Taken from “Warships and Sea Battles of World War I” (Bernard
Fitzsimons, Ed. London: BPC Publishing Ltd. 1973. ISBN 0-517-130912).

Edward Wittenberg
ewitten507@aol.com

Strict radio silence

Although the Admiralty was almost certain that only the German
battle-cruisers would come out and that their cartographical calculations
were correct, they were still not inclined to take chances. The seven
pre-dreadnought battleships of Vice-Admiral Bradford’s 3rd Battle
Squadron, also based on Rosyth, accompanied by Rear-Admiral
Pakenham’s 3rd Cruiser Squadron, were ordered to a position about 40
miles north-west of Beatty, to intercept Hipper if he came by a more
northerly route or to support the British battle-cruisers if they got into
trouble. Much further south, Commodore Keyes was moving from Harwich
to the Heligoland Bight in the hope of intercepting and torpedoing any
German vessels with his “Overseas” squadron of Firedrake, Lurcher and
four submarines.

Finally, Admiral Jellicoe, resting at Scapa Flow with the main
battleship force of the Grand Fleet, cleared harbour at 2100 hours on
the 23rd with three battleship squadrons, covered by three cruiser
squadrons and 28 destroyers. Further ahead of him ranged Rear-Admiral
Napier’s 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron. These forces, while covering the
Scottish coast in the early stages of their cruise, were to sweep down
to the rendezvous with Bradford’s vessels by mid-morning.

During the night the various squadrons picked their way between
the minefields (Beatty’s force actually dashing through an area which
was reportedly mined) and approached the Dogger Bank from different
directions. The British ships kept a strict radio silence while the
occasional German wireless traffic intercepted by the D/F stations
continued to confirm the Admiralty’s belief that something was afoot on
the German side. The weather was calm and the sea still. Apart from
Tyrwhitt’s forces, which were a little delayed by fog at Harwich, all the
British ships appeared to be moving according to schedule and Churchill
was thrilled with the idea of “a beast of prey moving stealthily forward
hour by hour into the trap”.

At 0700 hours on the 24th Beatty, with Goodenough’s cruisers
steaming parallel on his port beam, reached the rendezvous area. Ten
minutes later, with the dawn breaking to give almost perfect visibility,
the Arethusa with seven new ‘M’ class destroyers of the Harwich force
were sighted straight ahead. The Aurora, Undaunted and the rest of the
destroyers were then some 13 miles astern, delayed because of the early
fog.

It was this latter group, still south of the rendezvous point,
which first clashed with Hipper’s forces. The Aurora leading the 1st
Destroyer Flotilla, sighted a three-funnelled cruiser and four destroyers
on her starboard bow shortly after 0700 hours and moved closer to
challenge. expecting to meet up with Tyrwhitt’s flotilla again. The
cruiser was, in fact, the Kolberg, which was guarding the port flank of
Hipper’s battle-cruisers, then steaming around the north side of the
Dogger Bank. Opening fire on the Aurora at 0715 hours the Kolberg
managed to get in three quick hits although they did little damage.
Recovering from this surprise, the Aurora began to return the fire and
soon scored a hit on the Kolberg’s forebridge, which killed two men and
forced her to turn away. The Aurora, proceeding north-eastwards again
and joined by Undaunted’s flotilla, soon sighted more German warships
to starboard and then, at about 0730 hours, saw the Southampton’s
shape at the head of Goodenough’s squadron, looming out of the dusk to
the north. Some five miles behind the Southampton steamed Beatty’s five
battle-cruisers.

Confident. that he was about to surprise a weaker enemy, Beatty
had ordered his battle-cruisers to steer SSE towards the sounds and
flashes of the guns and to increase speed to 22 knots, while sending
the cruisers on ahead. Hipper, on the other hand, had not expected an
immediate encounter and therefore had to act warily in case he came up
against the Grand Fleet or a part of it. The engagement with the Aurora
to the westward was soon followed by sightings of more destroyers and
Goodenough’s squadron, and then by the sight of heavy smoke further
north. Although not greatly increasing his speed, Hipper therefore
ordered an almost complete turn so that his forces were steaming
south-eastwards by 0740 hours. By that time the heavy smoke to the
north-west had resolved itself into the five British battle-cruisers,
which were steadily working themselves up to full speed.

Hipper, suddenly aware of his critical position 170 miles from
Heligoland without any hope of support from the High Seas Fleet,
ordered his destroyers to push on ahead and his main force to increase
speed to 23 knots, which was Blucher’s maximum. The German
battle-cruiser squadron then steered south-easterly in line ahead
formation, led by Seydlitz with Moltke, Derfflinger and Blucher following
in that order. Beatty, who had originally hoped to get to the Germans’
leeward (the port side, in this instance) before engaging and thus avoid
his own smoke as well as eventually cutting off the Germans from their
base, was forced by Hipper’s manoeuvre to follow on the starboard and
fear of mines being dropped from the enemy’s stern, and of loss of time,
now prevented his battle-cruisers from switching over to port.

As the chase developed, the respective admiralties were being
acquainted with the situation. Churchill, Fisher, Wilson and Oliver,
gathered together in the War Room of the Admiralty, could do nothing
but wait and hope as confused messages came flooding in. In the middle
of the North Sea and about 140 miles NNW of the action, Jellicoe’s great
fleet of ships swung slightly more to starboard to intercept if the
German battle-cruisers turned north. Further south, Vice-Admiral
Bradford’s force, cruising north of the Dogger Bank and joined by the
2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, was ordered to steer eastwards to cut off
Hipper if he fled to the north-east. The German admiralty, which first
received the news of Seydlitz’s sighting at about 0750 hours, ordered all
ships at Wilhelmshaven to get up steam and to assemble in the Schillig
Roads, but having left it so late it would be many hours before they
could join in the battle.