> watchman’s bucket’, with only two guns firing on her port side.
>
> She turned as if to try to bring her starboard guns to bear, only
> to receive two 6-inch shells simultaneously from Kent, which knocked
> out her two forward guns. Captain Allen had the fight all his own way
> from then on, and by 6.25pm the Nurnberg was down by the stern,
> blazing fiercely and scarcely moving, although still firing an occasional
> shot up to 6.35pm, to which Kent replied. Nurnberg then fell silent. Kent
> also ceased fire and waited for the enemy to haul down her colours.
>
> Either the enemy would not, or could not, owing to the fires
> blazing everywhere, so the Kent opened fire again for another five
> minutes; then at last she surrendered and the only two boats on board
> Kent that would float after the 37 shells that had hit her were lowered
> to take off survivors. At that very moment, 7.27pm, the Nurnberg turned
> over on to her starboard side and slipped beneath the waves. While
> albatrosses circled above, attacking anyone in the water, Kent’s boats
> found only twelve men alive out of her crew of 400, five of whom later
> died. Kent had lost four killed and twelve wounded.
>
> Although the fast Dresden had for the time being escaped-a
> matter for which Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee incurred the First Sea
> Lord’s wrath-Admiral von Spee and his squadron had been eliminated
> and Allied control of seaborne commerce was now almost complete, for
> the time being. British sea power was playing a decisive part in the
> war, but already, as the Battle of the Falkland Isles showed, the
> destructive power of British shells appeared to be decidedly inferior to
> that of the enemy’s. It was an inferiority that was to show up clearly in
> the Battle of Jutland.

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Fri Oct 24 08:35:46 1997
>Date: Fri, 24 Oct 1997 08:34:16 -0700
>From: Mike Potter
>Organization: Artecon, Inc.
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 3.01Gold (WinNT; I)
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Subject: Greek, Turkish navy ships almost collide
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>Greek, Turkish navy ships almost collide
>________________________________________________________________________
> Copyright © 1997 Nando.net
> Copyright © 1997 Reuters
>
>ATHENS (October 23, 1997 6:40 p.m. EDT http://www.nando.net) – The
>long-time Greek-Turkish rivalry in the Aegean Sea took another course on
>Thursday with reports that naval ships from the two countries had been
>in a near collision.
>
>Both countries accused the other of causing the incident, which occurred
>Wednesday in international waters between the two Greek islands of Chios
>and Lesbos.
>
>Defense Ministry officials in Athens said a Greek navy minesweeper
>brushed against a Turkish patrol boat, the result of “dangerous handling
>by the Turkish captain.”
>
>In Turkey, the state-run Anatolian news agency said a Greek minesweeper
>tried to pass over a semi-submerged Turkish submarine.
>
>The agency quoted Turkish chief of staff Ismail Hakki Karadayi as saying
>the action of the Greek ship was an example of “a hostile attitude.”
>There were no injuries, it said.
>
>The near collision was the latest in a series of incidents between
>Greece and Turkey, which are at odds over both Cyprus and the
>sovereignty of various small islands in the Aegean.
>
>Athens has accused Ankara of numerous violations of its air space
>coinciding with Greece-Cyprus war games on the divided island.
>
>It said Turkish planes twice buzzed a transport plane carrying Greek
>Defence Minister Akis Tsohatzopoulos to and from the Cyprus military
>exercises.
>
>Greece lashed out at the United States this week for not condemning
>Turkey for the Tsohatsopoulos incident. Washington said late on
>Wednesday that it had raised the issue with Ankara.
>
>-= END OF MESSAGE =-

