Mr. Rowlett,

Quite simply, if the conventional wisdom “is not correct” then why
continue to press an argument based on it?

Chris Havern

>———-
>From: Brooks Rowlett[SMTP:brooksar@indy.net]
>Sent: Thursday, January 22, 1998 9:56 AM
>To: mahan@microworks.net
>Subject: Re: The Kaiser’s Fleet
>
> Sumida et al effectively point out that the conventional wisdom of how
>the British Battle Fleet of World War I came to be, is not correct.
>However, the PUBLIC PERCEPTION of the threat of the German battlefleet, and
>its
>continual harping by British politicians and naval officers, cannot be
>discounted. Whatever the reasons that the British Battle Fleet evolved as
>it did, all those other historians weren’t WRONG, they were INCOMPLETE:
> There was considerable public opinion that the Imperial German Fleet was
>a threat; there was a public perception of challenge and rivalry; and
>there was public support driven by this perception of threat for the taxes
>that payed for the British Battle Fleet. While it may be true that the
>crossing of the Belgian border by German troops was the final impetus
>toward war, nontheless the succession of crises and the buildup of the
>Hochseeflotte, contributed to the mood that made the declaration of war
>publicly acceptable.
>
>Navies don’t declare war; politicians and governments do. Those are far
>more vulnerable to public perceptions. From that viewpoint, the remarks
>about the lack of wisdom of Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II retain validity.
>I would suggest, however, that they might have found it more preferable
>to publicly declare the nature of the ‘Riskfotte’ concept, that while
>they didn’t necesarily think they could beat the Royal Navy, they could
>cause it so much damage that Britain would aquiesce to various German
>goals rather than be drastically weakened and left vulnerable to a much
>more minor power. This might have been perceved as less of a challenge.
>
>I think my point is that in politics and saber-rattling, perceptions are
>very important – the perceptions and blunders that led to the outbreak fo
>the First World War being the classic case in point. Whatever the truth
>about the design origins and missions of the fleets of Britain and
>Imperial Germany, nonetheless it was the perceptions of those in the minds
>of the politicians that contributed to the outbreak of the war – and the
>accuracy of those perceptions was irrelevant to the decisions. One makes
>decisions on what one THINKS one knows -even if that later turns out to
>not be true!
>
>- A ‘middle of the road’ answer,
> – Brooks.
>
>
>