Aside from the odd statement that “a North Sea force, [was] a direct and
unambiguous threat to the United Kingdom,” (as if a trans-Atlantic
force, like the Russian or French guerre de course cruisers, would be
less of a threat to British interests?) the decision to make a North Sea
force was deliberate. You are on the right course in that one can save
a lot of space by limiting the space allocated to fuel, berthing, and
food if you don’t need high-endurance ships. You can instead add more
armor or hull redundancies, more damage control equipment, larger fire
control apparatus, and even more ammunition (I leave the specific
differences up to the WW1 naval experts)—all because you don’t need
warships to sail half-way around the world on a regular basis. The
designs were different from the RNs, just as everybody’s designs were
slightly different from everbody elses based on the specific political,
military, financial, economic, and strategic situation.

Timothy L. Francis
Historian
Naval Historical Center
email address: Francis.Timothy@nhc.navy.mil
voice: (202) 433-6802

The above remarks are my opinions, not those of the U.S. Navy or the
Department of Defense

> ———-
> From: Bill Riddle[SMTP:riddleb@fhu.disa.mil]
> Reply To: mahan@microworks.net
> Sent: Wednesday, January 21, 1998 5:37 AM
> To: mahan@microwrks.com
> Subject: The Kaiser’s Fleet
>
> The author states that in 1907 “…British naval strategists
> observed
> with concern that the Kaiser’s new battle-fleet was of such
> limited
> range that it was effectively a North Sea force, thus making it a
>
> direct and unambiguous threat to the United Kingdom.”
>
> My questions: What was it that so limited the German fleet?
> (Inadequate
> bunker space … consumable storage … crew limits … ?) Did
> their
> designs vary so much from other navies? A deliberate design
> compromise for some reason? A mistake?