>
> Furthermore, his assessment of Tirpitz and Wilhelm II being fools that
>essentially got what they deserved is unfortunate because it is not only
>a gross generalization and misrepresentation, but it borders on
>character assassination. If I may, I’d also like to point out that the
>British declared war not because of the actions of the High Seas Fleet,
>but because the Imperial Army violated the treaty safeguarding the
>territorial integrity of Belgium. And as to the building of a
>medium-sized navy to deal with “Russia or France”, it appears that the
>treaty obligations of both aforementioned countries would have ensured
>that the Germans would have had to have a navy capable of dealing with
>both Russia and France. Finally I would like to say that “creating the
>impression” that you are a threat, does not necessarily mean that an
>actual threat is posed, at least as it is perceived by those who make
>policy.
>
> Chris Havern
>

I have seen every self-evident truth in the field of diplomatic history
“revised” in my generation. It’s the best way to get noticed. If you watch
carefully you can see the rehabilitation of at least elements of the Nazi
regime. Churchill has recently been portrayed as the man who unnecessarily
prolonged WWII, but also destroyed the British Empire in the process. Our
own various Cold War “revisionist” debate says a lot more about the US than
it does about the history of the Cold War. So allow me to be a little less
than impressed by news of “new research” concerning the Anglo-German naval
race.

It is no secret that Fischer had a lot of things on his fertile mind. (The
US for one.) The battlecruiser was a bad idea that sounded good. However it
is very bad history indeed to equate the arms race between Britain and
Germany with Fischer. He he was only one party and not the most important.
As E. Kehr argued in the 1930’s, the German fleet became the symbol of an
expansionist Germany (or at least a nation deprived of its “place in the
sun”) both inside Germany and out. The poisoning of relations between the
Germans and London should hit one on the head if you stand back a foot or
two. Prior to the German naval bills, Anglo-German relations were very good,
and had been for generations. Britain had maintained neutrality during
Bismarck’s wars and existed in a state of “splendid isolation” with no
evident desire to grow intimately involved in continental rivalries. We can
now see the Kaiser as a misunderstood, basically nice enough fellow who
wanted to please everybody if we like. At least he wasn’t Hitler.
(Personally, I think the Kaiser was the Crown Prince’s father in every sense
of the term and that is not a compliment.) At the time, his bombast, love of
military display, escapades in Morocco made Germany appear to be aggrieved
at its position in Europe, militarily powerful and potentially very
dangerous. The Kaiser chucked a perfectly good relationship with Russia out
the window soon after he fired Bismarck. (We take it for granted, but an
alliance between Czarist Russia and Republican France – when the French
Revolution was still very much alive in Europe’s political memory – came as
quite a shock.) Only the Kaiser could have shifted Britain from a position
of lofty neutrality to something close to a binding alliance with France by
1914. (The “division of labor” between the British and French navies prior
to 1914 would have had traditional British statesmen spinning in their
graves. It also says something about Tirpitz’s bathtub toys and their impact
on diplomacy.)

I do not argue for a mono-casual approach to the beginning of WWI. However,
I don’t see how you can chuck 75 years of diplomatic history out of the
widow and not see that when Britain was confronted by a naval rivalry from
Germany it had a drastic impact on British policy and was central to
Britain’s addition to the Triple Entente. Britain in the years before the
war was undergoing a series of domestic trials. The empire itself was under
domestic scrutiny. Yet not even the Labor Party was able to stop the British
naval expansion. The reason was simple: the Germans were building ships and
the British were determined not to be equalled in an area where their
survival had traditionally rested. That point was so simple and so basic to
the diplomatic history of Europe for three hundred years, it should need no
elaboration.

Play a simple mind game. Picture in 1900. The Kaiser proclaims the intention
of Germany to equal the naval might of Russia or France. In a decade Germany
builds a fine fleet, but one that is significantly smaller than Britain’s.
In the meantime, Tirpitz, the Kaiser and their imperialist supporters keep
their mouth shut. Do you think Britain would have been closely aligned with
France and Russia by 1914? They might have protested, but do you think they
would have declared war on Germany because of Belgium. And had they done so,
would the staff talks between Paris and London that allowed Britain’s
intervention to play a crucial role at the Marne taken place? I doubt all of
these things very much.

I was in Washington on and off during the 70’s. Even US military leaders and
think-tank gurus that didn’t really believe the Red Army was going to come
blasting through the Fulda Gap could not figure out why the Red Navy was
expanding so fast. And they were worried. Put yourself in the shoes, not of
Jackie Fischer, but of Asquith and his government. What would you think
about a very rapid and very substantial increase in German naval power? What
do you see as the motivation in Berlin? Would this effect your diplomacy.
Betcha it would.
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930