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Fri Oct 24 12:25:46 1997
>X-Sender: tcrobi@pophost.fw.hac.com
>Date: Fri, 24 Oct 1997 14:24:27 -0500
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Tom Robison
>Subject: Offered without comment
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>The following is quoted verbatim from the December 1997 _Naval_History_
>Magazine:
>=====
>
>WAKE ISLAND TO BECOME WASTE DUMP?
>by Commander David Gaddis, USNR
>
>Is Wake Island, site of one of the greatest battles in the history of the
>U.S. Marine Corps, destined to become a storage place for spent nuclear
>fuel and nuclear fissile material?
>
>Plans are underway by three companies — International Fuel Containers,
>U.S. Fuel & Security (USF&S), and Nuclear Disarmament Services — to use
>the lagoon at Wake Island for indefinite storage of thousands of 120-ton
>steel drums full of nuclear material from around the world (though
>primarily from the United States and Russia). Retired U.S. Navy Admiral
>Daniel J. Murphy has been selected as chairman and chief executive officer
>of the three companies, and retired U.S. Marine Corps General P.X. Kelly
>also is a board member. Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Dr. Viktor
>Michailov reportedly agreed to a “joint venture partnership” in 1996 for a
>large part of the former Soviet Union’s nuclear waste to go to Wake.
>
>At an introductory meeting on 26 July 1996, Admiral Murphy, other company
>officials, and two U.S. State Department officials were in attendance.
>USF&S laid out a plan to form a “Wake Island Defenders Memorial Fund” to
>take legal custody of Wake atoll from the Air Force as a C-3 charity; the
>fund, in turn, would lease the lagoon to the company for use as a nuclear
>waste storage facility, in perpetuity. Compensated board members would
>manage the enterprise and form a trust fund for U.S. veterans. In addition
>to General Kelly and Admiral Murphy, the board would include Alex Copson,
>founder of the venture.
>
>Based on the island’s capacity to hold at least 40,000 ten-ton containers
>in the lagoon, USF&S secretery Andrew Antippas estimated the venture could
>provide $4-billion over 40 years to the proposed veterans’ trust fund.
>Revenues from the above contributions would be used to augment federal
>veteran benefits, according to Antippas, and the board would “decide these
>priorities and tasks” for distribution of the funds to veterans.
>
>The nuclear waste would be shipped to Wake by 20 ships built for the
>purpose by Trinity Marine in Gulfport, Mississippi. These ships — moving
>material to Wake from around the world — would allow the three companies
>to tap into the estimated $120-billion spent-fuel business worldwide.
>According to one estimate, $9-billion in start-up costs and yearly
>operating costs of $1-billion could make the company worth as much as
>$11-billion once the plan is authorized by law.
>
>Will this plan — to start a colossal joint venture that would ship
>hundreds of tons of nuclear waste to the Wake Island lagoon — be executed?
>If so, it could make a strange bedfellow to preservation of the islands,
>which the group claims to support. Apparently there is great pressure from
>Russia to get the legislation passed by Congress in 1997, because other
>agreements have been made to dispose of the waste, one of which may involve
>Iran.
>
>=====
>End of quoted article.
>
>
>Tom Robison, tcrobi@most.fw.hac.com
>Airborne Communications Systems
>Hughes Defense Communications,
>1010 Production Rd.
>Fort Wayne, IN 46808
>
>Any opinions expressed herein are mine alone, and do not reflect
>the views or opinions of Hughes Defense Communications, Hughes
>Aircraft Corp., Hughes Electronics Corp., General Motors Corp.,
>Raytheon Corp., my wife, or God.

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Fri Oct 24 13:47:29 1997
>Date: Fri, 24 Oct 1997 21:59:34 +0200
>To: mahan@microwrks.com, wwii-l@listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu, >marhst-l@post.queensu.ca
>Subject: Further minor updates on the US Navy pages
>X-Mailer: T-Online eMail 2.0
>X-Sender: 0611603955-0001@t-online.de (Silvia Lanzendoerfer)
>From: BWV_WIESBADEN@t-online.de (Tim Lanzendoerfer)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>I have put up the wartime biographies of Admirals Nimitz, Halsey, Spruance,
>Kinkaid, Clark and part of “Ted” Sherman’s.
>
>Enjoy,
>Tim
>
>Tim Lanzendoerfer | “I have just taken on a great
>Amateur Naval Historian | responsibility. I will do my
>Email: BWV_Wiesbaden@t-online.de | utmost to meet it” – Nimitz
>—————————————————————–
> The United States Navy in the Pacific War 1941 – 1945
> http://www.microworks.net/pacific
> The ships, the men, the battles
>—————————————————————–

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Mon Oct 27 20:26:21 1997
>X-Sender: tcrobi@pop.mindspring.com
>Date: Mon, 27 Oct 1997 22:24:34 -0500
>To: mahan@microwrks.com
>From: Tom Robison
>Subject: HistoryNet news
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
>Offered for your edification and enjoyment.
>
>———————————————————————
>* * * * * * * * * * * TheHistoryNet Digest * * * * * * * * * * *
>———————————————————————
> New Features & Highlights on http://www.TheHistoryNet.com
> [posted October 27, 1997]
>
>* First Naval Battle of Guadalcanal **
>Like weary boxers, the opposing forces slugged it out with one another in
>Ironbottom Sound.
>http://www.thehistorynet.com/WorldWarII/articles/1997/1197_cover.htm
>
>
>Tom Robison
>Ossian, Indiana
>tcrobi@mindspring.com

