Archive for January, 2009

The Good Shepherd

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

Here is the section on The Good Shepherd in my biography of CSF. Copyright
1998, John Forester.

After finishing the last revisions to The Nightmare in January, 1954,
Cecil made a lengthy trip to England, where he attended a cocktail party at
the American embassy and was also entertained in the office of the First
Lord of the Admirality. On his return to Berkeley in July, he started work
on the convoy novel, The Good Shepherd. This is the story of Commander
Krause, USN, captain of a destroyer escorting a convoy to Britain at the
height of the U-Boat battle. Because Cecil was not sure of American naval
phrasing and proceedures, he arranged, for a fee of $1,000, that the
retired American submarine admiral, Ralph Christie, who lived in San
Francisco, would advise him and correct his errors. Christie was “really
patient Â… [with] trifling details Â… like the actual wording of a report or
an order; heÂ’s a bit puzzled that I can deal with strategy and tactics
without any help from him.” “The admiral approves­he’s quite interested and
each morning over the telephone we fight terrific battles, destroyer versus
submarine.” “He’s as interested in watching a novel being composed as I am
watching a destroyer being handled.” As the book progressed, Christie
brought Cecil genuine plotting sheets with the destroyerÂ’s tracks all
plotted out as the battle progressed. “His heart just bleeds for Krause­he
shook his head sadly over him yesterday and said ‘That poor guy’s in a
mess.”

However, Cecil had returned to his standard complaining mode that had left
him as he was writing The Nightmare. “Sixty more days.” “Fifty two more
working days. They go on and on. Â… The damn thing may run as high as
100,000 words. ItÂ’s all right from one point of view; if the action
compells that length well and good Â… I believe a longer book sells better
than a shorter book­and similarly if all the action can be crammed into a
shorter length well and good too. But damn me if I like the idea of three
more working weeks, which it would look like. Hell.” “Forty four more
damned dreary days of work.”

Shortly after Cecil started The Good Shepherd, it became more likely that
The Gun would be filmed, offering Cecil release from his misery. “It will
be just too bad if I finish work on the Good Shepherd and find that I
neednÂ’t have done it after all because these film rights have made me rich
for life. I’m tempted to tear up what I’ve done and wait and see.” When the
film contract was signed in September, “If I hadn’t signed that damned
contract for 1812 [a history of the War of 1812] I could retire this minute
and leave the Good Shepherd unfinished which would intrigue my biographers.
A great temptation.” “I’m really thoroughly tired. Me and Krause. I don’t
think anyone who hasnÂ’t endured it can appreciate the particular kind of
flatnes and fatigue­there’s nothing else like it. Late nights spent playing
bridge or sitting up with a sick child don’t compare with it.”

Commander Krause of The Good Shepherd was an ingenious mixture of CecilÂ’s
previous military characters, a blend which could have resulted in his
finest characterization, but which, to my mind, did not. Krause had the
single-minded devotion to his service of Rifleman Dodd and Leading Seaman
Brown, the professional doubts of the early Hornblower, the conquered but
well-remembered temper of Captain the Honorable Miles Ernest
Troughton-Harrington-Yorke, and he had survived a passionate awakening like
Rose SayersÂ’s with more than a trace of General CurzonÂ’s prudery and
Hornblower’s detachment. To this was added one great advantage — he started
this mixture as the son of a loving, compassionate, religious and respected
father, an entirely new figure in CecilÂ’s works (but who appears only in
KrauseÂ’s memories). Instead of the complex, fascinating character that
could be made from these materials, Krause is a dull man who finds his
competence in the self-limiting, unlimited agony of war, and his peace in
utter weariness, face down, spread-armed, only half undressed and half in
bed, at the close of his duty. The creative talent that started these
half-men fifteen and twenty years before was now only strong enough to mix
their parts without synthesizing a whole man.

