Sumida et al effectively point out that the conventional wisdom of how
the British Battle Fleet of World War I came to be, is not correct.
However, the PUBLIC PERCEPTION of the threat of the German battlefleet, and its
continual harping by British politicians and naval officers, cannot be
discounted. Whatever the reasons that the British Battle Fleet evolved as
it did, all those other historians weren’t WRONG, they were INCOMPLETE:
There was considerable public opinion that the Imperial German Fleet was
a threat; there was a public perception of challenge and rivalry; and
there was public support driven by this perception of threat for the taxes
that payed for the British Battle Fleet. While it may be true that the
crossing of the Belgian border by German troops was the final impetus
toward war, nontheless the succession of crises and the buildup of the
Hochseeflotte, contributed to the mood that made the declaration of war
publicly acceptable.

Navies don’t declare war; politicians and governments do. Those are far
more vulnerable to public perceptions. From that viewpoint, the remarks
about the lack of wisdom of Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II retain validity.
I would suggest, however, that they might have found it more preferable
to publicly declare the nature of the ‘Riskfotte’ concept, that while
they didn’t necesarily think they could beat the Royal Navy, they could
cause it so much damage that Britain would aquiesce to various German
goals rather than be drastically weakened and left vulnerable to a much
more minor power. This might have been perceved as less of a challenge.

I think my point is that in politics and saber-rattling, perceptions are
very important – the perceptions and blunders that led to the outbreak fo
the First World War being the classic case in point. Whatever the truth
about the design origins and missions of the fleets of Britain and
Imperial Germany, nonetheless it was the perceptions of those in the minds
of the politicians that contributed to the outbreak of the war – and the
accuracy of those perceptions was irrelevant to the decisions. One makes
decisions on what one THINKS one knows -even if that later turns out to
not be true!

– A ‘middle of the road’ answer,
– Brooks.