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Sat Oct 25 14:43:37 1997
>Date: Sat, 25 Oct 1997 23:41:48 +0200
>To: wwii-l@listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu, mahan@microwrks.com, >marhst-l@post.queensu.ca
>Subject: Re: Questions, Questions, and still more….QUESTIONS!
>X-Mailer: T-Online eMail 2.0
>X-Sender: 0611603955-0001@t-online.de (Silvia Lanzendoerfer)
>From: BWV_WIESBADEN@t-online.de (Tim Lanzendoerfer)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
> > Tim:
> >
> > According to the book “Combat Command” by Admiral Frederick C.
> > Sherman, in the fall of 1943 he commanded a carrier task force built
> > around the Saratoga and Princeton. After the invasion of Tarawa, he
> > shifted his flag to the Bunker Hill which was teamed with the
> > Monerery. He took over command of TG 38.3 (Essex, Lexington, Langley
> > & Princeton) on August 16, 1944.
> >
> > Sorry I can’t be a little more specific as to dates as the book is
> > more of a general history of the fighting in the Pacific rather than
> > an autobiography.
> >
> > Allan
>
>Allan, thanks for the reply. How did you like Combat Command?
>Anyway, for whom it interests. I think I was able to track Sherman, at least
>starting in November 1942 – where he was in between, I don’t know…or I know
>and just don’t know as I type this.
>Sherman became Rear-Admiral and commander of Enterprise when Kinkaid was
>relieved in November 1942. He stayed on that post until Enterprise went to
>Hawaii in May, from when on he was with Rear-Admiral Fitch as advisor to
>COMAIRSOPAC. He then transfered to Pearl Harbor as COMCARDIV2 on Essex,
>conducting operations with her and Enterprise until the latter >returned to the
>States, and transfered back to the South Pacific as commander of >TF38 (Saratoga,
>later Saratoga and Princeton), conducting the famous raid on Rabaul >in November
>1943, and from then on I can track him alright.
>The confusion came because The Fast Carriers is improperly indexed: >the entire
>period above except the TF38 thing is not indexed under the name Sherman,
>Frederick C.
>
>Thanks again,
>Tim
>
>Tim Lanzendoerfer | “I have just taken on a great
>Amateur Naval Historian | responsibility. I will do my
>Email: BWV_Wiesbaden@t-online.de | utmost to meet it” – Nimitz
>—————————————————————–
> The United States Navy in the Pacific War 1941 – 1945
> http://www.microworks.net/pacific
> The ships, the men, the battles
>—————————————————————–

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous

From Tue Oct 28 11:09:40 1997
>Date: Tue, 28 Oct 1997 17:55:11 +0200
>To: mahan@microwrks.com, wwii-l@listserv.acsu.buffalo.edu, >marhst-l@post.queensu.ca
>Subject: BB-38 (fwd)
>X-Mailer: T-Online eMail 2.0
>X-Sender: 0611603955-0001@t-online.de (Silvia Lanzendoerfer)
>From: BWV_WIESBADEN@t-online.de (Tim Lanzendoerfer)
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>Reply-To: mahan@microworks.net
>
> > I am also looking for a William Bonneau who was born somewhere between 1926
> > and 1929. He served in the US Navy aboard the USS Pennsylvania BB-38 in
> > 1945. He was aboard when she took a Japanese Torpedo. He was in “A”
> > division and was trapped in a flooding compartment on Aug. 13, 1945 and was
> > saved by my father (now 72) and another man. My father has asked me to see
> > if I could locate him to see how he is doing today and maybe talk on the
> > phone. If you have any info PLEASE e-mail me. If you have any suggestions
> > on how to go about this search or where to post information. Thanks for
> > your time.
>
>I got this through my webpage. Does anybody have the address of a veteran’s
>organization that might be able to help? Or anybody who knows of >other forms to
>aid this man on his search?
>
>Thanks,
>Tim
>
>Tim Lanzendoerfer | “I have just taken on a great
>Amateur Naval Historian | responsibility. I will do my
>Email: BWV_Wiesbaden@t-online.de | utmost to meet it” – Nimitz
>—————————————————————–
> The United States Navy in the Pacific War 1941 – 1945
> http://www.microworks.net/pacific
> The ships, the men, the battles
>—————————————————————–

Posted via email from mahan’s posterous