> I think it’s the other way round – confusion typically resulted in higher
> losses.

That would mean that confusion was first (egg and hen thing, kinda), but it
usually wasn’t: at Tassafaronga, everything was quite okay until torpedoes
struck home; at First Guadalcanal (or third Savo…), the Allied formation was
also pretty much intact until losses from gunfire and torpedoes struck the
column and forced ships out of the line. At Cape Esperance, the confusion did
not create losses (Except for Duncan. She may be counted as a victim of
confusion, but less of Scott’s than of her own skipper’s.). At Savo,
the forces
were pretty much intact until Mikawa struck, and a Second Guadalcanal, Lee’s
line not only was intact until battle but indeed performed admirably well.

> And those Allied admirals who were aware of that problem tried to keep a
> tight
> rein (e.g., tying the destroyers to the cruisers, holding fire to have more
> time sorting out enemies and friends) whose inflexibility could also
> ultimately
> result in higher losses than on the Japanese side, but did prevent
piecemeal
> destruction.
>
> On the Japanese side, even in those cases where they were surprised (Cape
> Esperance, Tassafaronga), their doctrine and experience resulted in a
> coherent
> reaction and retreat, combined with a response that ranged from
reasonably to
> outstandingly effective. All the accounts that mention
communications agree
> that during the hot periods of many of these battles, TBS (Talk Between
> Ships)
> radio on the US side was virtually useless due to everybody
talking at once.
> If that’s not confusion…

Cape Esperance certainly was an example for good conduct durig a night battle,
but nevertheless, cohesion within the force was lost and Admiral Goto could as
well have remained at home, for he was unable to decide what to do.
The actions
of his vessels were the responsibilities of each individual officer, much like
at Guadalcanal 1, and Savo Island.

> It should be noted though that Abe had spent the previous seven (twelve?)
> hours moving blindly under the squall that covered his approach to
> Guadalcanal. Hara seems to rate the precision of the Japanese
> maneuvering during that time quite highly, even though the van destroyers
> slipped out of position. There is no doubt though that the First Battle
> of Guadalcanal was the one where both sides were confused. (But then,
> the Japanese had the additional disadvantage of their two big ships not
> being ready for a naval engagement.) In the Second Battle of Guadalcanal,
> the US task force was so small and the fighting power so concentrated that
> cohesion arguably played a smaller role there. Virtually all of the damage
> done to the Japanese in that battle was due to a single ship. Admiral Lee
> certainly does not come across as confused. 🙂

He certainly does not. His performance was probably the best of any Admiral
during the campaign, together with Mikawa’s at Savo.
I’m still unsure about Tanaka at Tassafaronga, partially because I do no know
what IJN doctrine said. Said simply, all Tanaka did was order a
torpedo attack.
The devastating effect was due to Captain Sato’s brilliant conduct.
I’ve ordered
Crenshaw’s Battle of Tassafaronga lately, I hope he will clear some of the
questions I have.
On Abe and Hara, quite right, I forgot (shortly…) why Abe’s
formation was out
of order.

Tim Lanzendoerfer | “I have just taken on a great
Amateur Naval Historian | responsibility. I will do my
Email: BWV_Wiesbaden@t-online.de | utmost to meet it” – Nimitz
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The United States Navy in the Pacific War 1941 – 1945
http://www.microworks.net/pacific
Last Updated: 7th February 1998
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