Perhaps we should bear in mind that war has been analyzed in two different
modes.

The older mode was that expressed by Clausewitz, that ‘war is the extension
of politics’. A Clausewitz-esque analysis would say that you set your war
aims in accord with your political wishes and, when these are achieved, you
Declare a Victory and go home.

The slightly newer style was that of Napoleon, best exemplified in the
writings of Jomini, one of his staff officers. Napoleon advocated war aims
be set as the destruction of the enemy’s will to resist, regardless of
political realities. Once this destruction of the will to resist was
accomplished, peace terms could be nasty or nice as political realities
dictated.

The US military has traditionally followed Jomini; the US political
establishment has traditionally followed Clausewitz. This dichotomy is
normal in Western countries. In both World Wars, the political
establishment adopted Jominian war aims (‘squeeze them ’til the pips
squeak’, shrieked Lloyd George, ‘and Hang the Kaiser!’, ‘unconditional
surrender’ intoned FDR). But, in Korea, for instance, the Western Alliance
strongly argued for Clausewitzian war aims, and, hence, the clearance of
South Korea and the status quo ante bellum was regarded as sufficient. No
one bothered to apprise GA MacArthur of the change, and, so, he ended up
making a fool of himself, believing that the two World Wars had marked a
complete change in American and European political thought. Similarly, in
the Viet-Nam imbroglio, the political establishment early and firmly
established Clausewitzian war aims, in so far as they established ANY war
aims, and only ‘bomb ’em back to the Stone Age’ LeMay was a significant
dissenting voice. (Well, GEN Harold K Johnson as well, but he didn’t speak
up at the time, so he doesn’t count.)

In the Persian Gulf, the Alliance early and firmly adopted a Clausewitzian
policy, that is, that the clearance of Kuwait was the war aim and that the
War would stop when that was accomplished. And so it did.

It really is a bit more complex than simply ‘the military wanted to fight
on and the politicians didn’t’. Most senior officers understood this;
Schwartzkopf didn’t, and it cost him a shot at a fifth star.

Marc

msmall@roanoke.infi.net FAX: +540/343-7315
Cha robh bas fir gun ghras fir!