While browsing through the stacks at my local library this summer, I
came across a work entitled “Warships and Sea Battles of World War I”
(Bernard Fitzsimons, Ed. London: BPC Publishing Ltd. 1973. ISBN 0-517-
130912). Last week, I checked it out again to review certain sections
concerning the German U-boat effort. While reading those sections, I
happened to re-read the section by Patrick Kennedy which deals with
the Battle of Dogger Bank. Since I’ve posted messages dealing with
Tsushima, Coronel and the Falklands, and Jutland, this section seemed to
fit in admirably. As always, questions and comments are welcome.
Take care, Ed.

Edward Wittenberg
ewitten507@aol.com

Dogger Bank: Clash of the Battle Cruisers

January 24, 1915 saw the largest naval clash of the
war up to that date: four German battle-cruisers
pitted against five British ones. The conflict was
confused, and poor British signalling was mainly
responsible for the major elements of the German
squadron slipping away, leaving only the hybrid
battle-cruiser Blucher to be finally crushed by the
storm of British fire. In the battle, however, points of
enormous importance for future naval operations had
become apparent. Signalling had to be improved,
gunnery, in the British vessels particularly, needed
drastic attention, armour protection for the ships’
vitals needed strengthening and a way of stopping
flash travelling down to the magazines needed
devising. These lessons were apparent to both
admiralties, but whether or not the lessons had been
learnt fully would have to wait till the next clash.

Shortly before noon on January 23, 1915, Winston Churchill
returned to his room at the Admiralty after a long talk with Admiral
Fisher, who was laid up in bed with a cold. Hardly had he sat down,
Churchill recounts, when Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson strode hurriedly into
the room with a ‘glow in his eye’ and baldly announced: ~First Lord,
those fellows are coming out again.’ The fellows referred to were of
course the Germans, and the decisions and orders which followed from
this announcement were to lead to the greatest clash in the North Sea
since the war began.

The movements had begun only a short while earlier at 1025 hours
that same morning when Rear-Admiral Hipper, resting with his
battle-cruisers off Wilhelmshaven, received orders to take them, together
with some cruisers and destroyers, and to sweep into the Dogger Bank
area that night. The German intentions were not very clear but it was
hoped to disrupt the British fishing fleet there and to sink a few of
their escorts. Moreover, the report of British scouting operations in that
area, brought in by a German seaplane on the 19th, had aroused
curiosity at the German admiralty and also the anticipation that some
light forces of the British might be caught unawares by a swift.
one-day reconnaissance mission from Wilhelmshaven. Such a sweep was
in any case well in line with the Kaiser’s recent decision that the
battle-cruisers could sortie to harass the British, although a major fleet
action was still considered to be undesirable.

It was the efficiency of its Intelligence services which enabled the
Royal Navy to learn so very quickly about the planned German operation
and to take steps to meet. it. The chance recovery by the Russians in
August 1914 of the German navy’s cipher signal books and squared
reference charts from the wrecked cruiser Magdeburg had been a boon
to the British deciphering team, who, from then on, were able to decode
the Germans’ intercepted wireless messages. In addition, the
establishment of radio direction-finder stations along the east coast of
England enabled the Admiralty to pinpoint the position of German
vessels when they used their radios. Thus Churchill had news of the
German plans and the probable size of their forces only one hour and a
half after Hipper had received his instructions.

Shortly after Hipper’s ships slid out of the Jade estuary on the
evening of January 23, a variety of British squadrons emerged from
harbour and also proceeded towards the Dogger Bank.

Rear-Admiral Hipper’s force consisted of the 1st and 2nd Scouting
Groups and two flotillas of destroyers. The 1st Scouting Group had to
sail without the Von der Tann, which was in dockyard hands, and
therefore was composed of four battle-cruisers, Seydlitz, Hipper’s
flagship, Moltke, Derfflinger and Blucher. The first three vessels were
similar, each carrying ten 11-inch guns, (the Derfflinger had eight
12-inch guns), adequately armoured and able to steam at about 25/26
knots. The Blucher however was an older, large armoured cruiser rather
than a battle-cruiser. Her armour, main armament and displacement were
consequently all much smaller than that of the rest of her squadron.
Most important of all, her maximum speed was some 2/3 knots less than
theirs and this tended either to slow down the whole squadron when in
action or to cause the Blucher to gradually fall behind. Tactically she
was a liability to the squadron.

The 2nd Scouting Group consisted of’ the four light cruisers
Stralsund, Rostock, Kolberg, and Graudenz, all of which carried twelve
4.1-inch guns. These were accompanied by 18 destroyers.

In numbers the balance of strength clearly lay with the British.
but in gun-power there was less of a discrepancy since the German
11-inch gun was superior to the British 12-inch gun. Hipper’s main
opponents were to be Vice-Admiral Beatty’s powerful battle-cruisers
Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand and Indomitable, all based on
Rosyth. Although the last two ships were smaller and not as well
armoured as their German opposite numbers and the Indomitable,
constructed in 1908. was slightly slower, they both carried eight 12-inch
guns as main armament. Moreover the Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal
were faster than Hipper’s squadron and each carried the powerful
13.5-inch guns, although the British battle-cruisers carried less armour
than Hipper’s three big ships.

Administrative and tactical reasons had caused the British
battle-cruisers to be divided into a fast and a slow division. Thus
Beatty directly controlled the 1st Battle-Cruiser Squadron which
included the Lion (his flagship), Tiger and Princess Royal, while
Rear-Admiral Moore, his Second-in-Command. directed the newly-formed
2nd Battle-Cruiser Squadron, which consisted of the New Zealand
(Moore’s flagship)and Indomitable – though remaining under Beatty’s
control throughout. These ships were accompanied from Rosyth by
Commodore Goodenough’s 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, consisting of
Southampton, Birmingham, Nottingham and Lowestoft, all carrying eight
or nine 6-inch guns.

Other British forces were also on the move on the evening of the
23rd. As soon as the Admiralty had received the news of an imminent
German sweep, Wilson and Vice-Admiral Oliver (the Chief of Admiralty
War Staff) had worked out in Churchill’s office the most likely position
for an interception. With professional expertise they ordered Beatty to
be at a point about 30 miles north of the Dogger Bank at 0700 hours on
the 24th and also ordered Commodore Tyrwhitt with his three light
cruisers Arethusa (his flagship), Aurora and Undaunted, together with
35 destroyers, out of Harwich, to join Beatty there and provide the
escort for the battle-cruisers.