>Please consider the following quotation. I original proferred it to the
>Marhst-l almost a month ago, but no body bit. I’m hoping the Mahan list
>might prove to be more fruitful ground.
>
>”The tests to which the Admirals in high command are subjected during a
>naval engagement are far more searching that those of Generals in a land
>battle. The Admiral actually leads the Fleet in person and is probably
>under as severe fire and in as great danger as any man in it; a General,
>whatever his wishes, has no choice but to remain in his headquarters in
>complete tranquillity, ten, fifteen, or even twenty miles away.

I think it would be news to any of the operational leaders in any large
surface engagement that they had very much control of anything. The night
battles off Guadalcanal were the essence of chaos: I think you could say
much the same about the carrier engagements. In one regard all military
action has changed in modern times: larger forces and more powerful arms
have forced dispersion of force and decentralization of control.
Subordinates are MUCH more important now than in previous eras. (This goes
down to the level of junior officers and noncoms.) The brass don’t really
like this of course. Consequently we and other militaries are spending
billions to restore a degree of “control” over operations to higher echelons
via sophisticated communication.

I do take issue with the relative level of lethality between the services.
Division and corps commanders during WWII were frequently under fire. It is
true that we did not lose very many top generals during the war, but I think
you’d find the list of KIA in the Wehrmacht quite large.

This may not be true in contemporary affairs. It did not miss the notice of
soldiers in Vietnam that no Generals and only a handful of Colonels were
KIA. (A few died in noncombat helicopter crashes). Must say that the
“peaceniks” had a point when they claimed that the top officers of SAC would
have been probably the safest people in the US had a general nuclear war
broke out. It’s been quite a change from the day when someone like Alexander
was EXPECTED to be in battle. As I recall, all of Napoleon’s Marshalls were
wounded at one time or another. The US Civil War was a deathtrap for general
officers, particularly Confederates.

One thing that bothered me about Desert Storm is the notion that it is
possible to engage in a large military action and suffer almost no
casualties. I feel to the tip of my toes that that episode was unique. In a
way I hope so. If governments come to the conclusions that they can strike
their enemies without danger of losss … one removes a powerful barrier
from striking enemies. That could be dangerous.
Eric Bergerud, 531 Kains Ave, Albany CA 94706, 510-525-0930