Cecil and the admiral finished revising The Good Shepherd in the second
week of October. Commander John Dale Hodapp, whom Cecil had met as first
lieutenant in the destroyer Abner Reed in 1943, had recently retired to be
the financial officer of the San Francisco Episcopal diocese; he took one
carbon copy of the completed manuscript home to read. He telephoned Cecil
to say that the book used submarine language rather than surface ship
language and required several hundred changes. “All the technical orders
and bearings and ranges have to be changed.” Finally, Cecil had to transfer
HodappÂ’s corrections to the publisherÂ’s typescripts while between planes in
New York. There were still further corrections to be made in January,
despite Little, Brown’s hurry to skip proof reading. “We’ll all look like
fools if [the changes] don’t [go in]. I’d rather cancel the contracts.”

Part of the reason for hurry was that Life paid $20,000 for a 30,000 word
condensation for their WashingtonÂ’s Birthday issue. In August, 1955,
Columbia Pictures bought the film rights for $75,000, with the intention of
starring Humphrey Bogart as Commander Krause. Harry Cohn, of Columbia, used
the promise of that role, when he recovered from cancer, to comfort Bogart
in his last year of life. In May, 1956, Admiral Christie threatened to sue
Cecil for $20,000, on the argument that he had contributed far more to the
story than had originally been planned. Hodapp offered to testify that
Christie had not done a good job, describing the number of ChristieÂ’s
errors he had had to correct. Contractually, Cecil was correct; Christie
had agreed to a fee of $1,000 for vetting the orders and procedures, and he
had vetted the orders badly. Equitably, CecilÂ’s own letters demonstrate
that Christie had contributed far more to the story, and had probably
provided a realistic battle sequence and avoided the errors and
contradictions that would otherwise have existed in CecilÂ’s account. Eight
years after assisting with The Good Shepherd, Hodapp became CecilÂ’s
secretary, calling himself literary assistant.

John Forester 408-734-9426
forester@johnforester.com 726 Madrone Ave
http://www.johnforester.com Sunnyvale, CA 94086-3041

Books

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

On 12 Feb 98, Bill Riddle wrote:

> “The Good Shepherd” is one I have not read. Didn’t think there were
> any CSF that I had missed. That goes to the top of my acquisition
> list.

The book has been described (ask your Dad to forgive me for this John) as
“Hornblower in WWII”. The qualities shared by both characters are rather
surprising at first, but in no way detract from the description of the many
instances of soul-searching that encumber what those not in command
consider easy decisions.

Regards,

James

PS: Check your clock Bill, you’re sending out incorrect date/time groups.
In the Heart of the Pine Barrens 39 54 03 N, 74 49 26 W

Was SMS Konigsberg a sister of SMS Emden?

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

While re-reading Edwin Hoyt’s _Guerilla: Colonel Von Lettow-Vorbeck and
Germany’s East African Empire_ (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc.
1981 ISBN 0-02-555210-4), a question occurred to me which, despite my
best efforts, I have been unable to answer: Was SMS Konigsberg a
sister of SMS Emden?

I have managed to obtain photographs of the Emden and Konigsberg
(available upon request), but since both are similar in appearance a
visual comparison is of little value. Each carried ten 10.5-cm (4.1 inch)
rapid fire guns and gross speed characteristics were similar (24.5 vs.
24.1 knots maximum speed). Emden was 395 while Konigsberg was 376
feet in length, although both possessed a beam of approximately 43 feet.
Cruising economically both could cover approximately 6,000 miles while
supporting a crew of nearly 320. Thanks in advance, Ed.

Edward Wittenberg
ewitten507@aol.com

K-Kreuzer Helo trials

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

I have a photo of a Flettner helicopter doing trials on a platform on top
of the ‘X’ (or BRUNO, auf Deutsch) turret on one of the “K-Kreuzern”
(is that the right plural?) – KARLSRUHE, KOLN or KONIGSBERG – but the ship
is not identified in the Schiffer book on German helicopters, and the
trails aren’t mentioned in Whitley’s book on German Cruisers; I have teh
first Marine-Arsenal volume by Breyer on these vessels but it only covers
their careers through ’37. Does anybody know which cruiser hosted these
trials?

(KOLN, at least, should have an umlaut…)

Also, does anyone know which vessels beside the DRACHE ex Yugoslav ZMAJ
carried the service model Flettner helicopter in the Aegean in 43-44?

