The Kaiser’s Fleet

January 18th, 2009

>Aside from the odd statement that “a North Sea force, [was] a direct and
>unambiguous threat to the United Kingdom,” (as if a trans-Atlantic
>force, like the Russian or French guerre de course cruisers, would be
>less of a threat to British interests?) the decision to make a North Sea
>force was deliberate.
>Timothy L. Francis
>Historian
>Naval Historical Center
>email address: Francis.Timothy@nhc.navy.mil
>voice: (202) 433-6802
>
If I may respectfully disagree with Mr. Francis there was a very big
difference between the High Seas Fleet and any other European Navy. As Hegel
reminds us, “quantity changes quality.” It appeared to the British
government, and not a few German politicians, that the Germans wished to
challenge British naval supremecy, not just challenge British interests. Any
fleet would have been a possible “threat” to the UK, but only the German
fleet as it appeared to be developing (not as it existed in 1914) could
possibly have threatened the existence of the British Isles themselves. If
one combines that with the common belief that the German Army was the
strongest in Europe, it is simple to understand the powerful inducement for
the immense change in British policy before WWI. The military symmetry of
the European balance of power was put completely out of kilter by the
possibility that one nation would be top dog on both land and sea. (The
Brits, after all, had never attempted to be a dominant land power. When
Bismarck quipped he’d have the British Army “arrested” if it landed in
Pommerania, he wasn’t entirely off the mark.) Building the High Seas Fleet
to the size and at the speed with which it was constructed was one of the
biggest blunders in the history of modern politics. Had there been only a
medium sized German fleet, appropriate to deal with France or Russia, I
doubt that Britain would have declared war in 1914. Instead, the Germans had
undoubtedly created the impression that they were a threat to Britain,
France and Russia. In light of Fritz Fischer’s findings, I don’t think we
dismiss the threat as simple paranoia. The Kaiser and Tirpitz were fools and
their country paid the price.
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930

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