Bywater, 30’s game, no treaty, carriers, etc.
January 2nd, 2009 From
>Date: Wed, 10 Sep 1997 17:53:05 -0600
>From: Brooks A Rowlett
>Reply-To: brooksar@indy.net
>Organization: None whatsoever
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>To: “Louis R. Coatney”
>CC: consim-l@listserv.uni-c.dk, mahan@microwrks.com,
> “Jim O’Neil”
>Subject: Re: Bywater, 30’s game, no treaty, carriers, etc.
>Precendence: bulk
>Sender: mahan-owner@microworks.net
>
>A few thoughts on this thread.
>
>1. Of course, while there was no ‘commercial’ game as such other than
>perhaps miniatures games, there was a series of games done where it
>counted: The United States Naval War College. Whether inspired by
>Bywater’s strategic vision or not, it is clear that the ultimate
>strategy of the US for conducting a Pacific Ocean war against Japan was
>heavily influence by the studies and strategic map games conducted
>there. For references see Miller’s superb WAR PLAN ORANGE and the
>equally superb THE BLUE SWORD by Michael Vlahos. For more on Bywater,
>of course, thre reference is William Honan’s biographical books, BYWATER
>in the UK edition, and (with an additional chapter) THE MAN WHO INVENTED
>PEARL HARBOR ( I >think>
>2. The points on lack of commercial game concepts (how old is RISK?)
>that could model a strategic campaign, or any of the basic mechanics we
>would have in our toolbox today, are well taken. In terms of the WWII
>operations research contributions, I believe I recall that the hexagon
>grid, for example, was introduced into commercial wargames by Charles
>Roberts only after he visited the Air Force pet think tank, the RAND
>corporation and discovered them in use there.
>
>3. The Washington Treaty was not the only contributor to the conversion
>of LEXINGTON and SARATOGA into carriers. US planners were not entirely
>the big gun obsessive-compulsives that Mitchell and later writers have
>claimed them to be. In fact the General Board, the concept planning
>body of the US Navy in this period, had ordered design studies of
>carriers of essentially the size of the LEXINGTON even before the call
>for the Naval Conference; which had resulted in studies of conversion of
>two of the battlecruisers so as to conserve money and materials. So it
>is just as plausible as the USN constructing all 6 LEXINGTON’s as
>battlecruisers that they might have constructed in addition, 2 carriers
>essentially similar to what we in fact got, or alternatley to have built
>four vessels as battlecruisers and 2 as carriers. In fact my own set of
>hypothetical Orders of Battle for Great Pacific ‘guerres imaginaires’
>has variations for all of these options.
>
>See Friedman US AIRCRAFT CARRIERS: AN ILLUSTRATED DESIGN HISTORY plus an
>earlier article on the LEXINGTON’s in WARSHIP QUARTERLY) from Conway.
>RObert C Stern’s THE LEXINGTON CLASS CARRIERS discusses this evolution
>of design as well, and also gives parameters of a design study of
>converting OMAHA class scout cruisers into carriers.
>
>Brooks A Rowlett
>brooksar@indy.net