>
> Mr. Rowlett,
>
> Quite simply, if the conventional wisdom “is not correct” then why
> continue to press an argument based on it?
>
> Chris Havern

Note my phrasing: The origin of how the British battlefleet came to be
created in the manner that it was. I was discussing, and I believe the
argument that I partly agree with was also discussing, the origin of
the First World War itself, with also reference to the FUNDING of the
British battle fleet (one of Sumida’s points being ‘affordable Imperial
defence’). That is a very different issue from the creation of the
DREADNOUGHT and the desire for battlecruisers being subsumed into repeat
dreadnought-type BB’s instead of BC’s. The conventional wisdom on
that subject, rather broader than Sumida’s topic, does still seem to
apply. To me it appears that the Kaiser & Tirpitz chose the wrong
answer to what I call ‘The US Naval War College Question*’ – “What do you
want the world to look like in ten years and what steps are you going to
take to make it turn out that way?”

* I call it that because it seems to have been a prominent question
offered by NWC moderators in political seminar games in the late 80’s.

And by the way, didn’t Mahan say the DREADNOUGHT was a mistake and the US
should not follow suit? The idea being that individually powerful ships
wre contrary to his thesis? Of course he said this before director
control and the advantages of all big guns combined with the produciton
rates to make dreadnought – style BB’s the new standard.

> > > >———-
> >From: Brooks Rowlett[SMTP:brooksar@indy.net]
> >Sent: Thursday, January 22, 1998 9:56 AM
> >To: mahan@microworks.net
> >Subject: Re: The Kaiser’s Fleet
> >
> > Sumida et al effectively point out that the conventional wisdom of how
> >the British Battle Fleet of World War I came to be, is not correct.
> >However, the PUBLIC PERCEPTION of the threat of the German battlefleet, and
> >its
> >continual harping by British politicians and naval officers, cannot be
> >discounted. Whatever the reasons that the British Battle Fleet evolved as
> >it did, all those other historians weren’t WRONG, they were INCOMPLETE:
> > There was considerable public opinion that the Imperial German Fleet was
> >a threat; there was a public perception of challenge and rivalry; and
> >there was public support driven by this perception of threat for the taxes
> >that payed for the British Battle Fleet. While it may be true that the
> >crossing of the Belgian border by German troops was the final impetus
> >toward war, nontheless the succession of crises and the buildup of the
> >Hochseeflotte, contributed to the mood that made the declaration of war
> >publicly acceptable.
> >
> >Navies don’t declare war; politicians and governments do. Those are far
> >more vulnerable to public perceptions. From that viewpoint, the remarks
> >about the lack of wisdom of Tirpitz and Kaiser Wilhelm II retain validity.
> >I would suggest, however, that they might have found it more preferable
> >to publicly declare the nature of the ‘Riskfotte’ concept, that while
> >they didn’t necesarily think they could beat the Royal Navy, they could
> >cause it so much damage that Britain would aquiesce to various German
> >goals rather than be drastically weakened and left vulnerable to a much
> >more minor power. This might have been perceved as less of a challenge.
> >
> >I think my point is that in politics and saber-rattling, perceptions are
> >very important – the perceptions and blunders that led to the outbreak fo
> >the First World War being the classic case in point. Whatever the truth
> >about the design origins and missions of the fleets of Britain and
> >Imperial Germany, nonetheless it was the perceptions of those in the minds
> >of the politicians that contributed to the outbreak of the war – and the
> >accuracy of those perceptions was irrelevant to the decisions. One makes
> >decisions on what one THINKS one knows -even if that later turns out to
> >not be true!
> >
> >- A ‘middle of the road’ answer,
> > – Brooks.
> >
> >
> >
>