Night Rules – “The Price of Darkness”

January 18th, 2009

In NAVAL ACTION, I’ve got basically a longrange low probability die
roll for radar, and a higher probability but shorter range die roll
for (Japanese) visual sighting. The ranges were much shorter at
night, of course, especially for initial contact, unless radar was
able to make contact out at sea, away from landform interference.

With closure at 8,000 yds (48 knots) per 5 minute turn, things happen
… quickly.

What no manual system can handle … simply … are ships’
*individual* actions, once action is joined … if control is
lost of the formation. The only Guadalcanal battle the Japanese
really lost control in was the First Battle of Guadalcanal.
Even in Esperance, they withdrew in formation. Even with our
superior radio communications, we lost control much more readily.
Superior training and discipline characterized the Japanese
performance.

There is also the question of mistaken recognition and friendly fire.

There are so many variables in “realistic” night combat, they
would require their own rulebook.

Probably the best American night-time performance, for its time of
the war, was Empress Augusta Bay (off Bougainville in Nov43) …
at least talking about cruiser actions. Our destroyers were
already starting to win consistently.

Note also in that battle how the comparatively long ranges and
wily American formation maneuvering threw off the salvoes of
Japanese “Long Lance” torpedoes, much as at Java Sea in early 1942.
Of course, travelling with “31 Knot Burke” — high speed — would
also lessen the chance of getting hit.

Lou Coatney, www.wiu.edu/users/mslrc/

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