Thanks,
-Brooks

Back to Iraq – OFF TOPIC

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

Perhaps we should bear in mind that war has been analyzed in two different
modes.

The older mode was that expressed by Clausewitz, that ‘war is the extension
of politics’. A Clausewitz-esque analysis would say that you set your war
aims in accord with your political wishes and, when these are achieved, you
Declare a Victory and go home.

The slightly newer style was that of Napoleon, best exemplified in the
writings of Jomini, one of his staff officers. Napoleon advocated war aims
be set as the destruction of the enemy’s will to resist, regardless of
political realities. Once this destruction of the will to resist was
accomplished, peace terms could be nasty or nice as political realities
dictated.

The US military has traditionally followed Jomini; the US political
establishment has traditionally followed Clausewitz. This dichotomy is
normal in Western countries. In both World Wars, the political
establishment adopted Jominian war aims (‘squeeze them ’til the pips
squeak’, shrieked Lloyd George, ‘and Hang the Kaiser!’, ‘unconditional
surrender’ intoned FDR). But, in Korea, for instance, the Western Alliance
strongly argued for Clausewitzian war aims, and, hence, the clearance of
South Korea and the status quo ante bellum was regarded as sufficient. No
one bothered to apprise GA MacArthur of the change, and, so, he ended up
making a fool of himself, believing that the two World Wars had marked a
complete change in American and European political thought. Similarly, in
the Viet-Nam imbroglio, the political establishment early and firmly
established Clausewitzian war aims, in so far as they established ANY war
aims, and only ‘bomb ’em back to the Stone Age’ LeMay was a significant
dissenting voice. (Well, GEN Harold K Johnson as well, but he didn’t speak
up at the time, so he doesn’t count.)

In the Persian Gulf, the Alliance early and firmly adopted a Clausewitzian
policy, that is, that the clearance of Kuwait was the war aim and that the
War would stop when that was accomplished. And so it did.

It really is a bit more complex than simply ‘the military wanted to fight
on and the politicians didn’t’. Most senior officers understood this;
Schwartzkopf didn’t, and it cost him a shot at a fifth star.

Marc

msmall@roanoke.infi.net FAX: +540/343-7315
Cha robh bas fir gun ghras fir!

Back to Iraq – OFF TOPIC

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

Your reasoning is sound, and Mahan might argue you are exactly on topic.
Strategy.

The current strategy in Iraq will fail to either destroy his weapons of
mass destruction or remove him from office. We cannot put enough pressure
on him to accomplish these ends. He is not afraid of us.

Following one of the most successful military campaigns in history, we are
left with him – by choice. Now we must learn to deal with it.

This is further proof that our military is second to none and our
diplomats are second to everyone.

* * * * J B K * * * *

On Thu, 12 Feb 1998, Eric Bergerud wrote:

>> Which is gonna hit home to the world wide viewing public?
>
>This caused me to put my wierd thinking cap on. I’m gonna place my bet on
>a disaster. Yes friends, you heard it here first.
>
What do the War of 1812, the Spanish American War, WWI and Vietnam all have
in common? They were all preciptated in part by a naval incident. Personally
I start to fret when I hear about naval build-ups. Everyone is talking about
antrax or nerve gas. If the Iraqis used weapons like that (and they worked)
they would get nuked by Israel, the US or both – depending upon who suffered
the attack. But what if that loonie in Baghdad sent his whole damn AF with
every cruise missile he can get his mits on against a US task force. The
Stark has always bothered me. If the US was acting in a “provocative” manner
and Iraq struck with conventional weapons at our Navy, would any of our
allies support a land attack?

Personally I do not think the history of events that led to the end of
Desert Storm has been written yet. In retrospect, we either suffered a
massive failure of leadership at the top or we got taken to the cleaners by
some of our Allies. (Can’t you just see it? The French, Egyptians and Saudis
assuring the US that the Iraqi Army had pledged to overthrow Sadam and
arguing that a US drive to Baghdad could only humiliate the Arab world and
strengthen the Iranian demons. So, just one little cease fire and everything
will be fine. Big military victory, no losses to speak of, and Sadam taken
care of by the local inhabitants. And we fall for it.) There may be hell to
pay for that blunder, particularly in an area of the world where losing wars
seems to increase the strength of sadistic dictators.
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

Best War Books!

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

Whoops, “RED Badge of Courage”

James

Greatest War Books?

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

I think we’re still looking for that great WWII novel/memoir. Sledge’s _With
the Old Breed_ is one of a number of very fine books, but great literature
didn’t seem to come out of that war. The Great War generated three that hit
me like a brick: Storm of Steel by Ernst Junger, Goodbye to All That by
Robert Graves and Sagittarius Rising by Cecil Lewis (the last is argubly the
greatest book written about aviation). The Vietnam authors have scored a
couple of good ones. My favorite is Larry Heinemann’s Close Quarters.
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

Back to Iraq – OFF TOPIC

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

>> Which is gonna hit home to the world wide viewing public?
>
>This caused me to put my wierd thinking cap on. I’m gonna place my bet on
>a disaster. Yes friends, you heard it here first.
>
What do the War of 1812, the Spanish American War, WWI and Vietnam all have
in common? They were all preciptated in part by a naval incident. Personally
I start to fret when I hear about naval build-ups. Everyone is talking about
antrax or nerve gas. If the Iraqis used weapons like that (and they worked)
they would get nuked by Israel, the US or both – depending upon who suffered
the attack. But what if that loonie in Baghdad sent his whole damn AF with
every cruise missile he can get his mits on against a US task force. The
Stark has always bothered me. If the US was acting in a “provocative” manner
and Iraq struck with conventional weapons at our Navy, would any of our
allies support a land attack?

Personally I do not think the history of events that led to the end of
Desert Storm has been written yet. In retrospect, we either suffered a
massive failure of leadership at the top or we got taken to the cleaners by
some of our Allies. (Can’t you just see it? The French, Egyptians and Saudis
assuring the US that the Iraqi Army had pledged to overthrow Sadam and
arguing that a US drive to Baghdad could only humiliate the Arab world and
strengthen the Iranian demons. So, just one little cease fire and everything
will be fine. Big military victory, no losses to speak of, and Sadam taken
care of by the local inhabitants. And we fall for it.) There may be hell to
pay for that blunder, particularly in an area of the world where losing wars
seems to increase the strength of sadistic dictators.
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

Back to Iraq – OFF TOPIC

Sunday, January 18th, 2009

On Thu, 12 Feb 1998, Andrew Fairnie wrote, conjecturing public reaction
to possible military action in Iraq:

> Which is gonna hit home to the world wide viewing public?

This caused me to put my wierd thinking cap on. I’m gonna place my bet on
a disaster. Yes friends, you heard it here first.

If a second Desert Storm is going to work, there has to be a disaster or
some sort of rallying call to the body politic. It will be another brush
off by the Hussein regime, because otherwise we won’t have the political
will to place ground troops in harm’s way. (Bear in mind this is only
conjecture on my part. As a wargamer, sometimes these thoughts come to
mind as possible causes for scenario creation.)

Examples used in the past 100 years:

Remember the Maine! (Barely within the 100 year mark.)

The Zimmerman Telegram.

Remember Pearl Harbor!

The so-called Tonkin Gulf Incident

“Courage Mom” (from Wag the Dog)

—-

Trivia question for any oceanographers out there. Most of the Persian
Gulf is shallow. If a US Carrier sinks there, how much of the
superstructure will remain above water, if any?

Tracy Johnson
Minister of Propaganda, Justin Thyme Productions
tjohnson@adnetsol.com
Last Two Wargames Played:
Axis & Allies
Gettysburg (Command #17 version)
Paint Ball
“Trust No One”
“Semper Pollus”
ADC-2239-5531
Vietnam: “Missed it by *that* much!”

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The Mahan Naval Discussion List hosted here at NavalStrategy.org is to foster discussion and debate on the relevance of Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan's ideas on the importance of sea power influenced navies around the world.
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